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President Prof. Carles Sierra
Secretary Prof. Vicente Botti
Member Prof. Peter McBurney
Member Prof. Paulo Novais
Member Prof. Pavlos Moraitis
Day of the defense: 8th February 2013
ii
Abstract
Multi-agent systems (MAS) are distributed systems where autonomous entities
called agents, either human or software, pursue their own goals. The MAS paradigm
has been proposed as the appropriate modeling approach for the deployment of ap-
plications like electronic commerce, multi-robot systems, security applications, and
so forth. In the MAS community, the vision of open multi-agent system, where het-
erogeneous agents can enter and leave the system dynamically, has gained strength
as a potentially interesting modeling paradigm due to its conceptual relation with
technologies like world wide web, grid computing, and virtual organizations. Given
the heterogeneity and agent’s self-interest, conflict is a candidate phenomenon to
arise in multi-agent systems.
In the last few years, the term agreement technologies has been used to address
all the mechanisms that, directly or indirectly, promote the resolution of conflicts in
computational systems like multi-agent systems. Among agreement technologies,
automated negotiation is proposed as one key mechanism in conflict resolution due
to its analogous use in human conflict resolution. Automated negotiation consists
of an automated exchange of proposals carried out by software agents on behalf of
their users. The final goal is the achievement of an agreement with all the involved
parts.
Despite being studied by scholars in Artificial Intelligence for several years,
several problems have not been addressed by the scientific community yet. The
main objective of this thesis is proposing negotiation models for complex scenar-
ios where the complexity may stem from (i) limited computational capabilities or
(ii) the necessity to accommodate the preferences of multiple individuales. In the
first part of the thesis we propose a bilateral negotiation model for the problem
of negotiation in Ambient Intelligence (AmI), a domain with a special emphasis
iii
on computational efficiency due to the limited capability of AmI devices. In the
second part of the thesis we propose several negotiation models for agent-based
negotiation teams. A negotiation team is a group of individuals that acts together
as single negotiation party due to its common interests in the negotiation at hand.
The complexity of negotiation teams resides in the fact that despite having com-
mon interests, intra-team conflict is also present. As far as we are concerned, the
topic of negotiation teams in MAS is introduced with this thesis.
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Resumen
Los sistemas multi-agente (SMA) son sistemas distribuidos donde entidades autó-
nomas llamadas agentes, ya sean humanos o software, persiguen sus propios obje-
tivos. El paradigma de SMA ha sido propuesto como la aproximación de modelo
apropiada para aplicaciones como el comercio electrónico, los sistemas multi-robot,
aplicaciones de seguridad, etc. En la comunidad de SMA, la visión de sistemas
multi-agente abiertos, donde agentes heterogéneos pueden entrar y salir del sis-
tema dinámicamente, ha cobrado fuerza como paradigma de modelado debido a
su relación conceptual con tecnoloǵıas como la Web, la computación grid, y las
organizaciones virtuales. Debido a la heterogeneidad de los agentes, y al hecho
de dirigirse por sus propios objetivos, el conflicto es un fenómeno candidato a
aparecer en los sistemas multi-agente.
En los últimos años, el término tecnoloǵıas del acuerdo ha sido usado para
referirse a todos aquellos mecanismos que, directa o indirectamente, promueven
la resolución de conflictos en sistemas computacionales como los sistemas multi-
agente. Entre las tecnoloǵıas del acuerdo, la negociación automática ha sido prop-
uesta como uno de los mecanismos clave en la resolución de conflictos debido a
su uso análogo en la resolución de conflictos entre humanos. La negociación au-
tomática consiste en el intercambio automático de propuestas llevado a cabo por
agentes software en nombre de sus usuarios. El objetivo final es conseguir un
acuerdo con todas las partes involucradas.
Pese a haber sido estudiada por la Inteligencia Artificial durante años, distintos
problemas todav́ıa no han sido resueltos por la comunidad cient́ıfica todav́ıa. El
principal objetivo de esta tesis es proponer modelos de negociación para escenarios
complejos donde la complejidad deriva de (i) las limitaciones computacionales o
(ii) la necesidad de representar las preferencias de múltiples individuos. En la
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primera parte de esta tesis proponemos un modelo de negociación bilateral para el
problema de las negociaciones en la Inteligencia Ambiental (AmI), un dominio con
un énfasis especial en la eficiencia computacional debido a las caracteŕısticas de los
dispositivos que podemos encontrar en el escenario. En la segunda parte de esta
tesis proponemos diversos modelos de negociación para equipos de negociación. Un
equipo de negociación es un grupo de individuos que actúa como una única parte
en el proceso de negociación debido a sus intereses comunes. La complejidad en los
equipos de negociación reside en el hecho de que, pese a tener intereses comunes,
el conflicto dentro del equipo también está presente. En lo que nos concierne, el
tema de los equipos de negociación en SMA es introducido con esta tesis.
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Resum
Els sistemes multi-agent (SMA) són sistemes distribüıts on entitats autònomes
anomenades agents, ja siguen humans o programes, persegueixen els seus propis
objectius. El paradigma de SMA ha sigut proposat com una aproximació apropi-
ada per a aplicacions com el comerç electrònic, els sistemes multi-robot, aplica-
cions de seguretat, etc. En la comunitat de SMA, la visió de sistemes multi-agents
oberts, on agents heterogenis poden entrar i eixir del sistema dinàmicament, ha
pres força com a paradigma de modelatge degut a la seua relació conceptual amb
tecnologies com la Web, la computació grid, i les organitzacions virtuals. Degut a
la heterogenëıtat dels agents, i al fet d’estar dirigits pel seus propis objectius, el
conflicte és un fenòmen candidat a aparèixer en els sistemes multi-agent.
En els darrers anys, el terme tecnologies de l’acord ha sigut usat per a referir-se
a tots aqueixos mecanismes que, directa o indirectament, promouen la resolució de
conflictes en sistemes computacionals com són els sistemes multi-agent. Entre les
tecnologies de l’acord, la negociació automàtica ha sigut proposta com a un dels
mecanismes clau en la resolució de conflictes degut al seu ús anàleg en la resolució
de conflictes entre humans. La negociació automàtica consisteix en l’intercanvi
automàtic de propostes per part d’agents software en el nom dels seus usuaris.
L’objectiu final es aconseguir un acord amb totes les parts involucrades.
Malgrat haver sigut estudiada per la Intel.ligència Artificial durant anys, diver-
sos problemes encara no han sigut resolts per la comunitat cient́ıfica. El principal
objectiu d’aquesta tesis és proposar models de negociació per a escenaris complexos
on la complexitat deriva de (i) les limitacions computacionals o (ii) la necessitat de
representar les preferències de múltiples individus. En la primera part d’aquesta
tesis proposem un model de negociació bilateral per al problema de la Intel.ligència
Ambiental (AmI), un domini amb un èmfasi especial en la eficiència computacional
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degut a les caracteŕıstiques dels dispositius que podem trobar en l’escenari. En la
segona part d’aquesta tesis proposem diversos models de negociación per a equips
de negociació. Un equip de negociació és un grup d’individus que actua com a
una única part en el procés de negociació degut als seus interessos comuns. La
complexitat en els equips de negociació resideix en el fet que, encara que tenen
interessos comuns, el conflicte dins de l’equip també està present. En allò que ens
concerneix, el tòpic dels equips de negociació en SMA és introdüıt en aquesta tesis.
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Multi-agent systems (MAS) are distributed systems where autonomous entities
called agents, either human or software, pursue their own goals in reactive, proac-
tive and social ways (1). This paradigm has been proposed as an adequate mod-
eling approach for the deployment of applications like electronic commerce (2),
multi-robot systems (3), security applications (4), and so forth. Inside the MAS
community, the vision of open multi-agent system, where heterogeneous agents
can enter and leave the system dynamically, has gained strength as a potentially
interesting modeling paradigm due to its conceptual relation with technologies like
world wide web, grid computing, and virtual organizations (5, 6). Given the het-
erogeneity and agent’s self-interest, conflict is a candidate phenomenon to arise in
multi-agent systems. In the last few years, the term agreement technologies (7, 8)
has been used to address all the mechanisms that, directly or indirectly, promote
the resolution of conflicts in computational systems like multi-agent systems.
Among agreement technologies, negotiation is proposed as one key mechanism
in conflict resolution due to its analogous use in the resolution of human conflicts.
Pruitt (9) defines negotiation as a process in which a joint decision is made by two
1
1. MOTIVATION
or more parties by verbalizing contradictory demands and then moving towards
and agreement. Classically, negotiation has been studied in the social sciences
and game theory. On the one hand, the social sciences mainly study how humans
behave and act in real negotiation processes (10). On the other hand, game theory
researchers focus on looking for optimal agreements under the assumptions of
unbounded computational resources and complete/partial information regarding
opponent’s preferences and strategies. Some of the most important theoretical
results come from game theory (e.g., the work of Nash (11), Rubinstein’s work (12),
and Binmore’s work (13)). Although game theory provides interesting theoretical
results, most of game theory’s assumptions do not hold in computer systems since
there are limitations on the information regarding players, and computational
resources are limited.
Artificial Intelligence (AI) scholars have focused on solving the problem of ne-
gotiation in computer systems. Thus, works in AI usually assume that information
regarding the opponent is usually imperfect or non-existent, and computational
resources are bounded and limited. The goal in AI has been reaching near optimal
solutions at reasonable computational costs.
The first works in negotiation from the perspective of AI are related to the
area of Negotiation Support Systems (NSS) (14, 15, 16, 17): decision support
systems that assist humans in real negotiations by providing communication in-
frastructures, predictions, strategy suggestions, and analysis tools for the avail-
able information. Nowadays, given the increasing implantation of large scale open
multi-agent systems, the number of available partners with whom one may ne-
gotiate/interact has increased exponentially. Since human negotiation across the
Internet could be extremely time consuming, automated negotiation has arisen as
a solution for large scale systems. As its name indicates, automated negotiation
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consists in autonomous software agents reaching agreementes on behalf of their
users.
Despite the fact that automated negotiation has been studied since the 90’s
decade (18, 19, 20, 21), there is still a wide range of problems whose solution has
not been treated in the literature.
On the one hand, nowadays the number of computational devices present in
our everyday life has grown considerably. The use of technology helps us to achieve
a better quality of life, to make our life easier and more comfortable. However,
due to the increasing number of devices, it is necessary that the technology itself
adapts to the needs of the user, instead of the human being the one that adapts to
technology. In that sense, Ambient Intelligence (AmI) tries to cover that necessity:
it looks to offer personalized services and provide users with easier and more effi-
cient ways to communicate and interact with other people and systems (22, 23). In
Ambient Intelligence domains, users enter and leave the system in a very dynamic
way. Applications are usually embedded in devices with very limited capabilities
like smartphones, mobile phones, PDAs, and so forth. Given the heterogeneity
of Ambient Intelligence domains, conflict may be present among users’ goals. In
that case, coordination and negotiation mechanisms are needed in order to solve
conflicting situations. Putting a special emphasis on computational efficiency of
negotiations carried out in Ambient Intelligence is of extreme importance. With
computational efficiency, we refer to factors such as the number of offers sampled
and the number of messages exchanged. We argue that most negotiation models,
even though they care about efficiency, they have not focused on the particular-
ities of Ambient Intelligence domains. The design of new computational models
for negotiation in Ambient Intelligence domains may lead to the implantation of
ubiquitous electronic commerce applications.
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On the other hand, most negotiation models have focused on scenarios that are
relatively simple compared to the scenarios that may be found in human negotia-
tions and complex electronic applications. For instance, on the one hand, a vast
majority of the negotiation models proposed in the literature are circumscribed
to bilateral processes with two single individuals. Nevertheless, negotiation pro-
cesses which only involve two single individuals hardly represent most negotiations
carried out in the real world, which entangle much more complex processes. One
of these negotiations that involve more than a single individual is negotiations
where negotiation teams participate. Negotiation teams (24, 25, 26) are groups of
two or more persons that join together as a single negotiation party because they
share a common interest which is related to the negotiation process. Negotiations
where parties are teams represent a great number of negotiations carried out in
the real world. For instance, when a company wants to sell a product line to an-
other company. It is habitual for both companies to send two negotiation teams,
one per company, composed by persons from different organizational departments.
Another scenario, involves a group of travelers that has decided to go on a travel
together and decides to negotiate a deal with a travel agent. The group of trav-
eler forms a negotiation team. As far as we are concerned, this thesis represents
the first step in automated negotiation towards providing computational models
for agent-based negotiation teams. We believe that the inclusion of agent-based
negotiation teams in multi-agent systems may make possible the design of new
social applications like electronic marketplaces for groups. In these applications,
we believe that achieving unanimity among team members is a very important
issue to be taken into account. By unanimity among team members we refer to
the fact that the final agreement should be acceptable to all of the team members.
This property avoids unexpected outcomes and creating discomfort among users
in the long run. Therefore, we consider it to be of extreme importance.
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Hence, in this thesis we pursue computational solutions for both complex sce-
narios: negotiation in Ambient Intelligence domains and agent-based negotiation
teams. This thesis has been developed under the umbrella of several research
projects in multi-agent systems. Automated negotiation, more especifically, the re-
search carried out in this thesis plays an important role in those research projects.
This thesis is developed under the framework of the following research projects
funded by the Spanish Government:
• “Agreement Technologies” Consolider-INGENIO 2010 under grant CSD2007-
00022 (Main Researcher: Carles Sierra, from 2007 to 2012). Agreement
technologies is a term coined in the last few years to refer to those tech-
nologies that allow computational entities to automatically solve conflicts.
Being used by humans so frequently, negotiation is one of the key technolo-
gies in agreement technologies. The work carried out in this thesis aims to
advance the state-of-the-art in mechanisms that are able to solve conflict
among computational entities.
• “Magentix2: A Multi-agent Platform for Open Multi-agent Systems” under
grant TIN2008-04446 (Main Researcher: Ana Garcia-Fornes, from 2008 to
2011). Magentix2 is a multi-agent platform that aims to provide support for
open systems. Open multi-agent systems are computational systems where
heterogeneous agents can enter and leave the system dynamically. In such
systems, conflict may arise due to the divergence of goals and interests shown
by heterogeneous agents. The work of this thesis aims to provide negotiation
mechanisms for Magentix2 agents.
• “Multi-agent Plan Interaction” under grant TIN2011-27652-C03-01-AR (Main
Researcher: Eva Onaindia, from 2012). In this project, we aim to analyze
processes where groups of agents aim to cooperate while having divergent
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interests. Negotiation teams are groups of agents who share a common goal
at the negotiation process. However, each team member may have different
personal goals that are possibly in conflict. Agent-based negotiation teams
are a subset of the scenarios studied by the Multi-agent Plan Interaction
project.
Additionally, this work has been also supported by “Advances on Agreement
Technologies for Computational Entities” PROMETEO/2008/051 (Main Reseacher:
Vicente Botti) funded by the Valencian Government. Moreover, the work of this
thesis could have not been possible without a 4-year FPU research grant AP2008-
00600 granted by the Spanish Government.
1.1 Objectives
As stated before, the main aim of this thesis is providing computational models
for negotiation in complex scenarios. More specifically, we focus on negotiation in
Ambient Intelligence domains and computational models for agent-based negotia-
tion teams. For that purpose, we decided to propose the following sub-goals:
1. State-of-the-art in Automated Negotiation: It is necessary to survey,
classify, and review the existing literature on automated negotiation and
related topics.
(a) Discuss the adequation of current negotiation models for Ambient In-
telligence.
(b) Discuss the state-of-the-art of negotiation teams in related topics like




2. Negotiation in Ambient Intelligence Environments: Ambient Intelli-
gence is a domain that requires special features due to the limited capabilities
of the devices that are usually employed. Even though negotiation models
in Artificial Intelligence care about computational efficiency, they have not
focused on specially limited domains as Ambient Intelligence. Therefore, it
is necessary to propose and validate a computational model for negotiation
in Ambient Intelligence.
(a) Propose a general bilateral negotiation model for Ambient Intelligence
that can be adapted to several domains.
(b) Validate the computational efficiency of the proposed mechanism: offers
sampled, and number of negotiation rounds.
(c) Validate the economic efficiency of the proposed mechanism.
3. Agent-based Negotiation Teams: As far as we are concerned, the topic
of agent-based negotiation teams is introduced in automated negotiation
with this thesis. The negotiation process is complex since not only the team
should solve the conflict with the opponent, but also the conflict that may
arise inside the team. Therefore, due to its novelty, we put a special empha-
sis on exploring this type of complex negotiation. There may be multiple
negotiation team models for the same scenario and their performance may
vary depending on several environmental factors. We aim to propose sev-
eral computational models for negotiation teams and analyze the impact of
environment conditions on team performance.
(a) Identify and analyze the workflow of tasks necessary that may help
agent-based negotiation teams to perform successfully in negotiations.
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(b) Propose and validate computational models for negotiation teams under
negotiation domains with predictable and compatible issues.
(c) Propose and validate computational models for negotiation teams under
negotiation domains with predictable and compatible and unpredictable
issues.
(d) Propose and validate computational models for negotiation teams that
are capable of guaranteeing unanimously acceptable agreements among
team members.
(e) Analyze the effect of environmental conditions on negotiation team’s
models and identify those models that work better under specific envi-
ronmental conditions.
1.2 Contributions
The specific contributions of this thesis are:
• State of the art. To achieve sub-goal 1.a we review the most important
works in automated negotiation, and more specifically in bilateral negotia-
tion. We analyze the adequateness of the different models proposed in the
literature for Ambient Intelligence, and we identify those mechanisms that
may prove more interesting for the aforementioned domain. For sub-goal
1.b, we review the literature in the social sciences and relate findings with
its computational counterpart.
• A genetic-aided bilateral negotiation model for negotiation in Am-
bient Intelligence. We propose a computational negotiation model for
bilateral negotiations carried out in Ambient Intelligence domains. The ne-
gotiation model aims to work with complex interdependent utility functions
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using computational resources as efficiently as possible. It aims to provide
solutions for sub-goals 2.a, 2.b, and 2.c.
• A general workflow of tasks for agent-based negotiation teams. We
propose a complete workflow of tasks that may help agent-based negotiation
teams to achieve success in negotiation processes. Each task is analyzed and
related to other areas in MAS. Additionally, open challenges that may arise
in the specific case of negotiation teams are highlighted. This contribution
covers 3.a and also 1.b to some extent.
• Agent-based negotiation team models: Representative, Similarity
Simple Voting, Similarity Borda Voting, and Full Unanimity Medi-
ated (and extension). The models aim to provide solutions for 3.b and 3.c
while providing different levels of unanimity regarding team decisions (i.e.,
no unanimity, majority/plurality, semi-unanimity, unanimity). Full Unanim-
ity Mediated and its extension, which guarantee unanimity regarding team
decisions, thus, cover sub-goal 3.d. The experimental evaluation of these
models under different environmental conditions covers sub-goal 3.e.
1.3 Document Structure
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. First, a state-of-the-art in
automated negotiation and negotiation teams is presented in Chapter 2. With
respect to the state-of-the-art in automated negotiation, a special emphasis is put
in bilateral models and the adequateness of such models for Ambient Intelligence
domains. The state-of-the-art regarding negotiation teams is presented from the
perspective of the social sciences, and their findings are related with the implan-
tation of negotiation teams in computer systems. Then, Chapter 3 presents our
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proposal and evaluation of a negotiation model for Ambient Intelligence domains.
The next chapter, Chapter 4, describes our proposal for a general workflow of tasks
for agent-based negotiation teams. Computational models for negotiation teams
that work in domains exclusively composed by predictable and compatible issues
among team members are presented and evaluated under different environmental
conditions in Chapter 5. The proposal of this thesis concludes in Chapter 6 with
the extension of one of our computational models to guarantee unanimously ac-
ceptable team decisions in domains composed by predictable and compatible and
unpredictable issues. Finally, we present our concluding remarks and possible fu-
ture lines of work in Chapter 7.
10
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State of the Art
2.1 Introduction to Agreement Technologies
Open multi-agent systems are distributed systems where heterogeneous agents,
with their own goals, can enter and leave the system during the life of the system
(27). For instance, we can think of an electronic commerce platform as an open
system where users, human or even automated software, acts according to its own
interests: in the case of sellers to maximize their own profits, and in the case of
buyers to acquire some goods at relatively good price.
Since agents (humans or software) have different goals, act based on their goals,
and they are heterogeneous (i.e., humans and software agents may show different
behaviors), it is feasible to find situations where an agent’s goals conflict with
other agents’ goals. If we refer ourselves to the example of electronic commerce,
the buyer may want to buy the product at a low price, while the seller may want to
maximize its revenue. In these situations, mechanisms that allow groups of agents
to coordinate, regulate their behavior, and solve conflict are needed.
Electronic commerce is not the only application where conflict may make act
11
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of presence. For instance, in the last few years grid computing (28) has emerged as
a new paradigm of computation where different entities collaborate to accomplish
several tasks. In grid computing, entities share several resources: from hardware
resources (e.g., computing nodes) to software resources (e.g., services). How should
those resources be distributed among the different tasks or users of the system?
Presumably, users want the best response time for their tasks, and resource owners
want to take the highest profit of their resources. Resource allocation is a deli-
cate matter, especially when collaboration requires cross-boundary relationships.
Software mechanisms that solve conflict in these scenarios are needed.
Even purely cooperative applications like rescue applications (29) are not alien
to conflict. In multi-robot systems for rescue applications, information is usually
distributed among the different robotic agents. Coordination among these entities
is a problem itself, which becomes more acute when agents’ opinions and informa-
tion conflict. How should these entities solve conflict and rescue as many persons
as possible while making an efficient use of the computational resources? Again,
software mechanisms are necessary to tackle conflict.
The term Agreement Technologies (7, 8) has been coined in the last few years
as an umbrella term for addressing all of those technologies that are envisioned
to collaborate, directly or indirectly, to the resolution of conflicts in software sys-
tems. Even though which works can be considered agreement technologies is ar-
guable (since the contribution to the resolution of a conflict may be indirect),
some authors distinguish between several challenges that need to be solved in the
so-called agreement technologies. In this thesis, we position ourselves with the
taxonomy/challenges introduced by Sierra et al. (8). Despite the fact that au-
tomated negotiation is the focus of this thesis, we think that it is important to
briefly describe the role of every other technology involved in agreement technolo-
gies, since it should help the reader to gain a broader view of how conflict may
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be solved in software systems. Next, we briefly describe each of the challenges
mentioned by Sierra et al.:
• Semantics: The current trend of service-oriented computing (30) has changed
the way in which complex systems are built. Nowadays, software is built by
using diverse services offered by very different providers. Given the hetero-
geneity of service providers, it is logic to think that service information is pro-
vided in different communication languages, and even using different terms
to address the same concept (i.e., different ontologies). Whenever a software
system needs to cooperate or solve a conflictive situation with other systems,
it requires of mechanisms that allow to understand other software systems
by matching and aligning ontologies and semantic concepts (31, 32, 33).
• Norms: Most distributed applications are no longer static but open, and
agents can exhibit a varied spectrum of behaviors. One possible way of
“solving” conflict is avoiding conflict, establishing mechanisms that preclude
agents of reaching a conflictive situation. Normative systems (34, 35) are
envisioned with such purpose (among others). The society of agents is regu-
lated by norms, which define which actions/states are to be punished in the
system (e.g., to avoid conflict) and which actions/states are to be rewarded
(e.g., promote actions that avoid conflict).
• Organizations: Agents usually have limited computational capabilities. There-
fore, if a complex problem needs to be solved, agents need to join together
as a group and coordinate to reach such complex goal. Agent organizations
(5, 36, 37) may be seen as large and implicit coordination mechanisms that
establish the roles to be played by agents and the interaction protocols to
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be carried out among organizational members. In this sense, agent organi-
zations may conflict by strictly defining the structure and interactions of the
group.
• Trust: Trust mechanisms (38, 39), usually used in concordance with reputa-
tion models, are devised to help agents to select whom they should interact
with. Trust is formed from one’s own past experiences with other agents.
To put it simply, positive experiences should bias one agent to collaborate
and interact with the other party, whereas negative experiences should bias
one agent to avoid interactions with the other party. Reputation is built
according to the opinion that agent societies have on individuals. Trust and
reputation mechanisms may help to reduce conflict by interacting with good
partners.
• Negotiation: Finally, the technology at core of agreement technologies is the
one that makes possible for agents to solve conflict per se. In this case, imi-
tating how humans solve conflicts, agents negotiate looking for an agreement
that is acceptable for all of the involved parties. Without this technology, it
would not be possible for agents to solve conflict, at least not in an efficient
way. Due to the fact that negotiation is the main topic of this thesis, it will
receive a thorough review in the next section.
Despite negotiation being crucial for solving conflicts, it should be highlighted
that it requires of semantics, norms, organizations, and trust to help in the resolu-
tion of conflicts. Semantics may help heterogeneous agents to form a negotiation
domain (e.g., negotiation problem) that is understandable by all of the parties
involved in the conflict situation. Then, society’s norms may be used to formally
force agents to respect established agreements. Otherwise, agents would violate
agreements whenever it suits them. Organizations establish a framework where
14
2.2 Automated Negotiation
roles and possible interaction protocols are formalized, giving room negotiations
with clear rules of interaction (e.g., negotiation protocols), and helping agents to
identify and search conflicting agents based on the information provided by roles
(e.g., sellers and buyers are classical roles in conflict). Trust and reputation may
guide agents to select negotiation opponents that are more likely to guarantee
a good service. Hence, every technology in agreement technologies collaborates
along negotiation in leading conflict situations towards good terms.
2.2 Automated Negotiation
Despite being part of a new topic like agreement technologies, automated negotia-
tion has been studied by scholars for a few years. Negotiation can be defined as a
process in which a joint decision is made by two or more parties. The parties first
verbalize contradictory demands and then move towards agreement by a process
of concession-making or search for new alternatives (9). Analogously, automated
negotiation consists of an automated search process for an agreement between two
or more software parties.
Two different research trends can be distinguished in automated negotiation
models: game-theoretic models and heuristic models. Since the decade of the 50’s,
automated negotiation has been studied in game theory. Game theory researchers
focus on reaching optimal solutions under assumptions of unbounded computa-
tional resources, complete/partial information regarding the strategies and prefer-
ences of other parties. Some of the most important theoretical results come from
game theory, like the work of Nash (11), Rubinstein (12), Binmore (13), and more
recent studies like Fatima et al. (40) and Serrano et al. (41). Although game
theory studies are interesting from a theoretical point of view, most of them make
strong assumptions that may not hold in real applications. For instance, compu-
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tational resources are of extreme importance for agents since they may be scarce
and shared among different tasks. Thus, negotiation should not always assume un-
bounded computational resources. Additionally, since agents are heterogeneous,
not all of the agents know the same strategies. Identifying which strategies are
known by each agent may be a hard task that can only be successful after several
negotiations. The same goes for the knowledge regarding the opponents’ prefer-
ences, reservations values, and so forth. Hence, models that tackle uncertainty
and limit the use of computational resources are mandatory for some situations.
Heuristic models tackle the problem mentioned above. They do not calculate
the optimum agreement, but they obtain results that aim to be as close as possi-
ble to the optimum. Heuristic models assume imperfect knowledge regarding the
opponent and the environment, and aim to be computationally tractable while ob-
taining good results. The work carried out in this present thesis can be classified
into this category of models. The reader is assumed to have some working knowl-
edge on heuristic models for automated negotiation. In other case, the reading of
several introductory texts and reviews like (2, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46) is recommended.
The amount of literature in automated negotiation is vast and immense, ranging
from bilateral negotiations, to multi-party negotiations. An extensive review of all
of the problems in automated negotiation would be an almost non-feasible task.
As a part of this thesis, we decided to work in negotiation models for Ambient
Intelligence domains. Thus, in this state-of-the-art we have mainly focused on
identifying the adequateness of the most important negotiation models to Ambient
Intelligence. Following, we discuss some of the most important works in the area
of automated negotiation and bilateral negotiation.
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2.2.1 Automated Negotiation and Ambient Intelligence
Nowadays, the number of computational devices present in our everyday life has
grown considerably. The use of technology helps us to achieve a better quality of
life, to make our life easier and more comfortable. However, due to the increasing
number of devices, it is necessary that the technology itself adapts to the needs
of the user, instead of the human being the one that adapts to technology. In
that sense, Ambient Intelligence (AmI) tries to cover that necessity: it looks to
offer personalized services and provide users with easier and more efficient ways
to communicate and interact with other people and systems (22, 23).
Agent technology has been appointed as a proper technology for the support of
AmI solutions (22, 47, 48). In fact, agents show interesting characteristics for AmI
environments since they are reactive, proactive and social (1). Firstly, reactiveness
allows agents to change their behavior according to some new conditions in the
AmI environment (new users, new services, etc.). Secondly, pro-activeness makes
it possible for agents to act autonomously according to the user’s goals, which
results in a smooth and non-intrusive interaction with the AmI user. And lastly,
the agent’s social behavior allows several heterogeneous entities to cooperate and
offer new complex services to the AmI user.
Conflict situations are not alien to AmI applications. For instance, shopping
malls may be converted into ubiquitous environments where several vendors offer
their products to passing shoppers (49, 50). In many cases, the shoppers know
what they want but do not have time to check every shop that offers such products.
A possible way of enhancing the customer experience is to automatically negotiate
with all of the vendors. A list with the best agreements may be presented to the
user through his mobile device. This way, the user does not have to check every
possible shop since his mobile device has negotiated with every shop taking into
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account the user preferences. Nevertheless, there are also benefits for vendors since
automated negotiation allows a more flexible commerce than classic e-commerce.
For instance, they may negotiate issues such as price, payment method, discounts,
and dispatch dates, which is what often happens in traditional non-electronic
commerce. Flexibility in e-commerce may result in client loyalty since the vendor
is able to adapt as much as possible to the client preferences. Therefore, automated
negotiation is a proper technology for e-commerce-based AmI applications such as
shopping malls.
If executed in environments with limited capabilities like Ambient Intelligence
domains (i.e., limited CPU, limited bandwith, energy saving necessities, etc.), ne-
gotiation models need new requirements that may have been overlooked in the
literature. Those requirements are limiting the number of interactions with op-
ponents (i.e., number of messages sent), using the lesser CPU the better (i.e.,
reducing the number of offers sampled, efficient learning mechanisms, etc.), and
reducing the use of memory (also related with the number of offers sampled). Ad-
ditionally, economic requirements (e.g., utility of the final agreement) should not
be forgotten. As far as we are concerned, classic automated negotiation models
have not explicitly concentrated on fulfilling all of these requirements at once.
2.2.2 Concession Strategies
The classic view of artificial intelligence with respect to negotiation in incomplete
information settings is that agents need to eventually concede in order to reach an
agreement (18, 51, 52). However, agents can concede in very different magnitudes
and in different rounds of the negotiation. Concession strategies determine how
the agents concede and when these concessions are carried out.
The most influential work regarding concession strategies is, perhaps, the work
of Faratin et al. (18). The authors proposed concession strategies that are a mix
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of different families of concession tactics. The authors divide concession tactics
into three different families:
• Time-dependent tactics: These tactics take into account the remaining time
in the negotiation to carry out concessions. In this family, we can distin-
guish between linear tactics, boulware tactics, and conceder tactics. On the
one hand, linear tactics carry out the same amount concession at each ne-
gotiation round until the reservation value is reached. On the other hand,
conceder tactics conceder very rapidly towards the reservation value in the
first interactions, whereas boulware tactics concede very slowly during the
first negotiation rounds, but it concedes faster as the negotiation process
approaches the deadline.
• Behavior-dependent tactics: In the case of behavior-dependent tactics, the
concession carried out by the agent depends on the negotiation movements
performed by the opponent in the previous rounds. The classic tactic in
this family is tit-for-tat, which mimics the concession carried out by the
opponent in the previous round. Other variants of tit-for-tat include random
absolute tit-for-tat, which performs the absolute concession carried out by
the opponent in the last offer plus/minus a small deviation, and averaged
tit-for-tat which takes the window of γ past opponent offers and carries out
the average concession carried out by the opponent.
• Resource-dependent tactics: This family of tactics computes concession based
on the scarceness of a resource in the environment and resource consump-
tion (i.e., time, product quantity, messages, etc). In general, the scarcer
the resource, the more eager should be the agent to maintain/obtain such
resource.
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Another classic concession based model for bilateral multi-issue negotiations
is the Agent Based Market Place (ABMP) framework proposed by Jonker et al.
(21, 53). ABMP is a negotiation framework, based on additive utility functions,
where proposed bids are concessions to previous bids. The amount of concession
is regulated by the concession factor (i.e., reservation utility), the negotiation
speed, the acceptable utility gap (the maximal difference between the target utility
and the utility of an offer that is acceptable), and the impatience factor, which
governs the probability of the agent leaving the negotiation process. Additionally,
the framework includes other remarkable characteristics such as the possibility of
sharing preference information with the other party, and guessing heuristics that
allows agents to determine the ranking of issues and issue values based on the bid
history.
2.2.3 Similarity Mechanisms in Negotiation
One of the traditional mechanisms proposed in the literature for solving conflicts
is the use of similarity mechanisms. They can be used to solve a current conflict
based on solutions given to previous conflicts or as mechanisms that implicitly
approximate offers to opponents’ preferences. Basically, the two similarity mecha-
nisms more widely used are Case Based Reasoning (54, 55) and similarity heuristics
(56, 57).
Sycara proposed a mediator that uses case based reasoning for solving conflicts
in the labor domain (i.e., PERSUADER) (14, 15, 16). PERSUADER takes as
input a set of conflicting goals and outputs an agreed plan of actions. The system
keeps track of the agreements found in past negotiations and, once a new conflict
situation is present, it looks for the most similar past situation. The retrieved
agreement is adapted to the present conflict situation, since the rationale behind
this heuristic is that similar conflict situations should yield similar solutions.
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Another popular use of similarity mechanisms is implicitly approximating one’s
own proposals to the preferences of the opponent. This is usually carried out by
means of similarity heuristics that look for trade-offs. A trade-off consists in decre-
menting the benefit obtained from some negotiations issues that are not important
for us but are important of the other agent, in order to get the decremented benefit
as an equivalent increase in the benefit obtained by other issues that are important
for us but are not important for the other agent. Faratin et al.(56) introduced the
use of similarity heuristics in bilateral multi-issue negotiations to compute simi-
larity between pairs of offers. Given a certain utility u demanded by one of the
agents, this agent proposes the offer with utility u that is the most similar to the
previous offer proposed by the opponent. The idea behind this heuristic is that
the more similar the offer is to the previous opponent offer, the more acceptable
it is for the opponent. For computing the similarity between two offers, a fuzzy
similarity criterion between issue values. The main drawback of fuzzy similarity
heuristics is that they require domain knowledge regarding the similarity between
issue values for the opponent.
The use of similarity heuristics was reintroduced again by Lai et al (57). In this
work, a bilateral negotiation protocol for multi-issue negotiations, where agents are
capable of sending up to k different offers per round, is presented. The k offers sent
by agents are selected from the iso-utility curve, which contains all of the offers
with a certain utility. The offer that is selected is the one that is the most similar
to the previous opponent offer that reported the most utility. The other k − 1
offers are selected randomly from the iso-utility curve. In this case, the similarity
heuristic employed is the Euclidean distance. As a similarity measure, Euclidean
distance may be less powerful than fuzzy similarity, but it has the advantage of
being more general and not requiring domain knowledge.
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2.2.4 Bayesian Learning in Negotiation
Bayesian learning is a probabilistic learning method based on Bayes’ theorem (58).
Given a certain set of hypothesis and some evidence, Bayesian learning attempts
to compute the probability that a certain hypothesis is true after observing the ev-
idence. Bayes is not only a general learning technique for problems where no prior
information may be available, but it is also provides mechanisms for updating a
model as new information becomes available. Negotiation is a process where infor-
mation is revealed gradually as the process advances. Therefore, new information
needs to be incorporated into agents’ negotiation models. This characteristic is
what makes Bayesian learning a widely used learning mechanism in automated
negotiation.
When reviewing the use of Bayesian learning in negotiation, one cannot forget
about the seminal work of Zeng and Sycara (59). In this article, the authors argue
about the benefits of using Bayesian models in negotiation. They study a bilateral
negotiation case where the buyer attempts to learn the reservation price of a seller
by updating its beliefs with Bayesian learning. Despite the fact that it introduces
the use of Bayesian learning in negotiation, the applicability of the article is limited
since it only focuses on single issue models.
Bayesian classifiers have been used to model the preferences of negotiating
agents. In Bui et al. (19), the authors propose a multi-party cooperative nego-
tiation mechanism for the distributed meeting scheduling domain. Agents start
from an initial set of possible agreements and jointly look for good collective agree-
ments by partitioning the set of possible agreements in a tree until a set with only
one agreement (leaf node) that is acceptable by all of the agents is found. From
the joint set of possible agreements, each agent proposes a partition of such set
where the final agreement will be looked for. Agents decide on which set should
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be explored from all of the partitions that have been proposed. If all of the agents
agree on the partition to be selected, the partition becomes the new joint set of
possible agreements and the refinement process continues. Otherwise, agents ex-
change preferences on the proposed partitions and the partition that maximizes
the preferences of the group is selected as the next joint set of agreements. In order
to save messages exchanged, the agents employ Bayesian classifiers to learn the
preferences of other agents according to the information gathered from the cur-
rent and past negotiations. Intervals of utility are used as classes and partitions
represent attributes of the Bayesian model.
Later, Narayanan et al.(60) present a negotiation framework where pairs of
agents negotiate over a single issue (i.e., price). The authors assume that the en-
vironment is non-stationary in the sense that agents’ strategies may change over
time. Non-stationary Markov chains and Bayesian learning are employed to tackle
the uncertainty in this domain, and eventually converge towards the optimal ne-
gotiation strategy. Non-stationary Markov chains are processes where the next
state of the process depends solely on the current state and transition probabili-
ties between states. The main difference with classic Markov chains resides in the
fact that transition probabilities change over time. In this negotiation framework,
states of the non-stationary Markov chain represent possible strategies that the
opponent may use to negotiate for the price. Since transition probabilities are
unknown for the agent, a set of candidate transition probabilities become hypoth-
esis of the Bayesian learning process, which is updated each time a new offer is
received from the opponent during several negotiations with the same opponent.
Based on the estimation of which strategy will be used by the opponent, agents
choose the best responding strategy.
Another example of the use of Bayesian learning in negotiation is presented
by Buffett et al. (61). In this article, a bilateral negotiation framework is pre-
23
2. STATE OF THE ART
sented. In the negotiation domain, agents negotiate over a set of limited objects
that can be included or excluded from the final deal. It is assumed that for one
of the agents (i.e., consumer agent), adding objects to a deal always results in
higher utility, whereas for the other agent (i.e., producer agent) subtracting ob-
jects from the deal results in higher utility. However, how much each agent values
each object may vary, leaving room for integrative bargaining. The negotiation
protocol forces agent to send offers that are necessarily a subset of the previous
offer in the consumer case, and a superset of the previous offer in the producer
case. However, which subset/superset should be selected is not trivial. For that
purpose, a Bayesian classifier is employed to classify opponent’s preferences into
classes of preference relations. A preference relation is a strict preference relation
over the objects in the negotiation domain. Groups of similar preference relations
are grouped according to the k-means algorithm prior to the negotiation process
in order to determine such classes. The classifiers are trained prior to the negoti-
ation by generating random offers that pertain to the different classes, and noting
the number of violated preference relations and the true class label. During the
negotiation, the negotiation history is compared against the different classes and
the number of violated preference relations is used to assess which class is more
likely to explain the negotiation history.
Hindriks et al. (52) present a negotiation framework for bilateral multi-issue
negotiations where agents’ preferences are represented by means of additive util-
ity functions. The main goal of this work is learning a model of the opponent’s
preferences, and Bayesian learning is used for this purpose. The opponent’s prefer-
ence profile is composed of the importance weights given to each negotiation issue,
and the type of valuation function (e.g., monotonically decreasing, monotonically
increasing, triangular, etc.). The negotiation framework also assumes that the
opponent uses time-based concession strategies, gradually conceding towards the
24
2.2 Automated Negotiation
reservation utility along time. The Cartesian product of the possible orderings of
issues and the types of valuation functions become the hypothesis of the Bayesian
learning process. Hence, the estimated utility by the concession strategy and the
estimated utility by each of the Bayesian hypothesis for the bid history become
the core of the learning and updating mechanism used to estimate the opponent’s
preferences. Since the number of hypothesis, and thus the learning cost, may grow
exponentially with the number of negotiation issues, a scalable learning algorithm
is introduced where the number of possible orderings for issues is reduced, while
still obtaining reasonably good results.
2.2.5 Genetic Algorithms in Negotiation
Genetic Algorithms (GAs) (62) have also contributed to the state-of-art in auto-
mated negotiation. They are general optimization and learning algorithms based
on the evolutionary processes found in the nature. Candidate solutions for a
problem form the genetic population of the algorithm, which gradually converges
towards high quality solutions by applying genetic operators like mutation and
crossover. GAs are general, which means that they do not rely on a specific
problem structure. Additionally, they can be used as an implicit learning and
adaptation mechanism in environments where dynamics and structure is also un-
certain. This is perhaps what makes GA an adequate approach to negotiation
problems, since they can be used to learn and adapt both to the opponent and the
environment.
The seminal work of GA’s in Automated Negotiation is Oliver et al. (63). They
focused on evolving negotiation strategies for bilateral multi-issue negotiations
where agents’ preferences are represented by means of additive utility functions. In
the proposed negotiation framework, a negotiation strategy is a set sequential rules
(i.e., rules that are applied in sequential order according to the round), where a rule
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is a utility threshold that determines if an offer from the opponent is acceptable
and a counter-offer to be made to the other party in case that the opponent’s
offer is not acceptable. A negotiation strategy is coded as a chromosome. A
random population of negotiation strategies (e.g., chromosomes) is generated as
initial population of a genetic algorithm for a specific negotiation domain. Each
negotiation strategy in the pool of candidates is faced against the different types of
opponents and the fitness of the strategy is obtained as the average utility obtained
by the strategy against the different opponents. With the purpose of evolving
the negotiation strategies and looking for near optimal strategies in a negotiation
domain, the strategies with the highest fitness are selected as the parents of the new
population, which is created through genetic operators like mutation and crossover.
This way, the population of negotiation strategies progressively converges towards
a good set of negotiation strategies. Even though the genetic algorithm were able
to converge towards reasonably good negotiation strategies, the expressivity of the
negotiation strategies in this framework (e.g., simple rules) may be far from the
complexity needed in real negotiation problems where hundreds of rounds may be
possible, leading to huge exploration space for this negotiation framework.
As commented above, Faratin et al. (18) introduced a negotiation framework
for bilateral negotiations where agents’ concession strategies can be classified into
time-dependent strategies, behavior-dependent strategies and resource-dependent
strategies. Matos et al. (64) proposed a framework where the concession to be
carried out in each negotiation issue is a linear combination of the concession of
the families of concessions strategies proposed by Faratin. The main research goal
of Matos et al. (64) is determining which the optimal negotiation strategies in dif-
ferent negotiation environments are. For this purpose, an evolutionary process is
proposed where the weights given to the concession strategies for each negotiation
issue represent a candidate solution in a genetic algorithm. Populations of sellers
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and buyers with different negotiation strategies negotiate in a round robin way.
After each round robin round, negotiation strategies are assigned a fitness value
which takes into account the utility obtained in the negotiations and the numbers
of messages exchanged. The highest fitness negotiation strategies for sellers and
buyers become the parents of the next population of negotiation strategies, which
is obtained by the application of genetic operators like mutation and crossover.
Eventually, the population of negotiation strategies for sellers and buyers con-
verges towards an optimal set of strategies for the environment under study. The
advantage of this proposal with respect to Oliver et al (63) is that the evolutionary
process does not depend on the number of negotiation rounds but on the number
of negotiation issues, which results in a more tractable search space.
Another authors that have studied genetic algorithms as mechanisms for evolv-
ing negotiation strategies are Tu et al. (65). However, the representation employed
for negotiation strategies is finite state machines (FSM). According to the represen-
tation used by the authors, nodes represent states in the strategy and transitions
between states have a precondition and an action associated. The precondition
indicates a condition that needs to be satisfied in the last opponent’s offer, and
the action is the proposal to be sent to the opponent. The evolutionary process
is, in essence, the same than the one applied by Oliver et al.(63) and Matos et
al. (64): an initial population of negotiation strategies, coded as FSM chromo-
somes, is generated randomly. After that, the evolution process starts by testing
the strategies against several opponents and selecting the highest fitness strategies
as parents of the next generation. One of the advantages of using FSM is that
they allow branching and states represent certain memory of what has happened
in the negotiation process.
Other experiments involving GA and negotiation were carried out by Gerding
et al. (66). The authors retake the framework introduced by Oliver et al. focuses
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on negotiation processes where the utility function is a linear combination of the
issues. The domain of the negotiation issues is [0,1] and one of the agents employs
monotonically increasing valuation functions, whereas the other uses monotoni-
cally decreasing valuation functions. However, importance weights given by each
agent to the negotiation issues may differ, leaving room for integrative bargaining.
The main difference between this work and Oliver et al. resides in the introduction
of the concept of fairness and social awareness. The former relates to an attempt
to avoid unbalanced final agreements, which are common in game theory and ne-
gotiations without time pressure due to the use of take-it-or-leave-it strategies by
agents in the last round. The fairness check consists in an agent checking an offer
and accepting such offer, if it exceeds the reservation value, with a probability
related to the utility reported by the offer. Thus, low utility offers have high
probabilities of being rejected even though they may be acceptable. The latter,
social awareness, refers to the fact that each agent may be able to negotiate with
multiple opponents in an agent society. Hence, if a negotiation with an opponent
fails, it is still possible to find another deal in the society.
Despite the fact that genetic algorithms have been used mostly for evolving
negotiation strategies, there are some works that have proposed the use of genetic
algorithms a learning mechanism for opponents’ preferences during the negotiation
process. Here, we may highlight the seminal work of Krovi et al. (67). The au-
thors propose a bilateral multi-issue negotiation framework where each agent uses
a different genetic algorithm each time a negotiation round ends. The population
of chromosomes is randomly initialized with 90 random offers and 10 heuristically
chosen offers: the last offer of the opponent and the nine best offers from the
genetic algorithm executed in the previous round. The fitness function employed
for evaluating offers may take into account several factors: one’s own utility func-
tion, the utility function of the opponent, and one’s own negotiation attitude (e.g.,
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competitive, cooperative, etc.). After the application of genetic operators like mu-
tation and crossover, the offer with the highest fitness is sent to the opponent as
counter-offer.
Choi et al.(68) base their negotiation framework on the idea introduced by
Krovi et al., using a GA as learning mechanism each negotiation round. The au-
thors propose the use of multiplicative utility functions for representing agents’
preferences, the use of stochastic approximation (69) of the opponent’s issue im-
portance by observing concessions, and the use of and adaptive mutation rate that
prevents abruptly escaping from high fitness search areas. Finally, Lau (70) also
proposes the use of genetic algorithms each round to compute the next offer to
be sent to the opponent. The author introduces genetic algorithms in a bilat-
eral framework where the fitness function of an offer is computed based on the
utility according to one’s own utility function, the Euclidean distance to the last
opponent’s offer, and a factor that represents time pressure.
2.2.6 Offline Learning in Negotiation
By offline learning we refer to a learning process that is carried out after or before
the negotiation process starts. Hence, the model is not updated during the ne-
gotiation and it requires of several iterations of the negotiation game to learn an
educated model. From the works that we have already reviewed, we can highlight
some works like Buffett et al. (61) where the learning of the Bayesian classifiers is
carried out before the negotiation starts. However, there are also other approaches
that have advocated for the use of learning before or after the negotiation process.
For instance, Coehoorn et al. (71) propose the use of kernel density (72) for
the estimation of the weights of the opponent’s additive utility function. The
negotiation model revolves around the idea that a rational agent gradually con-
cedes towards its reservation utility, and a rational agent should concede less on
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the most important issues at the start of the negotiation and concede more on the
least important issues. Given this assumption, the agent calculates for each pair of
consecutive offers the concession carried out in each issue, and an educated guess
of the weight based on such concession. Each tuple, composed of the difference
between pairs of consecutive offers, the estimated weight, and the probability den-
sity of the weight, forms a three dimensional kernel that is used along the other
kernels to calculate an estimation of the real issue weight.
Another set of approaches that heavily rely on offline learning are those ap-
proaches based on Artificial Neural Networks (73, 74). In (73), Carbonneau et al.
propose a neural network that takes as input the negotiation history of a bilateral
negotiation with continuous issues and an offer to make an estimation of the op-
ponent’s counter-offer. The major drawback of this approach is that it requires
that an artificial neural network is trained per negotiation case. Similarly, the
same authors propose an improvement over their previous work in (74). It aims
to make a predictive model that does not depend on the negotiation case. The
model takes pairs of negotiation issues as inputs of the neural network, where one
of the issues is considered the primary issue (i.e., independent variable) and the
other issue is considered the secondary issue (i.e., dependent variable). The neural
network may also take historical information from each issue like the minimum
value, maximum value, average value, etc. The output of such neural network is
the predicted value for the issues. The fact that the input is partitioned into pairs
of issues, allows the neural network to capture relationships between pairs of issues
and how these affect the counter-offer to be proposed by the opponent, which is
a much more general approach than taking the whole set of issues as input and
learning relationships between all of the issues. This model can be adapted to
new negotiation cases since the trained networks is independent of the negotiation
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scenario. The main drawback of this work is that the model is not able to capture
relationships between issues more complex than binary relationships.
2.2.7 Complex Interdependent Utility Functions
Negotiation processes normally consist in the exchange of proposal between the
involved parties. One of the key issues in negotiation strategies is the way in which
the agents’ preferences are represented. This issue strongly affects how proposals
are evaluated and how offers should be generated. In processes where just a single
issue is involved, it is quite clear how to evaluate and generate proposals: the
value of the issue. However, it is not easy to give a valuation when multiple issues
are involved. The multi-attribute utility theory (75, 76) comes into play in this
case. This theory provides mechanisms for the evaluation of proposals composed
of multiple issues. Classic multi-attribute theory has considered that issues are
independent. Issue independence means that the value of negotiation issues does
not affect the valuation of other issues. Hence, a classic way of representing such
preferences is by means of linear additive utility functions.
Despite the fact that linear additive functions perform well in some simple
domains, there are scenarios where they become poorly suited (77). Just as an
example, we could think of a water market domain where two parties negotiate
over the exploitation of several water resources. One of the parties desires to satisfy
its water needs whereas the other party has rights over several water exploitations.
In this negotiation, the different issues are the water exploitations to be included
in the deal. Even though the provider offers a proposal whose amount of water
may satisfy the buyer, the value of the proposal may turn into a low utility for
the buyer if the water sources are too distant. Thus, some issues have a negative
effect over the value of others, and preferences can no longer be represented as
classic linear additive utility functions. There is a need to provide complex utility
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Figure 2.1: An example of linear (left) and complex (right) utility functions
functions that are capable of representing interdependences between negotiation
issues. Negotiation strategies that perform well in domains with linear utility
functions may not perform equally in the case of complex interdependent utility
functions. In fact, the search space for each agent is much more complicated,
needing new negotiation strategies adapted to these complex functions. Figure
2.1 shows illustrative examples of the search space in the case of linear utility
functions and complex interdependent utility functions. The left figure shows the
search space of a two issues linear utility function, whereas the right figure shows
the search space of a two issues complex interdependent utility function using the
model introduced by Ito et al. (78), which will be reviewed later. As it can be
observed, the optimization problem faced by each agent is more complex in the
case of interdependent utility functions, leading to the need of new mechanisms
that tackle these domains.
Klein et al.(77) constitutes one of the seminal works in negotiation models
with complex interdependent utility functions. The authors propose a bilateral
negotiation model, which can be extended to the multi-party case, with complex
interdependent utility functions for bundles of items that can either be included
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or excluded from the agreement. The preferences of such bundles are modeled by
means of preference matrices. The content of a cell matrix represents the increase
or decrease in the overall evaluation of the offer when two different issues (i.e.,
represented by the indices of the matrix cell) are included in an offer. There-
fore, this complex utility function can take into account interdependence relations
that involve pairs of issues. The negotiation protocol goes as follows. An an-
nealing trusted mediator proposes an offer to all of the parties. Each party can
strong/weak reject or strong/weak accept the proposal. If every party accepts
the deal, or one of the agents emits a strong accept and the other agent emits a
weak reject, the offer becomes an acceptable offer and becomes the base for future
offers. Rejected offers can be made acceptable by the mediator due to its anneal-
ing mechanism. Then, in subsequent proposals, the annealing mediator mutates
the last accepted offer and proposes the modified offer to the agents. The agents
may have different strategies: hill climbing or annealing. A hill climber agent only
accepts one offer if it is better than the previously accepted offer, whilst annealing
agents can accept an offer that is worse than the previously accepted offer with
a certain probability that depends on the annealing configuration. The iterated
proposal mechanism continues until a fixed number of offers have been proposed.
Robu et al.(79, 80) introduce a bilateral negotiation model where agents rep-
resent their preferences by means of utility graphs. The negotiation domain is
formed of bundles of items that can be either included or excluded in a final deal.
Utility graphs are graphical models that relate negotiation issues that are depen-
dent. Nodes represent negotiation issues whereas arcs connect issues that have
some joint effect on the utility function (i.e., positive for complementary issues,
and negative for substitutable issues). Hence, utility graphs represent binary de-
pendencies between issues. The authors propose a negotiation scenario where the
buyer’s preferences and the seller’s preferences are modeled through utility graphs.
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The seller is the agent that carries out a more thorough exploration of the negotia-
tion space in order to search for agreements where both parties are satisfied. With
this purpose, the seller builds a model of the buyer’s preferences based on historic
information of past deals and expert knowledge about the negotiation domain.
This model is updated during the negotiation based on the bids exchanged with
the buyer. The model also introduces a proposal strategy based on utility graphs
that is capable of selecting which offers are more adequate based on the model of
the other agent’s preferences and one’s own preferences.
Later on, Ito et al. (78, 81) propose a multi-party negotiation model where
agents have their preferences represented by means of weighted hyper-cubic con-
straints. The negotiation domain is composed of multiple issues whose domain is
found in the integer domain. A utility function is composed of several constraints.
A constraint is composed of n different issues, one value interval for each of the
n issues, and a utility value u. The constraint is fulfilled by an agreement when,
for each issue present in the constraint, the issue interval contains the issue value
of the agreement. In that case, since the constraint is fulfilled, it adds u to the
overall utility of the agreement. The utility of the agreement is the sum of the
utilities reported by each constraint. The main difference between the preference
model proposed by Ito et al. and the previous approaches is that it is able to
capture dependencies for more than two issues. The authors also propose a nego-
tiation protocol and negotiation strategies. Since agent preferences are complex
and interdependent, each agent samples its own search space to find high utility
agreements. These agreements are discovered by a process of offer sampling fol-
lowed by a simulated annealing started from each of the offers sampled. After the
annealing process, each agent forms several constraint bids based on optimized
contracts and a bid value which represents the total value reported by fulfilled
constraints. A trusted mediator receives bids from all of the agents and attempts
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to find the contract that maximizes social welfare. Marsa-Maestre et al. (82, 83)
carry out further research in the area of negotiation models for complex utility
functions. More specifically, they extend the constraint based model proposed by
Ito et al. (78, 81) by proposing different bidding mechanisms for agents. They also
propose a negotiation protocol that may not be one-shot. In fact, the mediator can
suggest the relaxation of some constraint bids in order to increase the probability
of finding an agreement.
2.3 Negotiation Teams
The literature in human negotiation led us to the discovery of another potential
scenario where complex negotiation can take place: negotiation teams.
A negotiation team is a group of two or more interdependent persons who join
together as a single negotiating party because their similar interests and objectives
relate to the negotiation, and who are all present at the bargaining table (24, 26).
Hence, a negotiation team is a negotiation party that is formed of multiple indi-
viduals instead of just one individual. As a negotiation party, the team negotiates
with other parties in order to reach a final agreement.
In what kind of scenarios may negotiation teams be involved? There are several
scenarios whose importance range from day to day negotiations to crucial negoti-
ations like the ones found in business and politics. For instance, we can think of
the following negotiation cases where teams participate in real life:
• Imagine that a married couple want to purchase a car (25). For that matter,
the couple has to negotiate with a car seller the purchasing conditions like
price, payment method, and extras included in the contract. Clearly, this
is an agreement that is signed between two parties: the couple, and the car
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seller. However, one of the parties is clearly composed of two individuals
(i.e., the couple) that share the same goal (i.e., buy a car).
• Imagine that a group of four friends decides to go on a travel together. If a
travel needs to be arranged, the group of friends needs to find an adequate
destination, some nice accommodation and flights. Additionally, it may
even be interesting to include some pre-arranged social activities like visits
to museums, some sport activities, and so forth. There may be several
travel agencies that offer such services, and the group of friends may need to
negotiate with some of them to get a travel package that satisfies their needs.
As in the case of the couple, the group of friends is one single negotiation
party that is composed of multiple individuals that share a common objective
(i.e., go on a trip together).
• In another scenario, a human organization desires to sell a product line to an-
other company (25). It is usual for each company to send a negotiation team
composed of different experts coming from different organizational depart-
ments. This team is entrusted with the task of understanding the complex
scenario at hand, and taking the most adequate course of action for their
principals. It is unnecessary to highlight that, obviously, in this case both
parties are also composed of multiple individuals.
• Similarly to the scenario mentioned above, negotiations in politics also in-
volve negotiation teams. We could for instance think of the negotiations
carried out between Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam for promoting
cooperation on water resources (84). In these negotiations, each national
party formed a negotiation team that participated actively during the nego-
tiation process. Each team was formed of different specialists.
36
2.3 Negotiation Teams
Thus, it can be appreciated that negotiation teams are common in real life
negotiations. Despite their importance in real negotiations, teams have not been
studied by social sciences to the same extent as dyadic negotiations (85, 86, 87).
However, what are the reasons to send a negotiation team to the negotiation table
instead of a single negotiator? The first reason that may come to our minds is that
the more individuals may mean more cognitive capabilities and, therefore, better
task performance in the search process involved in negotiation. Effectively, this
was shown by Thompson et al. (24) where several experiments involving human
negotiation teams determined that as long as one of the parties is a negotiation
team, better joint outcomes (i.e., integrative outcomes) were obtained. This is
partially explained due to the fact that when teams are present at the negotiation
table, parties are more inclined to exchange information (24).
Another reason to send a negotiation team is skill distribution and informa-
tion distribution (10, 25, 88). With this, we mean that different team members
may have different and knowledge complementary skills needed to tackle properly
the negotiation. Working as a team allows to discover such specializations and
learn to take advantage of them (25). Thompson (10) recommends that managers
should recruit negotiation teams composed of experts in negotiation, experts in
the subject to be negotiated, and individuals with a variety of interpersonal skills.
Mannix (88) states that negotiation teams require a diverse set of knowledge, abil-
ities, or expertise in complex negotiations, and points out the correct assessment
of such skills as one of the keys for success in a negotiation. Skill distribution
and complementary skills are of vital importance when using some classic team
negotiation tactics like the good cop/bad cop persuasion tactic (89).
Finally, other authors consider that another reason to send a negotiation team
are stakeholders. The entity may be formed of different members whose inter-
ests have to be reflected in the final agreement (88, 90). For instance, Mannix
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(88) points out union negotiation as an example of negotiations where parties are
formed of different interests that have to be represented in the negotiation table.
Halevy (90) also remarks the importance that despite negotiation teams being a
single negotiation party, they are hardly ever a unitary player. In fact, a negoti-
ation team is usually a multi-player party with different and possibly conflicting
interests.
2.4 Conclusions & Discussion
In this section we try to identify some of the open issues in both of our fields of
interest: negotiation models for Ambient Intelligence and agent-based negotiation
teams.
2.4.1 Ambient Intelligence
As stated in the introduction and motivation of this thesis, one of our objectives is
providing computational models for negotiations that are carried out by agents in
devices with scarce resources like mobile phones, pdas and smartphones. In these
types of devices, an efficient use of the computation time, the memory usage,
and the bandwidth is crucial. In this discussion, we analyze how each reviewed
work would fit in the Ambient Intelligence domain. The analysis is based on
different criteria. The criteria are composed of factors that are interesting for every
negotiation domain, and factors that are especially interesting for the Ambient
Intelligence domain.
The number of negotiation issues tackled by the model is a very important fac-
tor. Negotiation processes are usually complex by nature and they should include
several issues. In this sense, we can categorize negotiation models into single issue
or multi-issue, preferring the latter when possible. Another important factor in
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negotiation models is whether or not they are mediated. It is true that mediators
may help to reach better agreements, however, they also require the existence of
an entity that is trusted by all of the parties. Non-mediated negotiation models
are more interesting from the point of view of Ambient Intelligence due to the fact
that users enter and leave the system in an extremely dynamic way. Thus, it may
be difficult to find a trusted mediator for every user.
Learning is also a very important issue in any negotiation model. First of all,
learning may help agents to find better agreements (either win-win agreements or
individually good agreements). Second, by learning agents may end negotiations
more quickly, thus reducing the computation time, the energy, and the bandwidth
spent by the negotiation. Therefore, learning is a desired feature in any negotia-
tion model and, of course, in negotiation models for Ambient Intelligence. When
analyzing different learning mechanisms in negotiation models, one can observe
differences in the object of learning. Some models attempt to learn the opponents’
preferences (e.g., issue rankings, issue weights, best offers for the opponent, etc.),
other models try to learn the optimal negotiation strategy, others aim to predict
opponents’ responses, and so forth. Another characteristic of learning mechanisms
is the data source for the learning process. It can either come from the present
negotiation or from a history of negotiations. In an Ambient Intelligence environ-
ment, where users enter and withdraw from the system in a very dynamic way,
agents may only face opponents once or a few times. Thus, learning mechanisms
that rely mainly on the current negotiation are preferred for Ambient Intelligence
domains. Finally, another important consideration is whether the learning model
can be easily adapted in the presence of new data or it needs to undergo a new
learning process. Given the limited computational resources, learning mechanisms
that are easily adapted are preferred over learning mechanisms that need new
training in the presence of new data.
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Complex interdependent utility functions are able to represent richer prefer-
ences for users. This should provide with more accurate preference models that,
when used by negotiation strategies efficiently, should end up with agreements
that are more satisfactory for users. Thus, negotiation domains should benefit
from the uses of complex and interdependent utility functions. Regarding interde-
pendence relations among negotiation issues, we pay attention to the cardinality of
such relations. Utility functions that are able to capture interdependence relations
among more issues should result in more powerful and flexible models since they
may be able to explain more complex scenarios. Table 2.1 gathers the analysis
on the aforementioned criteria for the negotiation models reviewed in Section 2.2.
Next, we discuss which approaches are more adequate for our goals.
Most of the models reviewed consider multiple issues, which fits our goals.
Only Zeng et al. (59) and Narayanan et al. (60) focus on single issue negotiations
that involve price. From those negotiation models that consider complex interde-
pendent utility functions, we have been able to observe that most of them focus
on mediated processes (77, 78, 81, 82, 83), which we argue that should be avoided
in Ambient Intelligence domains. Only Robu et al. (79, 80) consider complex
interdependent utility functions and their model does not require the presence of
a mediator. However, their model only captures dependencies between pairs of
issues. Therefore, there seems to be a dearth in non-mediated negotiation models
that work with complex interdependent utility functions, which should be our goal
for Ambient Intelligence domains. In terms of, interdependence cardinality, the
works of Ito et al. (78, 81) and Marsa-Maestre et al. (82, 83) are the only ones to
consider interdependence relations more complex than binary ones.
Concerning learning mechanisms, in general it can be observed that those mod-
els that cannot be easily adapted are those models that require data from multiple
negotiations (71, 73, 74). Other models can be easily adapted but require data
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Table 2.1: Categorization of computational negotiation models.
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from multiple negotiations, which is also not desirable (14, 15, 16, 19, 63, 64, 65, 66)
for Ambient Intelligence domains. Thus, similarity heuristics (56, 57), most multi-
issue Bayesian learning approaches (52, 61) and genetic algorithms used as an
implicit learning mechanism of opponents’ preferences (67, 68, 70) seem the most
appropriate learning mechanisms for Ambient Intelligence domains. Nevertheless,
some considerations have to be taken into account among these learning mech-
anisms. Most Bayesian learning approaches have been devised for linear utility
functions with no dependence among negotiation issues. This same assumption
has been used to relax the learning cost in Bayesian approaches. It is expected
that if issue dependencies are to be considered, the learning cost of Bayesian ap-
proaches will explode compared to other learning mechanisms. Hence, it seems
that similarity heuristics and genetic algorithms seem more appropriate. Both
are general and implicit learning mechanism of the opponents’ preferences, which
should be able to handle issue interdependence with relative little effort. On top
of that, genetic algorithms are also search and optimization mechanisms, which
could help in the exploration of one’s own complex utility function.
In conclusion, we have observed that none of the current models perfectly
fits the requirements of Ambient Intelligence domains: non-mediated protocols,
complex interdependent utility functions, and adaptive learning mechanisms that
rely on the current negotiation. Among the latter, we believe that similarity
heuristics and genetic algorithms may be considered the most appropriate learning
mechanisms. In Chapter 3 we propose a non-mediated bilateral negotiation model
with complex interdependent utility functions that aims to cover the necessities
of Ambient Intelligence. For that purpose, it relies on similarity heuristics and
genetic algorithms.
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2.4.2 Agent-Based Negotiation Teams
Up to this point, we have strictly considered human negotiation teams and the
advantages for humans to negotiate as a team. But, are negotiation teams also
feasible and needed in automated negotiation and electronic applications? We
argue that the answer to such a question is positive. Agent-based systems are
not alien to negotiation scenarios where it may be interesting to employ negoti-
ation teams. For instance, imagine a tourism e-market application. It is usual
for groups of friends/families, or even strangers, to organize their holidays as a
group. However, travelers usually have different preferences regarding trip con-
ditions (e.g., cities to visit, hotel location, leisure activities, number of days to
spend, budget limitations, etc.). Humans may be extremely slow at coming with
a proper negotiated deal that accounts for everyone’s preferences. Thus, software
agents representing each traveler could form a negotiation team that negotiates
with travel agencies in an e-market to obtain a quick and good trip package for the
group. The application of negotiation teams is not limited to the aforementioned
example. It can be extrapolated to other domains such as electronic farming coop-
eratives, customer coalitions, negotiation support systems for labor negotiations,
and so forth. Thus, there is a need for agent-based negotiation team models.
A trusted mediator with perfect knowledge regarding the group of travelers’
preferences or a trusted mediator who can aggregate preferences can be thought
of as possible mechanisms to coordinate a negotiation team. Nevertheless, there
are several reasons that preclude us from aligning ourselves with this kind of coor-
dination mechanisms. The first reason is that privacy is usually a concern among
users in electronic applications. In fact approximately 90% of the users in elec-
tronic applications care to some degree about the amount of information that they
filtrate in electronic applications, and only 10% do not care about letting others
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manage their information (91). Hence, one cannot expect that every team member
may be willing to share its full preferences to a mediator. The other important
issue is the fact that even though there may be some degree of cooperation among
team members, one should not forget that the team is a multi-player party and
opportunistic behavior may be present. In that case, preference aggregation is a
dangerous mechanism since it is quite prone to being manipulated and exaggerated
for one’s own benefits. Therefore, other types of mechanisms are needed to coordi-
nate agent-based negotiation teams. These mechanisms, which we have coined as
intra-team strategies, should reflect the preferences of team members in the final
agreement. For that reason, we think that unanimity regarding team decisions is
a very important factor when designing intra-team strategies. Agreements that
are unacceptable for a team member should be avoided since they might deterio-
rate human relationships. Furthermore, technologies that help to form unanimous
decisions may provide more user satisfaction, and they can help team members to
avoid unexpected outcomes. Despite the fact that several negotiation models have
been proposed in MAS, as far as we know, this thesis is the only work that has
considered agent-based negotiation team so far.
We can make an analogy between what we have commented regarding human
negotiation teams and agent-based negotiation teams. Basically, we can define an
agent-based negotiation team as a group of two or more interdependent agents
that join as a single negotiation party because of their shared interests in the
negotiation with some opponents. The reasons to use an agent-based negotiation
team are also analogous to the human case. First, more agents in the team may
mean more computation capabilities and, thus, more extensive and parallelized
exploration of the negotiation space. Second, we can also assume that different
and heterogeneous agents may have different experiences, they may offer different
services/skills, they may implement different algorithms, which in the end results
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in teams being able to tackle complex negotiation problems more efficiently (in
Chapter 4 we will analyze some factors that may play in detriment of negotiation
teams). Third and lastly, as in the human case, the team may really represent a
multi-player party whose preferences need to be satisfied as much as possible by
the final agreement between the team and opponents.
Nevertheless, human negotiation teams do not always guarantee a better out-
come than individuals. The performance of the team is directly related to co-
ordination among team members, and a team that is not capable of achieving
such coordination may fail at the negotiation. In fact, Behfar et al. (87) study
the causes that pose problems for human negotiation teams: logistics and com-
munication problems (e.g., communications inefficiencies), substantive differences
(e.g., confusion about goals, conflicting interests), inter-personal and personal-
ity differences (e.g., different negotiation styles), and confusion about team roles
(e.g., unclear decision rights). The same authors also identify those strategies that
help to overcome the aforementioned problems and lead teams towards success:
time and logistics management (e.g., coordinating strategies during negotiation
by stepping away from the table), team communications (e.g., preparing with
teammates), within-team negotiations (e.g., team problem solving, managing con-
flicting interests), and defining leadership and team roles (e.g., defining decision
rights). To put it briefly, communications, coordination, intra-team negotiation,
and clear rules of the game lead human negotiation teams to success. We believe
that those key elements are also important in agent-based negotiation teams. For
that reason, we put a special emphasis in analyzing the tasks to be carried out by
successful agent-based negotiation teams in Chapter 4. We describe which tasks
should be carried out, relate each specific task to similar research in multi-agent
systems, and point out some interesting issues that may arise in due to the na-
ture of agent-based negotiation teams. Intra-team strategies, especially those that
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In this chapter, a non-mediated bilateral multi-issue negotiation model for AmI
environments is presented. Its main goal is to optimize the computational re-
sources while maintaining a good performance in the negotiation process. The
proposed model is inspired by the seminal work of Lai et al. (57). The work of
Lai et al. presents a non-mediated strategy for general utility functions, which
obviously includes complex utility functions (one of the necessities identified in
Chapter 2). The strategy is based on the calculation of current iso-utility curves
and a similarity heuristic that sends offers from the current iso-utility curve that
are the most similar to the last offers received from the opponent. However, the
entire calculation of the iso-utility curve may require an exhaustive exploration of
the utility function, which may not be tractable in the case of a large number of
issues. Furthermore, if the exploration of one’s own utility function is not per-
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formed in an intelligent way, the result may be that most of the offers sampled are
of no use for the negotiation process since they might not interest the opponent.
This behavior is not desirable in AmI environments and we tackle these problems
in the negotiation model proposed in this chapter. The three main differences
between this present work and the work of Lai et al. are: (i) The present ap-
proach assumes that it is not possible to exhaustively search the utility function.
Before the negotiation process starts, each agent samples its own utility function
by means of a niching genetic algorithm (GA) (92, 93). The effect of this sampling
is that offers obtained are highly fit and significantly different;(ii) A few additional
samples are obtained during the negotiation process by means of genetic operators
that are applied over received offers and one’s own offers. The heuristic behind
this sampling is that offers obtained by genetic operators have genetic material
from one’s own agent and the opponent’s offers. Thus, these new offers may be
interesting for both parties. (iii) Genetic operators and similarity heuristics act
as a learning mechanism that implicitly guides the offer sampling and selection of
which offers must be sent to the opponent.
This chapter is organized as follows: section 3.2 describes an example of ap-
plication where automated negotiation and Ambient Intelligence can be combined
in order to offer a useful service for the user; section 3.3 describes the negotiation
model, explaining the chosen protocol and the new negotiation strategy in detail.
In Section 3.4, the experimental setting and the results obtained are discussed.
Finally, the conclusions are explained in Section 3.5.
3.2 Motivating Scenario: Product Fairs
In this section we introduce an example of application where automated negoti-
ation may be used along with well-known AmI technologies in order to provide
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a profitable service for users. The example focuses on product fairs. Fairs are
public events where sellers exhibit their products to a wide range of consumers.
At this kind of events there are usually a large number of exhibitors and products.
Therefore, it is extremely difficult to explore the whole fair or find interesting
deals for one’s interests. It is also difficult for sellers to attract interesting clients.
Thus, both consumers and sellers would benefit from a tool which allows to at-
tract/search prospective deals quickly. Furniture fairs are very popular, especially
in Valencia’s region. Even though our negotiation model has not been specifically
designed for furniture fairs, we use it in the examples that describe this chapter.
At this point, automated negotiation in an AmI environment may come in
handy. Let us suppose the following scenario at a furniture fair: each vendor has
been assigned a booth where he attends to clients. As well as setting up the typical
equipment, a hardware device with Bluetooth wireless communication is provided
(e.g. a personal computer). An agent, which can be downloaded and configured
by the vendor prior to the fair, is installed in this hardware device. These agents
should be provided with information regarding its owner’s preferences by means
of user modeling methods such as questionnaires, past experiences, and so forth.
Additionally, consumers are allowed to download an agent to their mobile de-
vices prior to the fair event. The only requirement for the mobile device is Blue-
tooth wireless capabilities. The consumer’s agent can be configured similarly to
the vendor’s agent. More specifically, the agent may ask what products its owner
would be interested in buying and general questions about the preferences regard-
ing possible negotiation issues.
When consumers and vendors enter the fair, they should start the execution of
their respective agents. Each consumer agent offers a negotiation service which can
be invoked by vendor agents. Whenever this service is invoked by a vendor agent,
a negotiation process starts between the vendor agent and the consumer agent.
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The negotiation process continues until a deal has been found or the consumer
has exited the Bluetooth coverage area of the vendor. If the deal is considered as
interesting by both parties (i.e. utility of the deal higher than a certain threshold
or reservation utility) and the deal is among the best ones for the consumer in
that specific area (determined by which vendors can be reached by Bluetooth in
that space point), the consumer agent and the vendor agent notify their respective
owners regarding the possible deal. However, deals discovered by this automatic
process are not to be considered as binding but as recommendations. If the deal
is considered as interesting enough by the consumer, it may result in the con-
sumer approaching the vendor’s booth. At that point, both parties may decide to
renegotiate or polish the deal which has been found by their agents.
Since Bluetooth technology has coverage limitations, the service can usually
only be discovered by vendor agents that are nearby. Usually, the range of com-
munications for Bluetooth devices goes from 5 to 10 meters (some devices may be
able to reach 100 meters, but they consume more energy). Therefore, negotiation
processes help consumer and vendor agents to find prospective deals as consumers
walk around the fair. These negotiations have to be as quick as possible to avoid
the consumer from exiting the covering range of vendors, and they also have to
save mobile devices’ energy by limiting the number of communications. An illus-
trative and simplified example of this application can be observed in Figure 3.1.
Consumer 1 is in Bluetooth range of vendors 2 and 5, whereas consumer 2 is in
range of vendors 4 and 7. Thus, consumer 1 agent can negotiate with vendor 2
agent and vendor 5 agent, and consumer 2 agent may negotiate with vendor 4 and
7.
The possible benefits of the proposed application can be summarized in: (i)
it allows consumers to save physical time by filtering the vendors that seem more
































Figure 3.1: An example of the furniture fair application
since it attracts consumers that will probably be interested in buying their goods,
instead of losing time with clients with whom the possibilities of making a good
deal are very low.
3.3 Negotiation Model
As it can be appreciated in the motivating scenario, the application is collaborative
in nature. This will be reflected in the negotiation model employed by agents. It is
very important for sellers and buyers to find good deals quickly given the dynamic
nature of the negotiation.
Negotiation models are composed of a negotiation protocol and a negotiation
strategy. On the one hand, the negotiation protocol defines the communication
rules to be followed by the agents that participate in the negotiation process.
More specifically, it states at which moments the different agents are allowed to
send messages and which kind of messages the agents are allowed to send. For
instance, the Rubinstein alternating protocol specifies (94) that agents are allowed
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to send one offer in alternating turns. Basically, the negotiation protocol acts as
a mechanism for the coordination and regulation of the agents that take part in
the negotiation process.
On the other hand, the negotiation strategy defines the different decisions
that the agent will make at each step of the negotiation process. It includes the
opponent’s offers acceptance rule, the selection of which offers are to be sent to
the opponent, the concession strategy, the decision of whether the agent should
continue in the negotiation process or not, and so forth. Therefore, the negotiation
strategy includes all the decision-making mechanisms that are involved in the
negotiation process.
The negotiation protocol used can be categorized as an alternating protocol for
bilateral bargaining (94). More specifically, the protocol used is the k-alternating
protocol proposed by Lai et al. (57). In our setting, we assume that agents do
not know other agents’ preferences, nor they know the strategies carried out by
agents and the exact conditions of the negotiation environment (i.e., incomplete
information setting). Additionally, the special characteristics of the devices where
agents are executed define a tightly bounded computational environment (i.e.,
bounded rationality).The proposed negotiation strategy is composed by a time-
based concession strategy and an offer proposal strategy that belongs to the family
of negotiation strategies that use a similarity heuristic in order to propose new
offers to the opponent (56, 57).
3.3.1 Negotiation Protocol
As mentioned above, the negotiation protocol belongs to the family of alternating
protocols for bilateral bargaining. In this kind of protocols, two different agents
negotiate without the need of a mediator. Non-mediated strategies are more ade-
quate for AmI applications since users enter and leave the AmI system in a very
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dynamic way. Thus, it may not be feasible to find a trusted mediator for every
possible pair of agents. Furthermore, in some AmI domains such as shopping
malls, where there are different competing vendors and lots of potential users, it
is difficult to determine who will mediate the negotiation process.
The protocol used is the k-alternating protocol proposed by Lai et al. (57).
This protocol is composed of several rounds where the agents exchange offers in
an alternating way. One of the agents, called the initiator, is responsible for
starting the current round. He can accept one of the offers received from the
opponent in the last round, exit from the negotiation process, or send up to k
different offers to the opponent agent. Once the initiator has performed one of the
possible actions, the opponent agent is able to accept one of the offers he has just
received, exit from the negotiation process or propose up to k different offers to
the initiator. Then, the round ends and a new round is initiated by the initiator
agent. The negotiation process ends when one of the agents accepts an offer (the
negotiation succeeded) or one of the agents decides to abandon the negotiation
(the negotiation failed).
Some of the properties of the k-alternating protocol proposed by Lai et al. are:
• The protocol is adequate for situations where both agents are equal in power
(e.g. none of them has the monopoly over a resource).
• Each agent is capable of sending up to k different offers, making it more
probable that one of the proposed offers satisfies the requirements of the
opponent agent.
• Since k different offers are proposed in each turn more information about the
opponent preferences can be inferred. This may produce faster agreements,
which is inherently interesting for every domain but particularly for AmI
domains since it may reduce the number of messages exchanged and thus
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Figure 3.2: An example of two agents negotiating in the k-alternating protocol.
the bandwidth consumption. Additionally, learning the preferences from a
complex utility function with dependences between issues is a hard task that
requires more information.
An example of two agents negotiating with a 3-alternating protocol (k = 3)
can be observed in Figure 3.2. Agent A is the initiator of the negotiation round,
whereas Agent B is the responding agent. The first round starts with 3 offers
proposed by the initiator. Once the offers reach Agent B, he decides whether he
should accept one of them or not. Since the 3 offers are not interesting for Agent
B, he decides to counteroffer 3 different offers. Due to the fact that none of the
offers proposed by Agent B are of interest to the initiator, he decides to send 2
offers. The 2 offers from the initiator reach Agent B, who analyzes the offers in
order to determine whether they are interesting. Since he found OfferA4 to be
interesting, he decides to accept it and the protocol thus ends with an agreement.
3.3.2 Negotiation Strategy
Agents follow a negotiation strategy based on a time-based concession strategy
and a proposal strategy that employs similarity heuristics to propose new offers
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to the opponent (56, 57). Both types of agents employ this type of collaborative
approach due to the characteristics of the motivating example.
The negotiation strategy complements some of the benefits introduced in the
inspiring work of Lai et al. (57), making it especially interesting for AmI envi-
ronments. The goal is to optimize the computational resources while maintaining
a good performance in the negotiation process. The main traits of the proposed
model are twofold. Firstly, it is not necessary to sample the entire utility func-
tion. Secondly, the proposed strategy provides an implicit learning mechanism
that guides the offer sampling and which of the offers sampled are to be sent to
the opponent.
The different mechanisms of the negotiation strategy can be grouped according
to the period during which they are applied: pre-negotiation and negotiation. In
the pre-negotiation, since utility functions are complex and dependencies exists
between negotiation issues, even an agent does not know which offers entail good
quality for itself without previous exploration. Since the negotiation is carried out
in limited devices, it is not feasible to completely explore the whole set of possible
offers. Therefore, each agent samples its own utility function by means of a niching
GA (self-sampling).
The mechanisms used during the negotiation include the acceptance criteria
for opponent’s offers, the concession strategy, the evolutionary sampling, and the
selection of which offers are sent to the opponent. The most remarkable part
is introduced with evolutionary sampling : genetic operators are carried out over
received offers and one’s own good quality offers in order to sample new offers
that may be of interest to both parties. Evolutionary sampling acts as an implicit
learning mechanism of the opponent’s preferences. The result of evolutionary
sampling may be used afterwards when the offers to be sent to the opponent are
selected. A brief outline of the proposed strategy can be observed in Algorithm
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1. A more detailed outline of the strategy used before the negotiation process and





2.Receive opponent offer(s) if there are any offers;
3.Acceptance criteria: accept an offer and end the negotiation, or reject all
of them and continue the negotiation process;
4.Concession strategy;
5.Evolutionary sampling;
6.Select which offers to send;
7.Send offer(s) and go to step 2;
Algorithm 1: A brief outline of the evolutionary negotiation strategy.
3.3.2.1 Pre-negotiation: Self-sampling
When an agent uses complex utility functions with issue dependencies, it may
be difficult to find offers with good utility for oneself. When the negotiation
domain is not large, a complete sampling of the utility function may be feasible.
However, when the domain is large, which is usually the case in real negotiations,
a complete sampling may be an extremely expensive process. For instance, a
complete sampling of a negotiation domain formed by 10 integer issues from 0
to 9 requires sampling 1010 offers. The cost associated to this sampling can be
exorbitant, especially if agent preferences change with a frequency that is greater
than the time invested in the sampling. Furthermore, this sampling is unacceptable
for AmI domains. Not only does it take too much computational time and power,




A possible solution to this problem is to use mechanisms that enable an agent
to sample good offers for the negotiation process and skip those of low quality. Due
to the highly non-linear nature of complex utility functions, non-linear optimizers
are required for this task. The main goal is to sample a set of different offers that
have good utility and are significantly different, because these offers may point to
different regions of the negotiation space where a good deal may be found for the
agent.
In this work, a genetic algorithm (GA) was used to solve this problem. GA’s
are general search and optimization mechanisms based on the Darwinian selec-
tion process for species (62, 92). Genetic operators such as crossover, mutation,
and selection are employed in order to find near-optimal solutions for the required
problem. Nevertheless, the problem posed by classic GA’s is that the entire pop-
ulation converges to one optimal solution. As already stated, different interesting
offers for the negotiation process need to be explored. Niching methods are intro-
duced to confront problems of this kind (93, 95). These methods look to converge
to multiple, highly fit, and significantly different solutions.
A possible family of niching methods for GAs is the crowding approach (95).
Crowding methods achieve the desired result by introducing local competition
among similar individuals. One advantage of crowding methods is that they do
not require parameters beyond classic GAs. Euclidean distance is usually used to
assess the similarity among individuals. Probabilistic Crowding and Deterministic
Crowding (95) are two of the most popular crowding methods. They only require
a special selection rule with respect to classic GAs. Both rules are employed to
select a winner given n different individuals. On the one hand, Deterministic
Crowding selects the individual that has the highest fitness value, resulting in an
elitist selection strategy. On the other hand, Probabilistic Crowding allows lower
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fitness value individuals to be selected as winners with a certain probability. This
probability is usually proportional to the fitness of each individual. In general,
Probabilistic Crowding is more exploratory than Deterministic Crowding. In both
cases, the niching effect is achieved by applying either of the two methods to those
individuals that are similar. Each parent is usually paired with one of its children
in such a way that the sum of the distances between pair elements is minimal.
For each pair, one of the two crowding methods is employed to determine which
individuals will form the next generation. In this work we define DC as our
Deterministic Crowding rule and PC as our Probabilistic Crowding rule. Both
rules can be observed in more detail in Equations 3.1 and 3.2, respectively.
Dc(X1, X2) =





X1 U(X1) > U(X2) ∧ random() ≤ p1
X2 U(X1) > U(X2) ∧ random() > p1
X2 U(X1) < U(X2) ∧ random() ≤ p2






where random() ∈ [0, 1], U(.) is the fitness function of our genetic algorithm, which
in our case corresponds to the utility of the offer. X1 and X2 are two offers, and p1
and p2 are the probability of acceptance of both offers by Probabilistic Crowding.
Self-sampling uses a GA that employs crowding methods to find significantly
different good offers. This GA is individually executed by the agent before the
negotiation process begins. The chromosomes of this GA represent possible offers
in the negotiation process, whereas the fitness function used is one’s own utility
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function. A portfolio with DC and PC is used. The population has a fixed number
of individuals and the whole population is selected to form part of the genetic
operator pool. Pairs of parents are selected randomly and multi-point crossover
or mutation operators are applied over them. In both cases, the result is two chil-
dren. To apply crowding methods, each parent is paired with the child that is the
most similar to it according to Euclidean distance. PC or DC is applied to each
of the similar pairs according to an established probability pdc (i.e., probability
for Deterministic Crowding to be applied) and 1− pdc (i.e., probability for Proba-
bilistic Crowding to be applied) respectively. Those individuals that are selected
as winners by crowding replace the whole current population. The stop criterion
was set to a specific number of generations. At the end of the process, the whole
population should have converged to different good offers that are to be used in
the negotiation process as an approximation to the real set of good deals for the
agent. This population, called P , is used as an input for the negotiation process.
A more detailed outline of the proposed GA can be observed in Algorithm 2.
3.3.2.2 Negotiation: Concession strategy
A concession strategy determines the aspirations of the agent at each negotiation
time instant. The agent usually proposes offers that have a utility equal or above
the utility level defined by its current aspirations. In this work, we assume a
time-dependent tactic, where the utility demanded by each agent depends on the
remaining negotiation time. This kind of concession strategies are adequate for
environments such as AmI, where time is a very important limitation (e.g., lim-
ited power devices, dynamic environments, real-time environments, etc.). Some
examples of concession tactics linear (same concession rate at each step), boulware
(18) (no concession until the last rounds, where it quickly concedes to the reserva-
tion value), and conceder (18) (at the start, it quickly concedes to the reservation
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P : Explored preferences, good quality offers;
Dc : Deterministic crowding rule;
Pc : Probabilistic crowding rule;
pcr : Probability of crossover operator;
pdc : Probability of DC;
n : Current number of generations;
nmax : Maximum number of generations;
pairi : Pair of solutions;
P =initialize();
n = 0;




while i ≤ |P | − 1 do
O1 = Pi;
O2 = Pi+1;
if Random() ≤ pcr then





(pair1, pair2) = argmin
Oi 6=Oj∧Xk 6=Xl
||Oi −Xk||+ ||Oj −Xl||;







i = i+ 2;
end
P = Paux; n = n+ 1;
end
Return P ;
Algorithm 2: Pre-negotiation: Genetic algorithm with niching mechanism. Its




One of the traits of similarity heuristics is that they are usually independent
of the underlying concession strategy. In our motivating application, it is very
important for both parties to appeal the other part. It is a more collaborative
relationship that does not give room for such competitive strategies. In boulware
and conceder strategies, agents may invest too many rounds exchanging high/low
utility offers that are not good for one of both parties. Since in our application
it is very important to appeal the other part while maintaining a good utility, we
assume a more exploratory concession strategy like linear concession.
In each negotiation round, the agents concede according to their strategy until
a private deadline is reached. The utility that an agent a demands for a negotiation
round t (i.e., concession strategy) can be formalized as follows (57):





βa ± δ (3.3)
where sa(t) is the concession strategy itself, which defines the demanded utility
level for agent a at negotiation round t. RUa is the reservation utility, and Ta is
the private deadline of the agent, and βa represents the concession speed of the
agent. Since a linear concession speed is assumed, βa = 1. δ is a small correction
factor that allows demands of the agent to be more flexible in a negotiation round.
3.3.2.3 Negotiation: Acceptance criteria
An opponent offer is accepted if it provides a utility that is equal or greater than
the demanded utility for the next negotiation round. Consequently, given the set






b→a} received by agent a from agent b at
instant t, the acceptance criteria for agent a can be formalized as depicted in the
following expression:
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b→a ) ≥ sa(t+ 1)
reject otherwise
(3.4)
where Xt,bestb→a = argmax
X∈Xtb→a
(Ua(X)) is the best offer received in the last negotiation
round in terms of one’s own utility function, Ua(.) is the utility function of the
agent, and sa(t+ 1) is the utility demanded for the next negotiation round.
3.3.2.4 Negotiation: Evolutionary sampling
One of the keys of the proposed strategy is the evolutionary sampling. This pro-
vides an implicit mechanism for learning opponent preferences and making an
intelligent sampling of the negotiation domain. Basically, it is based in the ap-
plication of genetic operators to offers received from the opponent in the last
negotiation round and one’s own good offers from P . The idea behind the evo-
lutionary sampling is that offers generated by this method have genetic material
from the opponent and one’s own agent. Therefore, these offers may yield a greater
probability of being accepted by the opponent that offers that have been sampled
in the pre-negotiation without considering the opponent’s preferences. The new
offers sampled in this mechanism are added to a special population called Pevo.






b→a}, which is the set of offers sent
by agent b to agent a at negotiation round t, and sa(t) the current demands of
agent a. For each offer received from the opponent Xt,ib→a, a total of M offers
are selected from the current iso-utility curve (i.e., offers with a utility in sa(t))





||Xt,ib→a −Xj || (3.5)
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where C is the set of M different offers, and ||Xt,ib→a−Xj || is the Euclidean distance
between one of the offers in C and the offer received from the opponent. Thus,
these M offers are the ones most similar to Xt,ib→a from the current iso-utility curve
in P and they will be involved in the evolutionary process. The M selected offers
are the most similar since applying crossover operators over offers that are too
different may disrupt the quality of the solution for both agents (the resulting
offer is too far from both agents’ offers).
Once the M closest offers have been selected, a total of ncross crossover op-
erations are performed for each pair (Xt,ib→a, Xj), where Xj ∈ C. The crossover
operator takes two parents and generates one child. More specifically, the number
of issues that come from Xt,ib→a is chosen randomly from 1 and N − 1, with N be-
ing the number of issues. The rest of the issues come from Xj . Which particular
issues come from each parent is also decided randomly. This way, each agent’s
preferences are taken into account in a statistically equal manner. Each child is
added to a special pool, called Pevo, that contains new offers sampled during the
different evolutionary sampling phases. An example of a crossover operation can
be observed in Figure 3.3.
A total of nmut mutation operations are carried out for each generated child
by crossover operations. The mutation operator changes issue values randomly,
according to a certain probability of mutating individual issues (pattr). When pattr
is low, mutated offers are close to the original offer, so the effect is the exploration
of the neighborhood of the offer. The operator is applied nmut times to each
child that is produced by crossover operations and to the original offers from the
opponent. Mutation also generates new children that are added to the special pool
Pevo
Note that no offer from Pevo is discarded even though their utility may be con-
sidered too low for the current negotiation round. The reason for this mechanism
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2 10 1 18 5
8 11 4 6 0
xt,ib→a
cj
Agent proposals: Each phenotype corresponds to the 
value of a negotiation issue
Total number of issues from the opponent (agent b): 3
Specific issues from the opponent (agent b) proposal: 1, 4, 5
Specific issues from agent's a proposal: 2, 3
Crossover
2 11 4 18 5s1
Figure 3.3: An example of a crossover operation.
is that offers that are not currently acceptable may be interesting in future rounds.
Furthermore, since they have genetic material from the opponent’s offers, they are
more likely to be accepted.
As can be observed in Algorithm 3, if the negotiation process lasts t rounds,
the Evolutionary Sampling explores a total number of offers that is equal to:
Samplesevo = t× ((k ×M × ncross) + (k ×M × ncross)× nmut + k × nmut)
= t× k × (M × ncross × (1 + nmut) + nmut)
Then, the number of offers sampled during the negotiation process depends on
the number of rounds that the negotiation lasts, k, M , and the number of genetic
operators that are performed per offer selected from the iso-utility curve.
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3.3.2.5 Negotiation: Select which offers to send
The next step in specifying the negotiation strategy consists of defining the mech-
anism to propose new offers. In this case, it is necessary to devise a mechanism
that is capable of proposing up to k different offers to the opponent taking into
account its preferences. The proposed heuristic takes into account the k offers
received from the opponent and the offers in P and Pevo.
In our proposal strategy, k offers from the current iso-utility curve are sent.
More specifically, two different iso-utility curves are calculated. The first one
is the iso-utility curve calculated using offers in P . The second one is the iso-
utility curve calculated using offers in Pevo. Basically, the first iso-utility curve
has offers that were generated during the self-sampling (only taking into account
one’s own preferences), whereas the second iso-utility curve only has offers that
were generated in the evolutionary sampling (they may take into account both
agents’ preferences). The negotiation strategy defines a proportion of ppevo offers
to come from the iso-utility curve in Pevo. The rest of the offers come from the
iso-utility curve in P .
The k1 = dppevo× ke offers selected from the iso-utility curve in Pevo are those
that minimize the distance to any offer received from the opponent in the previous









On the other hand, offers are also selected from the iso-utility curve in P . The
total number of offers corresponds to k2 = k− k1. In this case, offers that are the
closest to any offer received from the opponent in the previous negotiation round
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The parameter ppevo determines the degree of relevance of the new offers sam-
pled during the evolutionary sampling with respect to the offers sampled before the
negotiation process. When ppevo = 0, the strategy ignores the results that come
from Pevo. Consequently, only offers that were sampled in the pre-negotiation
phase (self-sampling) are sent to the opponent. In this particular case, the strat-
egy is equivalent to a negotiation strategy that only samples before the negotiation
process and does not take into account the opponent’s preferences. In contrast,
when ppevo = 1, the offers sampled during the evolutionary sampling are the only
ones taken into account. In any case, ppevo is a parameter to be adjusted.
3.3.2.6 Negotiation Trace
We prepared a very simple case based on the product fair example. To be more
specific, it depicts a purchase in a furniture fair where one buyer is interested in
buying chairs and tables from a seller. It should be pointed out that the goal of this
case study is not to test the performance of the model, which will be thoroughly
studied in Section 3.4, but to show a trace of the negotiation model from the point
of view of one of the agents. In this case, we will focus on the buyer.
We use the weighted constraint model proposed by Ito et al. (78) to represent
the utility functions of the buyer and the seller. The weighted constraint model
is introduced as a complex utility function to model agent preferences. Let us
consider a negotiation model where the number of issues is N , xi represents the
value of the i-th issue, each issue has an integer domain, and X = {x1, x2, ..., xN}
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P : Offers from self-sampling ;
Pevo : Offers from evolutionary sampling ;
k : Number of offers of the protocol;
M : Number of selected offers for genetic operations;
ncross : Number of times to crossover;
nmut : Number of times to mutate;
ppevo : Proportion of offers from Pevo;







b→a ) = accept then Send (Accept X
t,best
b→a −→ b) ;
t = t+ 1;
/*Evolutionary sampling*/;









foreach Xj ∈ C do
repeat
X1 = Crossover(Xt,ib→a, Xj);
if X1 * Pevo then Add(Pevo, X1) repeat
X2 = Mutate(X1);






if X1 * Pevo then Add(Pevo, X1)
until nmut times;
end
/*Select which offers to send*/;



















Send (Xt+1a→b −→ b);
Algorithm 3: Negotiation strategy during the negotiation process
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represents a particular offer. These settings make up an N-dimensional space for
the utility function.
In the weighted constraint model, a constraint cl represents a specific region
of the negotiation space. Any point of the space enclosed in that region is said to
satisfy the constraint cl. Basically, the term constraint represents an interdepen-
dence relationship among the negotiation issues. Each constraint cl has a certain
value v(cl, X) that is added to the utility of X when the constraint is satisfied by
the offer X. For instance, a constraint defined as cl = (1 ≤ x1 ≤ 10 ∧ 3 ≤ x2 ≤ 4)
and v(cl, X) = 10 would hold a utility of 10 for the offer (2,3).
A utility function in the weighted constraint model is formed by l constraints
whose values are summed up whenever the constraints are satisfied. The utility of





where X is the offer, cl is a constraint, L is the set of constraints, and v(cl, X) is
the value of the constraint if it is satisfied (0 otherwise).
As stated in (78), although the expression seems linear, it produces a non-
linear utility space due to the interdependence among the issues. Furthermore,
the utility function may generate spaces with several local maxima, which makes
the problem highly non-linear and very difficult to optimize. Additionally, the
agents do not have any knowledge about the possible constraints of the opponent,
thus making the problem of negotiation still more difficult.
This example consists of 3 different issues: price (P) [0-9] × 100 euros, chair
color in a chromatic scale (CC) [0-9], and table color in a chromatic scale (TC) [0-
9]. Next, we introduce the utility functions employed to represent the preferences
of both consumer and seller:
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Buyer Utility Function Seller Utility Function
(v1 = 100) (0 ≤ P ≤ 1) (v1 = 80) (8 ≤ P ≤ 9)
(v2 = 50) (2 ≤ P ≤ 4) (v2 = 60) (6 ≤ P ≤ 7)
(v3 = 25) (5 ≤ P ≤ 7) (v3 = 45) (4 ≤ P ≤ 5)
(v4 = 30) (0 ≤ CC ≤ 3) ∧ (0 ≤ TC ≤ 3) (v4 = 20) (1 ≤ P ≤ 3)
(v5 = 10) (0 ≤ CC ≤ 3) ∧ (6 ≤ TC ≤ 9) (v5 = 15) (1 ≤ CC ≤ 2)
(v6 = 50) (0 ≤ CC ≤ 3) ∧ (5 ≤ TC ≤ 6) (v6 = 10) (0 ≤ CC ≤ 1)
(v7 = 30) (4 ≤ CC ≤ 6) ∧ (0 ≤ TC ≤ 3) (v7 = 10) (2 ≤ CC ≤ 5)
(v8 = 20) (4 ≤ CC ≤ 5) ∧ (4 ≤ TC ≤ 5) (v8 = 5) (5 ≤ CC ≤ 9)
(v9 = 10) (4 ≤ CC ≤ 5) ∧ (8 ≤ TC ≤ 9) (v9 = 20) (8 ≤ CC ≤ 9)
(v10 = 50) (7 ≤ CC ≤ 9) ∧ (2 ≤ TC ≤ 4) (v10 = 60) (0 ≤ TC ≤ 1)
(v11 = 20) (7 ≤ CC ≤ 9) ∧ (6 ≤ TC ≤ 8) (v11 = 30) (1 ≤ TC ≤ 4)
(v12 = 5) (4 ≤ TC ≤ 6)
(v13 = 20) (6 ≤ TC ≤ 9)
(v14 = 10) (8 ≤ TC ≤ 9)
The consumer shows issue interdependences relating the two types of furniture
(e.g. some pairs of colors fit better than other pairs). In the case of the seller,
no interdependences are found but he may present preferences regarding which
models to sell (e.g. some of them need to be manufactured; some models only
have a few units, etc.).
As for the parameters of the self-sampling phase, they were set to |P | = 16,
nmax = 100, pdc = 80% and pcr = 80%. The rest of parameters of the negotiation
model were set to δ = 0.05, k = 2, T = 10, ppevo = 100%, ncross = 2, nmut = 2,
and M = 2.
The next table shows the 16 offers found by the self-sampling process carried
out by the buyer. It depicts the value for each issue and the utility of the offer.
In this case the utility has been scaled to [0,1] for the sake of simplicity.
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P=Self-sampling results for the buyer
(u = 1.00) 1 1 6 (u = 0.81) 1 3 0
(u = 1.00) 0 1 6 (u = 0.81) 1 5 3
(u = 0.93) 1 7 3 (u = 0.62) 0 2 4
(u = 0.93) 1 7 4 (u = 0.62) 1 9 1
(u = 0.93) 1 9 2
(u = 0.93) 1 2 5
(u = 0.93) 1 8 3
(u = 0.93) 1 8 4
(u = 0.93) 0 7 3
(u = 0.93) 1 9 3
(u = 0.93) 0 1 5
(u = 0.81) 1 5 0
Round 1 ss(1) = [0.95, 1] sb(1) = [0.95, 1] Once the self-sampling phase has
finished, the negotiation process starts with the buyer acting as initiator. Since
there are no opponent offers to evaluate, evolutionary sampling is skipped and the
agent directly proposes offers to the opponent. Due to the fact that no evolutionary
sampling has been carried out, Pevo is empty and only the iso-utility curve that
comes from P can be calculated. X=(1 1 6) and Y=(0 1 6) are selected since there
is no opponent offer to compare with. The opponent rejects the offers since they
yield a utility of 0.35 and 0.25 respectively. The opponent makes a counteroffer
which contains W=(8 1 1) and Z=(9 1 1). Both of them are rejected since their
utilities (0.18 for both of them) are lower than 0.85.
Round 2 ss(2) = [0.85−0.95] sb(2) = [0.85−0.95] Two offers have been received
from the opponent. Thus, the evolutionary sampling phase is carried out. The
iso-utility curve from P (ss(2) = [0.85− 0.95]) is shown in the following tables. It
shows the offers and the Euclidean distance to W and Z. For both W and Z, the
M = 2 offers which are more similar are selected. The offers selected from the
iso-utility curve become one of the parents for genetic operations, which are also
shown in the following tables. For the sake of simplicity, genetic operations which
produced children that were already in Pevo are not included (nor are they stored
70
3.3 Negotiation Model
more than once). All of the offers generated during this phase are added to Pevo.
Iso-utility curve (P)
Offer d(W) d(Z)
1 2 5 0.90 1.00
0 1 5 0.99 1.09
1 7 3 1.04 1.13
1 7 4 1.07 1.16
1 8 3 1.12 1.20
0 7 3 1.13 1.22
1 8 4 1.14 1.22
1 9 2 1.18 1.26
1 9 3 1.20 1.27
Genetic Operations
Crossover Mutation
Parent 1 Parent 2 Child Parent 1 Child
8 1 1 1 2 5 (u=0.31) 8 2 5 8 2 5 (u=0.34) 6 2 1
8 1 1 1 2 5 (u=0.81) 1 1 1 1 1 1 (u=0.68) 1 1 7
8 1 1 0 1 5 (u=0.81) 0 1 1 1 1 1 (u=0.18) 8 1 1
9 1 1 1 2 5 (u=0.31) 9 1 5 8 1 1 (u=0.31) 2 1 4
9 1 1 1 2 5 (u=0.31) 9 2 5 8 1 1 (u=0.15) 5 7 1
9 1 1 0 1 5 (u=0.31) 9 1 5 9 1 5 (u=0.46) 6 1 5
9 1 1 0 1 5 (u=0.81) 0 1 1 9 1 5 (u=0.62) 1 8 5
9 2 5 (u=0.81) 1 2 3
9 2 5 (u=0.15) 7 6 5
9 1 1 (u=0.50) 4 0 1
9 1 1 (u=0.37) 9 2 6
Next, it is necessary to select which offers to send to the opponent. Since
ppevo = 100%, if possible, all of the offers will come from the iso-utility curve
calculated using Pevo. If it is not possible, it will take as many offers as possible
from the iso-utility curve from Pevo and take the rest from the iso-utility curve
from P . In this case, X=(1 2 5) and Y=(0 1 5) are selected from P since Pevo does
not contain elements to form a current iso-utility curve. The opponent receives
the offers X and Y. Since they yield a utility of 0.25 and 0.15 respectively, both
are rejected. The seller sends W=(6 1 1) and Z=(9 4 1) as counteroffers. Both of
them are rejected since their utilities (0.34 and 0.18 respectively) are lower than
0.75.
Round 3 ss(2) = [0.75−0.85] sb(2) = [0.75−0.85] Two offers have been received
from the opponent. Thus, the evolutionary sampling phase is carried out. The
iso-utility curve from P (ss(2) = [0.75 − 0.85]) and genetic operations are shown
in the following tables.
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Iso-utility curve (P)
Offer d(W) d(Z)
1 3 0 0.60 0.90
1 5 0 0.72 0.90
1 5 3 0.74 0.92
Genetic Operations
Crossover Mutation
Parent 1 Parent 2 Child Parent 1 Child
6 1 1 1 3 0 (u=0.81) 1 3 1 1 3 1 (u=0.00) 8 8 1
6 1 1 1 3 0 (u=0.34) 6 1 0 1 3 1 (u=0.62) 1 6 7
6 1 1 1 5 0 (u=0.81) 1 1 0 6 1 1 (u=0.34) 6 2 1
9 4 1 1 3 0 (u=0.18) 9 4 0 6 1 1 (u=0.21) 6 1 8
9 4 1 1 5 0 (u=0.81) 1 5 1 1 1 0 (u=1.00) 0 1 6
1 8 5 (u=0.62) 1 8 5
9 4 0 (u=0.18) 9 5 0
9 4 0 (u=0.81) 1 4 1
9 4 1 (u=0.18) 8 4 1
9 4 1 (u=0.18) 9 6 1
1 5 1 (u=0.62) 1 7 0
1 5 1 (u=0.31) 4 7 1
Next, it is necessary to select which offers to send to the opponent. The table
below shows the iso-utility curve calculated from Pevo. In this case, X=(1 1 1)
and Y=(1 1 0) are selected from Pevo. The opponent receives the offers X and Y.
Since they yield a utility of 0.69 and 0.53 respectively, both are rejected. However,
in this round, the seller sends W=(4 1 1) as counteroffer. The offer is rejected
because its utility is equal to 0.5, and is thus lower than 0.65. From this point on
we will overlook the inner steps of the model due to the fact that the way it works
has already been described.
Iso-utility curve (Pevo)
Offer d(W) d(Z)
1 1 0 0.56 0.95
0 1 1 0.66 1.05
1 4 1 0.64 0.88
1 3 1 0.59 0.89
1 5 1 0.71 0.89
1 1 1 0.55 0.94
1 2 3 0.60 0.94
Round 4 ss(2) = [0.65 − 0.75] sb(2) = [0.65 − 0.75] In this round, the buyer
sends X=(1 1 7), which yields a utility of 0.33 for the seller. Therefore, the offer is
rejected. Then, the opponent sends W=(1 1 1) and Z=(1 2 1), Z being accepted by
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the buyer since its utility is equal to 0.81. The negotiation process ends with the
deal (Ub = 0.81,Us = 0.69), which is the Nash Bargaining Point for this negotiation
case.
This section has described the main traits of the proposed negotiation model
for AmI environments. More specifically, it has explained the protocol employed,
and the negotiation strategy that is adapted to AmI domains thanks to the in-
telligent sampling provided by genetic operators during the negotiation process.
Additionally, we have also shown how the proposed model works in a small case
study. In the next section the proposed model is tested in several scenarios to
check its performance.
3.4 Experiments
The performance of the devised strategy is studied in this section. The proposed
negotiation model is tested in the weighted constraint model proposed by Ito et
al. (78). This model makes it possible to represent unrestricted interdependence
relationships among issues. Furthermore, if the number of constraints is large, it
can represent highly non-linear utility functions. Therefore, it represents a proper
testbed for the proposed strategy. Nevertheless, as in the work of Lai et al. (57),
the proposed negotiation model is general and does not depend on a particular
utility function. The model of Ito et al. was selected as a testbed because it
provides a well studied utility function (78, 82, 83) that holds enough complexity
to study the real performance of the negotiation model.
Firstly, the negotiation setting employed in the experiments is briefly described.
After this, the different experiments and their results are presented.
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3.4.1 Negotiation Setting
The aim of these experiments was to evaluate whether or not the proposed model
is capable of working in domains where the agents’ utility functions are highly
non-linear. For that purpose, different negotiation cases where randomly created:
• Number of issues N = [4-7].
• Integer issues. xi ∈ [0, 9].
• L = N∗5 uniformly distributed constraints per agent. There are constraints
for every possible interdependence cardinality. For instance if N=4, there
are 5 unary constraints, 5 binary constraints, 5 trinary constraints and 5
quaternary constraints.
• v(cl, .) for each n-ary constraint drawn randomly from [0, 100 ∗ n].
• For every constraint, the constraint width for each issue xi is uniformly
drawn from [2, 4]. For instance, if the constraint width for issue x1 is 3, then
(0 ≤ x1 ≤ 3), (1 ≤ x1 ≤ 4), (2 ≤ x1 ≤ 5), (3 ≤ x1 ≤ 6), (4 ≤ x1 ≤ 7),
(5 ≤ x1 ≤ 8) and (6 ≤ x1 ≤ 9) are all of the possible configurations for issue
x1 in the constraint (just one is used in the constraint).
• Agent deadline was set to a maximum of 10 rounds. This represents a total
of 20 messages exchanged between both agents (offers and counteroffers).
Agents do not know their opponent’s private deadlines.
• Agent reservation utility RU = 0. It is set to zero in order to find a deal,
if possible. Should this be the case, the deal is checked against certain




• Agents do not know their opponent’s utility functions
For each number of issues, a total of 100 negotiation cases were generated with
the above settings. The execution of each case was repeated 30 times in order to
capture differences between executions of the negotiation model.
In order to evaluate the quality of final agreements, some measures were gath-
ered at the end of each negotiation.
• Euclidean distance to the closest Pareto frontier point (51). This is a measure
of economic efficiency for agreements. If an offer is not in the Pareto frontier,
it means that one of the two parties can improve its utility without decreasing
the utility of the other agent. The closest an agreement is to the Pareto
frontier, the better.
• Euclidean distance to the Nash Product (51). Since the proposed model
is collaborative in essence, it is worth to study the distance to the Nash
product. This is the point that maximizes the product U1 ∗U2 in the Pareto
Frontier, where U1 is the utility of agent 1, and U2 is the utility of agent 2.
• Number of negotiation rounds. Faster agreements are preferred since a lesser
number of messages are exchanged, less bandwidth is needed, and limited
devices need less power to send messages.
Additionally, some experiments were also devised in order to test the compu-
tational performance of the proposed model in a real environment. Measures such
as the time spent in decision making tasks before the negotiation process (self-
sampling) and during the negotiation process (opponent offer acceptance phase,
evolutionary sampling, and offer proposal) were gathered. For that purpose, the
proposed model was implemented using a HTC Desire (1 Ghz, 576MB RAM, An-
droid Operating System) as one of the parties and a PC (2 Ghz, 4096MB RAM,
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Ubuntu Operating System) as the other party. A total number of 30 negotiations
were carried out in order to measure the computational cost of the proposed model.
In this work, we employ confidence intervals (95%, α = 0.05) to study possible
differences in the averages. If confidence intervals for both data samples do not
overlap, we can claim that there are statistical and significant differences between
both data samples.
3.4.2 Results
The proposed strategy, which will be named as Evolutionary Sampling or ES, was
compared with two different negotiation models. The first strategy is an imple-
mentation of the general framework proposed by Lai et al. (57). This model is
provided with the whole sampling of the utility function, so that it can completely
calculate iso-utility curves. It is used as a measure of how close the proposed
strategy is to the ideal case where all of the offers are available. The second model
assumes that it is not possible to completely sample all of the offers. Therefore, it
samples before the negotiation process by means of a niching GA (self-sampling)
and uses the similarity heuristic (ppevo = 0) during the negotiation process, which
will be named as Non Evolutionary Sampling or NES model. The number of
samples explored by the NES model before the negotiation process is set equal
to the number of samples explored by the ES model (|P | + Samplesevo). Con-
sequently, both the NES and ES model yield the same sampling cost in every
experimentation.
Five different experiments were carried out in order to test the proposed model.
In the first experiment, the three different models are compared as the number of
issues is increased. The second experiment, studies the impact of the proportion
of offers (ppevo) that are sent from the special pool Pevo in the ES model. Next,
the three models are compared as the number of proposals k increases. Finally,
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the ES and the NES model are compared as the size of the population (|P |)
provided by the self-sampling increases. Finally, we studied the time consumed
by the proposed method in a realistic environment involving limited devices.
3.4.2.1 Experiment 1: Performance Study on the Number of Issues
The goal of this experiment is to study how the proposed strategy behaves for
negotiations with a different number of issues N = {4, 5, 6, 7}. It is important for
the proposed model to be capable of properly handling negotiations with multiple
issues. A negotiation setting where agents are limited to k = 3 proposals per
negotiation round is used. The three different models were tested during this
experiment.
The parameters of the self-sampling were set to nmax = 100, pdc = 80% and
pcr = 80%. The number of samples optimized before the negotiation process was
set to |P | = 128 for the ES model and to |P | = 128 + Samplesevo for the NES
model.
The parameters of the ES were set to M = 5, ncross = 4, nmut = 4, pattr =
30%, and ppevo = 100%. Therefore, all the offers are sent from the samples
generated by the evolutionary sampling carried out during the negotiation process.
The distance to the Nash Product, the distance to the closer Pareto Frontier
Point and the number of negotiation rounds were measured for the three models.
The results for this experiment can be found in Figure 3.4. The figure shows
the average and its associated confidence intervales (95%, α = 0.05). Intuitively
speaking, since the number of offers sampled remains constant and the number
of issues increases, the performance of the NES and the ES model should be
worsened with respect to the results achieved by the model of Lai et al. However,
the results for the ES do not comply with this intuitive hypothesis. As can be
observed, even though the proposed model and the NES model explore the same
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number of offers, the NES obtains worse results than the other two models. This
is particularly true as the number of issues increases, since the performance of
this method drastically decreases. On the contrary, the ES model is capable of
achieving statistically equal results to the model of Lai et al., which can access the
whole iso-utility curve. Nevertheless, the proposed model explores far fewer offers
than the complete sampling of the utility function, especially for larger number
of issues. For instance, when N = 6, Lai et al. has access to 106 offers, whereas
the proposed model has only sampled an average of 1510 samples (128+ average
Samplesevo). Only when the number of issues is equal to 7, there are significant
differences between Lai et al. and ES, which highlights the obvious fact that, as
the negotiation domain gets larger, more sampling is necessary.
The ES model has been able to achieve similar results to the case where the
full iso-utility curve can be calculated, while maintaining the offers sampled to
a small number. This result is particularly interesting for AmI domains where
agents may be executed in devices with low computational and storage capabilities.
Therefore, fewer samples mean less power consumption and less capacity needed to
store them. Moreover, it must also be highlighted that the number of rounds was
also lower than that obtained by NES, which, consequently means fewer messages
sent, less bandwidth needed and, of course, less power consumption by the limited
devices.
The reason for this improvement is the intelligent sampling achieved by the
use of genetic operators during the negotiation process. On the contrary, sampling
only before the negotiation process leads to worse results since it is not capable
detecting which offers will be interesting for the negotiation. Both, the ES and the
NES model, have the same computational cost, but the ES is obviously preferred
since it is capable of achieving a better performance un all aspects.
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3.4.2.2 Experiment 2: Performance Study on ppevo
In this case, the experiment’s goal is to study how relevant the proportion of offers
that are sent from the offers sampled during the negotiation process (governed by
the parameter ppevo) in the ES model is. Since all of the configurations sample
new offers during the negotiation process, all of them yield a very similar compu-
tational cost. In fact, it may only be different if one of the configurations obtains
a significantly different number of negotiation rounds. Consequently, the main
subject of study in this scenario is the economic efficiency (distance to Nash and
Pareto Frontier), although some improvements in the computational cost may be
observed due to a lower number of rounds.
The same conditions from the previous experiment were set (k = 3 and N =
{4, 5, 6, 7}), and the same configuration parameters were set for the ES (M = 5,
ncross = 4, nmut = 4, and pattr = 30%). However, in this scenario we compare
the ES model results when 1 out of 3 offers (ppevo = 30%), 2 out of 3 offers
(ppevo = 50%), and 3 out of 3 offers (ppevo = 100%) come from the offers sampled
during the evolutionary sampling phase.
The results for this second scenario can be observed in Figure 3.5. The graphic
shows the averages and their associated confidence intervals (95%, α = 0.05). It
can be observed that the three different configurations yield similar results for
the distance to the Nash Product, the distance to the closest Pareto Frontier
Point, and the number of negotiation rounds. This similarity is explained due
to the fact that, on most occasions, the offer accepted by the opponent is the
closest one from the evolutionary sampling population (Pevo). Therefore, it is
always sent, as long as the results from the evolutionary sampling are not ignored.
Nevertheless, it seems that higher values of ppevo have a slightly (and significantly)
better economic and computational performance than lower ones. The reason for
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this slight improvement is that, in some cases, the offer preferred by the opponent
may be the second or third closest from Pevo. Due to this small improvement,
higher values of ppevo are preferred in practice.
3.4.2.3 Experiment 3: Performance Study on k
The next experiment aims to study the performance of the three different models
(Lai et al., NES, and ES ) as k is increased. The number of offers sent may
help to reach agreements faster since more negotiation space is explored. This is
very important in AmI environments where devices have limited power and their
running time must be optimized. Lai et al. (57), demonstrated how higher values
of k helped to reach better agreements. In this scenario, the experiment is repeated
in order to evaluate whether the differences between the three models still hold
for different values of k.
The studied values of k were 1, 3, 5, and 7. The rest of the negotiation setting
was configured to use negotiation cases with N = 6 issues. The parameters of
the self-sampling were set to the values employed in the previous tests except for
|P | = 256. The parameters of the ES were set to the same conditions described
in Experiment 1.
The results for this experiment are shown in Figure 3.6. The graphic shows
the averages and their associated confidence intervals (95%, α = 0.05). As it
can be observed, the three models achieve better results as k increases. These
results agree with those presented in (57). Although all of the models improve,
the differences observed in Experiment 1 still hold for this scenario. The NES
model gets worse results than Lai et al. and the proposed model. On the contrary,
the ES obtains results that are statistically equivalent to the case when the full
iso-utility curve can be calculated for small values of k. For higher values of k the
proposed model gets slightly better results than Lai et al.
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It must be noted again that the number of offers sampled for ES and NES is the
same and it is much lower than the complete sampling of the utility function. For
instance, in this scenario, the complete sampling consists of 106 offers, whereas the
other two methods sampled an average of 773 samples for k = 1, 1653 for k = 3,
2497 for k = 5, and 3357 for k = 7.
3.4.2.4 Experiment 4: Performance Study on |P | and Memory Perfor-
mance
This last experiment was designed to assess the influence of the population op-
timized by the self-sampling on the performance of the ES model and the NES
model. It is especially relevant to see how many samples the NES model needs to
achieve similar results to those ones obtained by ES. Obviously, more population
means more storage needed and more computational cost since it needs to optimize
more samples.
The average number of samples explored was analyzed for a negotiation setting
where N = 6 and k = 3. The settings used for the self-sampling and the ES in
previous experiments were repeated for this scenario. The number of sampled
offers was increased by allowing more offers to be optimized in the self-sampling
(|P | = {128, 256, 512, 1024, 2048, 4096}).
The results for this experiment can be observed in Figure 3.7. The figure
contains the averages and their associated confidence intervals (95%, α = 0.05).
The x axis of the graphics show the average number of offers sampled by both
models, thus it shows |P | + rounds ∗ Samplesevo. In the case of the NES model
all of the samples were produced before the negotiation process started. Several
observations can be made from the data shown in the graphics. On the one hand,
it seems that the size of |P | does not have too much of an effect on the performance
of the ES model, since it is more dependent on the exploration carried out during
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the negotiation process and does not need as much sampling to get results similar
to the case where the full iso-utility curve can be accessed. Therefore, the behavior
of the model remained almost constant for different configurations of |P |. Again,
this behavior is very adequate for AmI environments since the model can properly
work with configurations that do not require too many computational resources.
On the other hand, the NES model performance increased along with the number
of offers sampled. It must be noted, that when the number of samples for both
methods was 5506, the two of them obtained very similar, almost equivalent,
results. Therefore, the NES needed 5506 samples to achieve similar results to the
same results obtained by the ES model for 1510 samples. It can be concluded that
NES needs 55061510 = 3.64 times more samples to achieve similar results to ES.
It is possible to approximately analyze the total amount of memory employed
by both methods when they achieve statistically equivalent results. As has been
suggested by the previous experiment (Experiment 4), the NES model needs 5506
samples to achieve statistically equivalent results to those the ES model with 1510
samples. If we assume that the underlying platform is a 32 bit platform, where
integers usually need 32 bits to be stored, we can approximately calculate the
memory needed by both models as follows:





where |Samples| is the number of samples, N is the number of issues of the ne-
gotiation process, 32 is the size of an integer, 18 converts from bits to Bytes, and
1
1024 converts from bytes to KBytes. Taking into account the formula above, the
NES model would take 129 KB to store the data needed for the previous type
of negotiation process (N = 6, |Samples| = 5506), whereas the ES model would
take 35 KB (N = 6, |Samples| = 1510). Depending on the underlying device, this
difference may be important (e.g. devices with a few MB of storage available).
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Table 3.1: Approximate amount of memory needed by the NES and ES model.
However, this difference may be still more important if we consider that in some
scenarios it may be necessary to perform several negotiations at the same time
(e.g. the fair scenario). For instance, Table 3.1 shows the approximate amount of
memory necessary (in Kilobytes) for NES and ES to carry out several negotiations
at the same time. As the number of negotiation issues is larger, the amount of
space needed to store offers is bigger. Thus, storing a lesser number of offers is
preferred to larger numbers.
3.4.2.5 Experiment 5: Time Performance
As introduced earlier, it was also interesting to test the computational performance
of the model in a real environment. Thus, the proposed model was implemented
using a HTC (1 Ghz, 576MB RAM, Android Operating System) as one of the
parties and a PC (2 Ghz, 4096MB RAM, Ubuntu Operating System) as the other
party. The self-sampling parameters were set to nmax = 100, pdc = 80% and
pcr = 80%. The number of samples optimized before the negotiation process
was set to |P | = 128. As for the parameters employed during the negotiation
process, these were set to k = 3, M = 5, ncross = 4, nmut = 4, pattr = 30%, and
ppevo = 100%. The number of issues of the negotiation process was N = 5. The
time spent in the whole negotiation process (tt), the time spent in sending/waiting
for offers (tm), the time spent in self-sampling (ts), and the time spent in decision-
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tt (s) ts (s) tdm (s) tm (s)
0.773 0.264 0.358 0.415
Table 3.2: Average time performance of the ES model for 30 negotiations.
making during the negotiation process (tdm) were measured. Table 3.2 shows the
average negotiation time in seconds for the 30 negotiation cases that were studied.
As can be observed, the time spent for a negotiation process tt was reason-
ably good (less than a second) and it enables negotiations to be carried out in
environments where real-time responses are needed (e.g. Ambient Intelligence).
Moreover, it can also be observed that the time spent in decision-making tasks tdm
does not take as much time as other tasks such as sending/waiting for offers tm.
This leaves room for more negotiation processes to be carried out in parallel during
CPU idle time (e.g. waiting for offers). Again, carrying out multiple negotiation
processes simultaneously proves especially interesting again for AmI environments.
For instance, in the fair scenario, it makes it possible to negotiate simultaneously
with those vendors who are available in the area where the consumer is walking at
that moment. The time spent in self-sampling is the least problematic since it is
a process to be carried out only once until agent preferences change. In some AmI
environments, such as the fair, we may consider preferences to be static during the
fair event. Thus, self-sampling would only be needed once. Despite all those facts,
it must be remarked that the time spent in self-sampling is reasonably good.
3.5 Conclusions
A multi-issue bilateral bargaining model for Ambient Intelligence domains that
deals with complex interdependent utility functions has been presented in this
chapter. This work complements the inspiring work of Lai et al. (57) and provides
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a negotiation model that is adequate for Ambient Intelligence applications. The
main contribution of this chapter has been achieving efficient agreements while
maintaining the use of computational resources low.
The proposed model uses a negotiation protocol where agents are allowed to
send up to k different offers in each negotiation round. Before the negotiation
process starts, each agent samples its own utility function by means of a niching
genetic algorithm. This genetic algorithm gets highly interesting and significantly
different offers for one’s own utility function (self-sampling). After the negotiation
process starts, the agents apply genetic operators over the last offers received
from the opponent and those offers that are most similar from the current iso-
utility curve (evolutionary sampling). The desired effect is to sample new offers
that are interesting for both parties. Therefore, the opponent’s preferences guide
the sampling process during the negotiation process. The offers that are sent to
the opponent are selected from the current iso-utility curve, being those that are
the most similar to the last offers received from the opponent. An additional
mechanism is introduced that allowing priority to be given to those offers that
come from the evolutionary sampling iso-utility curve. The results obtained by
the proposed model, while maintaining good economic performance, cope with
the problems found in AmI environments. The results of the experiments can be
summarized as:
• The proposed model needs very few computational resources and storage to
obtain results statistically equivalent to the ideal case where the all of the
offers are available (57). It obtained similar results in economic performance
(distance to Nash, distance to Pareto Frontier) and number of negotiation
rounds.
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• When the proposed model and the NES model sample the same number
of offers, the first obtains better results. In fact, the NES model needs to
sample 3.64 times more offers to obtain similar results.
• The proposed model needs less negotiation rounds to achieve better results
than the NES model. Therefore, the environment bandwidth is optimized
since it needs fewer messages to be sent in order to reach agreements.
• We have also been able to appreciate that, in an environment involving
limited devices, negotiations are executed in a very reasonable time (i.e., less
than a second for a maximum deadline of 10 rounds, 20 messages exchanged).
This is also a very important factor for AmI devices and the motivating
application.
Consequently, the proposed model fits perfectly for the conditions needed by
AmI environments, since it needs less computational resources and it obtains eco-
nomically efficient results.
In this chapter we were able to cover our goals with regards to negotiation
in Ambient Intelligence: a negotiation model that is capable of reaching good
agreements while being computationally efficient. Hence, for this point on, we
drove our main research efforts towards a novel topic like agent-based negotiation
teams. This effort is reflected in the following chapters, where we propose a gen-
eral workflow of tasks for agent-based negotiation teams and we propose several
negotiation models for a wide variety of negotiation scenarios (i.e., scenarios ex-









































































Figure 3.4: Distance to the Nash Product, distance to the closest Pareto Point,
and number of negotiation in Experiment 1.
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Figure 3.5: Distance to the Nash Product, distance to the closer Pareto Point,







































































Figure 3.6: Distance to the Nash Product, distance to the closest Pareto Point,
and number of negotiation rounds in Experiment 3.
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Figure 3.7: Distance to the Nash Product, distance to the closest Pareto Point,
and number of negotiation rounds in Experiment 4.
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4
A General Workflow of
Tasks for Negotiation Teams
4.1 Introduction
In a negotiation, the steps that both parties have to take in order to implement
an agreement have been studied by different scholars. Whenever parties engage
in a negotiation, the following steps are usually necessary to finally implement an
agreement (46): Identify social conflict, identify negotiation parties, structuring
personal information, analysis of the opponents, define a protocol and select a
negotiation strategy, negotiation (i.e., exchange of offers, argumentation, learning,
etc.), and re-negotiation. In this chapter, we focus our study to negotiations
between a negotiation team and an opponent party. However, the steps introduced
in the workflow are general and could be easily adapted to multiparty negotiation
where negotiation teams participate. The steps that are necessary to implement
an agreement in such setting are similar to the steps proposed in the literature
(46). However, some special considerations have to be taken into account since
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at least one of the parties is composed of more than a single individual. In this
chapter, we propose a general workflow of tasks for a negotiation team involved
in a negotiation with an opponent party which refines previous general workflows
(46). The workflow is designed from the perspective of an initiator agent that
identifies a conflict situation and may need to form a team to negotiate with one
or several opponents. The proposed schema aims to be general to be potentially
adaptable to a wide range of domains.
The tasks that have been included in the workflow are thoroughly described
in this chapter. For each workflow task, we attempt to identify which factors may
be important, which problems may arise in each of the tasks, and which related
work may help to efficiently solve the task at hand. The analysis is qualitative
and descriptive.
The general workflow of tasks can be observed in Figure 4.1. In the pro-
posed schema, we distinguish between tasks that are carried out with opponents
(task with opp.), tasks that mainly concern interactions with team members (team
task), tasks that only involve one individual agent (individual task), and tasks that
involve team members, opponents, and the individual. The workflow is there-
fore divided into Identify Negotiation (individual task), Team Formation (team
task), Opponent Selection (team task), Understand Negotiation Domain (team
task), Agree Negotiation Issues (Task with Opponents), Plan Negotiation Protocol
(team task), Agree External Negotiation Protocol (task with opponents), Decide
Intra-team Strategy (team task), Select Individual Strategy (individual task), and
Negotiation & Adaptation (team, individual and opponents). In the graph, the
flow of tasks seems to follow a linear path. Nevertheless, it must be taken into
account that we consider that in each step the team of agents may agree to re-
plan a previous step according to new information acquired. The planning must
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be seen as a continuous process where the team adapts itself to deal with unex-
pected events. However, if these unexpected events do not occur, the workflow
is expected to follow the path depicted in Figure 4.1. Additionally, it should be
also considered that since the workflow aims to be general, some of the tasks may
not be necessary for some application domains. For instance, in some negotiation
scenarios like the traveling friends domain, the negotiation team may be formed
from the start of the problem since it was created by the users. If the workflow
is to be used as a basis for a negotiation support system, the opponent selection
phase may not be necessary since there is only one and it is already known by
users. These are just some examples where a part of the workflow is skipped due
to domain special features. Next, we describe all of the workflow tasks.
4.2 Identify Negotiation
The first step consists of identifying a conflict situation that requires negotiation.
The agent has to analyze its environment and determine whether or not a con-
flict exists, the number of involved parties, potential partners, and whether or
not it is convenient to form a team. As commented by Lopes et al. (46), most
artificial intelligence researchers have focused on how to reach an agreement, but
very few have studied the problem of detecting conflict. In multi-agent literature,
one can identify works where conflict detection mechanisms are designed for spe-
cific domains like cooperative planning or air traffic management (96, 97, 98, 99).
However, research in domain independent conflict detection mechanisms is a topic
that needs further research. This research is especially important if one attempts
to design general negotiators that are able to work in different domains. Some
researchers like Lopes et al. (100) have employed libraries of axioms that allow
agents to compare their own plans and intentions with those expected plans and
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Figure 4.1: A general workflow of tasks for agent-based negotiation teams.
intentions of other agents to detect potential conflict. Libraries of axioms have the
disadvantage that they are static unless they are provided with additional learn-
ing mechanisms. In that sense, case-based reasoning (54, 55) may help to have a
library of conflict detection axioms that learns from the environment and evolves
as the environment does.
Once a potential conflict has been identified by an agent, we propose that the
agent needs to answer the following additional questions:
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• Which agents are affected by the detected conflict? This question aims to
identify possible participants in the negotiation process.
• Which agents do not share common goals with me? Related to the previ-
ous question, the purpose of this question is to determine which potential
participants may represent opponent parties. These potential opponents
may form a unique opponent party, or they may be considered as individual
opponents. In the latter case, it may be possible to conduct several nego-
tiations threads in parallel and treat negotiation threads as outside options
(101, 102, 103, 104).
• Which agents share common goals with me? The purpose is to determine
the agents that may form a common party with the agent. If some of these
agents cannot form a common party with the agent but they still may want
to purchase the same product, they may be considered as competitors (101).
For instance, in an e-commerce site, those agents that want to buy a unique
and exclusive good compete with other agents that attempt to buy the exact
same good.
Libraries can be complemented by search mechanisms. The technologies em-
ployed for looking for partners/opponents may vary. In fact, it heavily depends
on the application where negotiation teams are deployed. One interesting tech-
nology is searching in social networks and markets (105, 106). For instance, in
the traveling domain, one agent may look for travel companions based on its own
social network and its extended social network (e.g., which may include the social
network of its friends). Similarly, one agent could look for service providers or
travel agencies based on the same type of algorithms.
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In any case, the final product of this workflow task is a list of potential team
members, a list of potential opponents, and, possibly, a list of potential competi-
tors. With these lists, the agent faces the problem of selecting its team in the next
workflow task.
4.3 Team Formation
Once the agent has studied which agents may be considered as potential partners,
and which agents may be considered as opponents or competitors, the agent faces
the challenge of determining whether benefits arise from forming a negotiation
team (107). In some situations, it may be mandatory for the agent to be part
of a negotiation team. In fact, the team may even be static (i.e., a married
couple negotiating with a seller over an apartment). If that is the case, identifying
negotiation partners, and forming a negotiation team are tasks that can be skipped
from this workflow. Nevertheless, some scenarios may be less rigid and the agent
may be able to form a negotiation team from the list of potential partners. Thus,
the agent should analyze which team he expects to be the optimal negotiation
team according to the list of potential partners, the list of opponents, and the list
of competitors. If it is expected that no team reports more benefits for the agent
than negotiating individually, the agent should decide to negotiate as a single
individual party.
Traditionally, allocating agents into optimal groups has been a field of study for
coalition formation (108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116). Many coalition
formation algorithms focus on optimally dividing coalitional payoffs (112, 113, 114,
115, 116), which are the resulting benefits from carrying on a task as a group. In
a team negotiation process, such benefits may be difficult to anticipate since it
requires solving the problem of the negotiation with the opponent when the group
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has not been formed yet. On top of that, the result of the negotiation may be an
object whose payoff may not be divided among team members. For instance, in
the case of the traveling friends, the final result of the negotiation is the travel.
Even though the cost of the travel may be divided among team members, how do
you expect to divide the benefits of other factors of the negotiation such as the
payment method, arranged foods, hotel location, and so forth?
Another trend of research in coalition formation are buyers coalitions (108,
109, 110, 111): groups of buyers that join together in order to take advantage
from volume discounts. However, most works in group buying have focused on
single issue transactions where only price is involved and coalitional benefits can
be shared. Therefore, complex multi-issue negotiations faced by negotiation teams
are not supported by current group buying approaches.
Additionally, it should be noted that even though every groups of buyers may
be considered a type of negotiation team, not every negotiation team is a group
of buyers. For instance, let us imagine the negotiation between a union and the
manager of an enterprise. The union may send a negotiation team formed by
different experts or different stakeholders (i.e., representatives for different types
of workers). In this case, the goal is not obtaining volume discounts as group
buyers’ case. Moreover, group of buyers are highly dynamic formations that may
change when better coalitional options arise. That is not the case of the group of
traveling friends or the union, where once the team has been formed, it usually
remains static during the negotiation process.
Another field relevant to this workflow task is classic team formation (117,
118, 119). When teams are formed, agents with different skills are sought. Team
members with different skills/expertise may be desirable for complex negotiation
domains. Nevertheless, team literature in multi-agent systems usually assumes
that team members share the same goal. Therefore, they are fully cooperative with
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each other. Team members in a negotiation team may have different sub-goal or
preferences despite sharing a common goal. Hence, team members may not be so
cooperative with other fellow team members, especially when information sharing
is involved. The ideal formula for negotiation formation may be a mixed approach
between coalition formation and team formation. In any case, we propose that the
following factors may be interesting to be considered when forming a negotiation
team:
• Electronic commerce has given more social power to consumers, which now
can find new sellers at a relatively low cost (120, 121). Not only that, but
trust and reputation models (38, 39) and gossiping (122) may give an ad-
ditional coercive power to consumers over sellers. This may produce sellers
that are more willing to act cooperatively. Thus, it is expected that, the
larger the negotiation team, the greater social power it will be able to exert,
and the more cooperative the seller will be.
• Even though from the previous rule it seems intuitive that the larger a nego-
tiation team is, the better, this may not be necessarily true in every case. If
the preferences of the team members are compatible and very similar, adding
new team members to a negotiation team may only result in greater social
power. However, if the preferences of the team members are very dissim-
ilar, adding new team members may result in greater intra-team conflict.
Attempting to satisfy more preference profiles may considerably reduce the
agreement space of the negotiation, and result in lower utilitarian outcomes.
Thus, despite the fact that larger teams may be able to bring together more
social power, intra-team conflict may deteriorate the quality of the final
agreement to a point that greater social power does not compensate. Gen-
erally, it is not possible to exactly know the preferences of potential team
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members prior to the negotiation itself. Nevertheless, past experiences with
negotiation partners (123) and recommender techniques like collaborative fil-
tering (124) may help to accomplish the task of assessing which negotiation
partners are more similar.
• Related to the previous issue, more team members or stakeholders may bring
additional negotiation issues to the negotiation table. The first effect over
the negotiation is that the negotiation domain becomes larger and, possibly,
computationally harder to work with. Despite this computational disad-
vantage, it may introduce negotiation issues that are only interesting to a
sub-group of the agents that participate in the negotiation. If the opponent
is not interested in these issues, it may make trade-offs easier. In contrast,
if a negotiation issue is introduced to satisfy a sub-group of the team mem-
bers, and it results in high conflict with the opponent, it may difficult finding
an agreement. Thus, additional issues in the negotiation are double-edged
swords that can report both benefits and disadvantages.
• One of the problems that negotiation teams may face is tackling negotia-
tion domains that are inherently complex. This means that the nature of
the domain is hard to understand and it requires the expertise of different
persons. For instance, when an organization negotiates in a complex nego-
tiation, it sends a negotiation team composed of different experts. These
experts may come from the different departments of the organization (e.g.,
marketing, human resources, research & development, etc.) and have differ-
ent backgrounds that enrich the understanding of the problem. Information
regarding agent identities (39) may come handy to determine which potential
team members are more fit for the negotiation problem.
99
4. A GENERAL WORKFLOW OF TASKS FOR NEGOTIATION
TEAMS
• Different agents may provide different social relationships to the team’s social
network. Social networks may directly impact upon the performance of
teams (125) since it can provide with extra information for the team.
4.4 Opponent Selection
Once the team has been formed, it is necessary to find suitable opponents from
the list of prospective opponents. The team should decide which opponents they
are going to face. If enough computational resources are available, all of the
opponents can be selected and negotiations can be carried out in parallel. However,
if computational resources are scarce, a subset of the opponents has to be selected.
If team members are rational, they should select the opponents that are expected
to satisfy more one’s own demands and the demands of the team members. In this
sense, evaluating negotiation opponents based on the expected utility calculated
from a set of past negotiation experiences (123) may prove an appropriate strategy.
However, if no negotiation experiences are available about the different opponents,
or there is not enough data to make conclusions about which opponents should be
chosen, teams may resort discuss about the different opponents via argumentation
in groups (126, 127, 128, 129, 130). Once the evaluation of the different opponents
has been carried out, the selection of a subset of negotiating opponents may be
carried out by means of classic social choice techniques like voting (131).
In any case, the final product of this workflow phase should be the list of
opponents with whom the team pretends to negotiate.
4.5 Understand the Negotiation Domain
Understanding together the negotiation domain is a task of extreme importance.
Not only does it allow team members to get a grasp of other team members’ prefer-
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ences, but it makes it possible for team members to tackle correctly the negotiation
when the domain is complex and requires expertise in different knowledge areas.
For example, imagine that a negotiation team representing a software company
negotiates with a client the development of a new software product. The negoti-
ation team is composed of the manager of the software company, a representative
from the R&D department, and a representative from the economic department.
The manager of the software company and the representative from the economic
department know that the price is a very important issue for the software company.
Nevertheless, they may not be able to identify which technologies are viable for the
product, which services are viable in the final product, and the development time
for the application. Thus, they require the knowledge of the R&D representative
during the negotiation. It is important that team members share knowledge about
the negotiation domain prior to the negotiation, especially when team members
have very different expertise. Otherwise, the negotiation may end up with an in-
efficient agreement (i.e., a high price but deadlines that are far beyond what is
realistic).
Even assuming that team members have similar backgrounds, it is still impor-
tant to understand the negotiation domain together. Let us imagine that a group
of friends (e.g., Alice, Bob and Charlie) decides to go on a travel together and
have fun. What is the meaning of “having fun”? Clearly, it may be different for
each friend: Alice thinks that a city that offers lots of adventure sports is fun, Bob
thinks that having fun also involves finding a place with a considerable night life,
whereas Charlie is happy with any plan as long as it does not involve much money.
From this situation, it can be inferred that the price, adventure activities included
in the travel package, and the night life activities are relevant negotiation issues
for the team in the negotiation at hand.
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But identifying negotiation issues that are relevant for the team is not the
only task necessary to completely understand the negotiation domain. Identifying
which issues are predictable and compatible for the team, and which issues are not
predictable is also crucial. On the one hand, a negotiation issue is predictable and
compatible among team members if the preferences of all of the team members
over issue values are known and compatible. For instance, in a team of buyers, it
is logical that all team members prefer low prices over high prices. In this type
of negotiation issues, there is full potential for cooperation among team members
since increasing the utility for a team member (i.e., decreasing the price) results in
other team members staying at the same utility or increasing their utility. On the
other hand, a negotiation issue is not predictable among team members if nothing
can be inferred about which issue values are preferred by team members. The issue
may be compatible among team members (i.e., same ranking of preferences over
issue values) or not, but it is not possible to know the nature of the negotiation issue
unless team members are willing to share information. For example, in the team of
traveling friends, it is not known whether team members prefer Rome to London,
London to Rome, or they all prefer Berlin to London and Rome. Using information
regarding which issues are predictable and compatible and unpredictable among
team members may be useful for deciding on which negotiation strategy is used
among team members.
The technologies that can give support to these processes are varied. As in any
phase that involves deliberation and discussion, argumentation in groups (126,
127, 128, 129, 130) may be a useful technique to discuss regarding the negotiation
domain and reach an agreement over which negotiation issues are relevant to the
negotiation process. Other technologies like formation of shared expert mental
models (132) and belief merging of multiple knowledge bases (133, 134, 135) may
also prove useful for obtaining a shared model of the negotiation domain. However,
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it should be noted that most belief merging methods are not strategy-proof (135,
136). A belief merging method is strategy-proof when it is robust against attempts
of manipulation by agents. An agent may try to manipulate the belief merging
process if it expects to increase its utility. Another interesting issue is whether or
not agents have incentive to share all of the information regarding the negotiation
domain. An agent may be willing to share a piece of information only if it expects
that it is going to report higher utility than hiding the piece of information (i.e.,
selective information disclosure (137)). For example, taking up the example of the
traveling friends, if Alice likes Rome, but she knows that Rome may not be a good
place for night activities, she may hide this information from Bob in order to avoid
making Rome less likeable by the group.
The final result of this phase should be a list of negotiation issues that are
relevant to the team, and, ideally, an understanding of which issues are predictable
and compatible and unpredictable among team members.
4.6 Agree Negotiation Issues
Since the previous stage produced a list of issues which is relevant for the team
members, the next stage consists of agreeing a final list of negotiation issues with
the opponent. The opponent may have its own list of issues relevant to the nego-
tiation. Thus, a final list of issues to be negotiated should be agreed between both
parties.
From the initial set of negotiation issues proposed by the team, some of the
issues may not be negotiable since the opponent does not offer that service. For
example, if the team members had originally concluded that negotiating packages
of adventure activities is a relevant issue to the team but a travel agency does
not work with such packages, the issue cannot be included in the negotiation.
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Additionally, some negotiation issues that were not included in the list proposed by
the team may be included in the final list since they are relevant to the opponent.
As for those negotiation issues present in the lists proposed by team members
and the opponent, it may also be necessary to agree on the issue domain (i.e., the
values that the negotiation issue can take). Similarly to the agreement on the list
of issues, the final domain value may not contain all of the values proposed by
both parties (i.e., Rome cannot be a value for the city of destination if the travel
agency does not offer flights to Rome).
Despite being an important process in the pre-negotiation, very little atten-
tion has been paid to agreeing negotiation issues between parties. In fact, most
researchers in negotiation assume that the list of negotiation issues and their do-
mains are already agreed in their negotiation models. Faratin (20) mentions in his
thesis the possibility of adding and removing non-core issues during the negotia-
tion. While core negotiation issues remain static during the negotiation process,
involved parties may be able to add or remove non-core negotiation issues as the
negotiation process advances. However, the list of non-core issues is assumed to be
known by both parties and the development of an issue-manipulation algorithm
was appointed as future work. We acknowledge that this is a process that needs
to be researched in the future.
4.7 Plan Negotiation Protocol
After the list of issues is set, the parties have to agree a negotiation protocol. There
are different negotiation protocols that may be applied for a specific situation.
For instance, if the negotiation team engages with an opponent in a bilateral
negotiation, both parties could employ the classical alternating offers protocol
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(12), extensions of such protocol like the k-alternating offers protocol (57), or
more complex protocols like (138, 139).
The team as a whole may have different opinions and knowledge about the
available protocols. In fact, some of the team members may not even know some
of those protocols. In that case, those protocols cannot be used by the team since
some of its players do not know the rules and decision making strategies to face
such games.
In this phase, if more than an applicable protocol is known by all of the team
members, they should decide as a group which protocols are preferred by the team
(i.e., a ranking of the known protocols). This may be based on the expertise of each
agent in the aforementioned protocol, computational efficiency, decision making
mechanisms known by team members, and so forth. Given the assumption that the
set of known protocols for a specific situation is limited and probably small, team
members may employ argumentation techniques (126, 127, 128, 129, 130) followed
by a voting mechanism (131) to decide on a ranking of the available protocols.
As far as we are concerned, very little work has been carried out with respect
to evaluating negotiation protocols. The only exception is presented in Miller et
al. (140). The authors propose a framework where protocols are not imposed at
design time. Instead, protocols are inside a dynamic library at runtime. Agent
are able to analyze, instantiate and reason regarding the possible outcomes that
the protocol may entail.
4.8 Agree Negotiation Protocol
Considering that the team has already decided on which negotiation protocols are
preferred by team members (i.e., some sort of ranking over the negotiation pro-
tocols), they should agree with the opponents on the negotiation protocols that
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are to be used for interacting. Again, opponents may not know how to play some
games, making some of the options not feasible. Some protocols known by the op-
ponent may not be known by all of the team members. Over the list of protocols
that are known by both parties, both parties may have different preferences and
knowledge regarding the different protocols. This decision between both parties
is going to involve some kind of simple negotiation (i.e., we do not expect the
number of possibilities to be large) or discussion among both parties. In some
cases, besides the negotiation protocol, some parameters of the protocol have to
be decided also by both parties (i.e., who is the initiating party in the alternating
offers protocol (12), the number of offers allowed in the k-alternating offers proto-
col (57), who acts as trusted mediator in mediated protocols like (138, 139), etc.).
Some authors like (141, 142) have started to tackle the problem of negotiating
over negotiation protocols. In (141), a formal framework is presented for express-
ing and constructing dynamic negotiation protocols in open environments. The
construction of negotiation protocols is based on basic pieces named as dialogue
acts (i.e., basic communication particles) that aim to solve one of the specific goals
of the negotiation protocol. However, how a group of agents may agree on such
protocols is not specifically covered. Reed et al. (142) can be considered as a
complement to the previous approach. Basically, the authors present a framework
where agents agree on the semantics of communicative particles, which may be
later used to construct dynamic communications in open multi-agent systems.
The final result of this phase is a set of negotiation protocols that will be
followed in the negotiations with the different opponents.
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4.9 Decide Intra-team Strategy
Negotiation protocols define the rules of interaction to be followed by the differ-
ent parties. For instance, it indicates when the different parties can make of-
fers/arguments, which kind of messages they are expected to send/receive, etc.
Generally, these interactions involve one of the parties taking a particular decision
(i.e., which offers is sent in the alternating offers protocol, which type of argument
is sent to convince about one’s own position, the information that is leaked to the
other parties, etc.). In a single player party, how these decisions are taken are up
to the agent. However, when the party is formed by multiple individuals, which is
the case of the negotiation team, the team has to decide on how, when, and what
decisions are taken, and who takes those decisions. This is what we termed as an
intra-team strategy or team dynamics.
For example, in the case of the alternating offers protocol (12), each party
should decide on which offer is sent to the opponent party, whether or not to
accept the offer proposed by the other party, and when one should withdraw from
the negotiation process. Thus, any intra-team strategy for teams participating in
the alternating offers protocol should decide on those issues.
For the same negotiation protocol, there may be different intra-team strategies.
In the case of the alternating offers protocol, the team may delegate on one of the
team members to take all of the decisions or some/all of the may involved in
the decision-making processes of the team. The list of offers to be sent to the
opponent may be decided prior to the negotiation with the opponent, or it may
be dynamically constructed as the opponent gives its feedback in the negotiation
process by means of its counter-offers. As for the acceptance of opponent’s offers,
the team may decide on using voting mechanisms with different unanimity rules.
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In fact, the spectrum of intra-team strategies for a certain negotiation protocol
may be as large as to be considered infinite.
Obviously, for different negotiation protocols, different decisions have to be
taken and an intra-team strategy that has been proposed for a particular negoti-
ation protocol may not be directly applied to other type of negotiation protocol.
Thus, usually negotiation protocols and intra-team strategies are tightly coupled.
Another interesting problem that may arise in several intra-team strategies is
role/task allocation. For instance, if an intra-team strategy relies on the selection
of a representative that will act on behalf of the team, who plays such role? If the
intra-team strategy requires that an agent coordinates voting processes, who acts
as a trusted mediator? The role of trusted mediator may be taken by an agent
from inside the team or by an external agent. It is also known that negotiation
may involve several tasks like looking for outside options, seeking information,
and monitoring the market. How are these tasks divided between the team mem-
bers? Traditionally, multi-agent teamwork literature has been especially fruitful
in the area of task/role allocation (36, 143, 144, 145, 146). Nevertheless, as far
as we know, none of these approaches have been explicitly applied to teamwork
in negotiation teams. Partly, this may be explained by the fact that most studies
in multi-agent teamwork have focused on teams where all of the team members
share a joint goal. Despite the fact that negotiation teams have a common joint
goal (otherwise, they would not collaborate), each team member may have its own
individual goals. Teams with mixed motives have not been as extensively studied
in multi-agent literature with the exceptions of (147, 148). Therefore, it is neces-
sary to study to what extent team members would fully collaborate in negotiation
team’s tasks in spite of their own utility. For example, how interesting is it for
a team member to look for new outside options for the team when current ones
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report high utility for himself? A self-interested team member may decide to ne-
glect its search tasks and continue with present outside options if it considers that
new outside options will not increase its current welfare.
One of the hypotheses of this thesis is that there is not a single intra-team
strategy that is capable of outperforming the rest of intra-team strategies for
every possible scenario. Depending on the goal of the team (e.g., social choice
performance measure), and depending on the conditions of the negotiation envi-
ronment (e.g., team size, similarity among team members’ preferences, opponent
concession, deadline length, etc.), some intra-team strategies will perform better
than others. Some researchers have proposed the use of extensive simulation in
the laboratory to assess which strategies would work better in certain specific con-
ditions (63, 64, 65, 66, 149, 150). The results of these simulations can provide
profitable knowledge to be used when the agents face the challenge of selecting
an appropriate strategy. Despite the fact that these simulations have been carried
out in the bilateral setting for single individual parties, no study exists for the
team case.
4.10 Select Individual Strategy
Each team member should plan its individual strategy before heading into the
negotiation. An intra-team strategy defines mechanisms for team decision-making
but they do not define how individual team members behave when playing those
mechanisms. It is up to the agent to decide how to act inside the team: it can
be more or less cooperative. The agent should also decide its attitude with the
opponent, which may be classified as competitive, conceding, matcher or inverter
(151). The two aforementioned factors will define the initial negotiation strategy
of each team member.
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Generally, the selection of the initial negotiation strategy is based on what is
expected about the opponent and teammates. As stated in the previous section,
one of our hypotheses is that the state of the negotiation environment plays a key
role in selecting which intra-team strategies are more appropriate for each specific
situation. Thus, team members should also decide on their individual strategy
based on the knowledge about the negotiation environment.
4.11 Negotiation & Adaptation
The final phase is the negotiation itself. During this phase, team members should
follow the planned intra-team strategies, individual strategies, and negotiation
protocols. However, negotiation is a dynamic process that may not go as planned
(e.g., opponents not behaving as one initially thought, team members performing
below/above one’s expectations, members leaving the team, etc.). Therefore, it
may be necessary that each team member adapts its own negotiation strategy,
and that the team replans some of the aspects related to team composition and
team dynamics. More specifically, we argue that it may be interesting to study
the following adaptation problems:
• Team membership: As stated, team membership may be dynamic. In fact,
how dynamic a negotiation team is may depend on the application domain.
Domains where team members are more self-interested and less bonds exist
between team members (e.g., team of buyers) may be more dynamic than
domains where team members are more cooperative and there are human
bonds (e.g., group of travelers, human organizations, etc.). In any case, in
both situations the problem of dynamic membership may arise. For instance,
new buyers may appear in the electronic market and they may be added
to the team to take advantage of larger price discounts. Similarly, a new
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traveler may decide to travel during holidays and his user may state the
desire of joining the pre-existing group of travelers. Cases of team member’s
withdrawal are also possible. For instance, one of the buyers participates in
other buyers’ coalitions and it decides to close a deal, making its membership
in the rest of the buyers’ coalitions no longer necessary.
• Negotiation issues: Initially, both parties agreed to negotiate over some
initial issues. For some reasons (e.g., computational issues, computational
tractability, etc.), they may have decided to leave some less relevant issues
out of the negotiation. However, at some points an impasse (152, 153) may
occur in the negotiation. A negotiation impasse occurs when the parties are
unable to reach an agreement and the perspectives of reaching one are very
negative. They are in a deadlock. A possible solution for such problematic
situation is what is known as issue linkage (154, 155, 156). Basically, when
parties negotiate on one issue, adding another issue and linking its value
to the value of the initial issue can increase the probability of finding an
agreement. The new issue may be added to reduce intra-team conflict (e.g.,
how costs are split in the team), or they may be added to reduce conflict
with the opponent (e.g., include a payment method issue and maximize the
preferences of the opponent in the new issue). This adaptation heuristic
may be positive for cases that are prone to fail. However, as suggested by
(155, 156), issue linkage may also have negative effects since it may also re-
duce the agreement space. As of today, issue linkage is an area that has not
been widely studied in automated negotiation, where it has been assumed
that issues remain static during the negotiation process. Hence, it is an area
that requires further exploration, especially for the team case since conflict
may appear at the team level and the opponent level.
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• Intra-team strategy and individual strategy adaptation: As stated, intra-
team strategies define what decisions are taken by the team, how decisions
are taken, and when those decisions are taken. Assuming that team members
chose the best intra-team strategy according to the initial negotiation con-
ditions and expectations, it may be possible that one of such conditions and
expectations changed during the negotiation process, precluding the initial
intra-team strategy from being the best choice. In that case, it may be wise
for team members to change their current intra-team strategy in order to
match the new changes in the negotiation environment. Obviously, changes
in the intra-team strategy and environment’s condition also call for an adap-
tation in team members’ individual strategies. In this sense, there have been
some works that advocate for a change in individual agents’ strategies in
bilateral negotiations (60, 101, 102, 103, 149, 157, 158, 159). All of these
works show the benefits of adapting one’s behavior during the negotiation
to achieve better results. We can distinguish between works where individ-
ual agents adapt their behavior attending to environmental conditions like
outside options and competitors (101, 102, 103) and works where individual
agents adapt their behavior during the negotiation attending to the attitude
of the opponent (60, 149, 157, 158, 159). However, as far as we are concerned,
these techniques have not been extrapolated to the team case.
4.12 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have proposed a general workflow of tasks that may help
agent-based negotiation teams to perform successfully in their correspondent ap-
plications. Next, we conclude by overviewing these tasks in order of appearance,
and outlining the major challenges that may arise in each of them.
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• Identify Negotiation: The first step consists of being able to perceive when
conflict is present and who may be involved in the conflict (i.e., opponents,
prospective teammates, and competitors). Conflict detection in open sys-
tems may be of extreme importance, and adaptive mechanisms may be
needed to detect conflict in such systems. We argue that case based reason-
ing may be a useful technology since it may be able to detect and anticipate
conflict based on past experiences, and it may be able to learn from new
situations. Additionally, agents may employ search mechanisms in networks
to be able to discover new partners, opponents, and competitors. It should
be stated that most work in similar areas has focused on domain specific
conflict detection or static general rules for detection of conflict. Thus, this
area of work remains largely unexplored.
• Team Formation: If the agent thinks that it may be beneficial to form a
negotiation team, it should attempt to select its teammates. Closely re-
lated research areas are coalition formation and cooperative team formation.
The former has focused on forming optimal groups of agents and how to
divide the payoffs of the group task. However, the result of the negotia-
tion may be difficult to anticipate and, while some negotiation issues like
price may be naturally divisible, others may be hard to be divided (e.g.,
payment method). Furthermore, negotiation teams may not be able to be
disbanded or join other teams when better coalitional options appear. Co-
operative team formation aims to form teams based on complementary skills
for a certain task. Nevertheless, team members may not be fully coopera-
tive since they have their own and possibly conflicting individual interests.
An ideal solution to this task may inherit features from both cooperative
team formation and coalition formation and, additionally, it may need to
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take into account factors specific to negotiation teams like (i) the relation-
ship between team size and social power; (ii) the relationship between team
size, team similarity, intra-team conflict and conflict with the opponent; (iii)
requiring different knowledge expertise; (iv) the social network provided by
each team member. In conclusion, even though some related research has
been carried out, it may need to consider additional issues that are specific
to negotiation teams.
• Opponent Selection: The next step consists of selecting the opponents with
whom the team will negotiate. In this task, related research exists that could
be directly employed like selecting opponents based on past experiences and
arguing or using social choice to assess the best available options based on
other information sources.
• Understand the Negotiation Domain: The general idea behind this task
is creating a shared knowledge model of the negotiation domain at hand.
It includes identifying negotiation issues, merging different points of views
and expertise, clarifying team goals that may be abstract in essence, and
identifying the nature of prospective negotiation issues (e.g., predictable,
unpredictable, compatible, etc.). Some related research in this area may
be argumentation and belief merging. However, it should be taken into
account that some team members may be self-interested and they may show
opportunistic behaviors (e.g., manipulating belief merging, hiding relevant
information for one’s own interest, etc.).
• Agree Negotiation Issues: The next part consists of agreeing with the op-
ponent which negotiation issues should be considered in the negotiation.
Despite its importance, negotiation models usually assume that the negotia-
tion domain as given and they do not provide mechanisms that allow forming
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or negotiating the domain. This is potentially one of the most interesting
research challenges since, as far as we know, related literature is almost nil.
• Plan Negotiation Protocol: Given a specific situation, there may be differ-
ent negotiation protocols that may be used to negotiate with the opponent.
Team members should argue about which protocols are preferred according
to his experiences, strategies known, and so forth. Although the problem has
not been explicitly covered by the literature, its solution may not pose excep-
tional efforts compared to classic argumentation and social choice problems.
• Agree Negotiation Protocol: Similarly, once team members have discussed
about the available negotiation protocols, they should negotiate a proper
negotiation protocol and its parameters with the opponent. The problem
may not be different from any other negotiation.
• Decide Intra-team Strategy: Intra-team strategies define team dynamics for
a specific negotiation protocol. This refers to the coordination and nego-
tiation protocol carried out within the team to decide on the steps to be
carried out in the negotiation with the opponent. If the intra-team strat-
egy requires role differentiation, techniques from role/task allocation may
be employed. However, it should be considered that agents may not be
fully cooperative. Thus, the problem slightly differs from classic role/task
allocation. Additionally, team members may employ information regarding
the current environment state (e.g., deadline length, number of competitors,
team size, beliefs regarding the opponent, etc.) in order to decide on the
most appropriate intra-team strategy. We have identified that even though
some studies exist that identify good practices and good strategies for sin-
gle individual parties, the area remains largely unexplored for intra-team
strategies.
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• Select Individual Strategy: The intra-team strategy defines team dynamics,
but it does not define the individual behavior of team members per se. The
next step consists of each team member deciding on its own the most ap-
propriate individual behavior for the negotiation at hand. This task may
not pose additional difficulties compared to the selection of the individual
negotiation strategy in classic negotiations.
• Negotiation & Adaptation: The final task of this workflow consists of carry-
ing out the negotiation and adapting some of the decisions taken in order to
properly face unexpected events. We have identified three main aspects that
may be adapted in a negotiation team. The first of them is team membership
since team members may join and leave the team during the negotiation. In
that sense, the mechanisms needed for this adaption may not differ so much
from the ones employed in team formation. The second aspect that may be
adapted is negotiation issues. Parties can solve impasses in the negotiation
and better off other parties by including other issues that were not initially
included in the negotiation. As far as we are concerned, this problem has
not been widely studied in multi-agent literature. The third and final factor
that we consider is the intra-team strategy and the individual strategy. Usu-
ally, team members have planned on using an intra-team strategy and an
individual strategy based on some initial prediction of the negotiation envi-
ronment and teammates’ behavior. However, based on new evidence, initial
predictions may prove wrong and adjustments need to be done in order to
properly tackle the negotiation. In automated negotiation, some works exist
that allow single individual parties to adapt themselves to changes in the
negotiation environment and new information. These mechanisms could be
employed as long as they were adapted to the negotiation team case.
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It must be stated that, in this thesis, our goal is not to detail how to carry
out each task. Each of the proposed workflow tasks may give room for an indi-
vidual PhD thesis by itself and needs to be studied in-depth. In this thesis we
focus on solving the tasks related to the negotiation, although some of our models
also cover tasks in the pre-negotiation (e.g., information sharing). In any case,
we think the type of analytic studied carried out in this chapter may help the
reader to understand the complexity involved in negotiation teams and make clear
some of the problems for future researchers in the field. Out of the tasks pro-
posed in this workflow, we decided to focus on the study of intra-team strategies
in this thesis. The reason behind this decision is that given that intra-team strate-
gies govern team dynamics and negotiaton decisions, they are expected to have a
greater impact on team performance. Thus, in Chapters 5 and 6 we propose and
validate different intra-team strategies. The intra-team strategies in Chapter 5
are evaluated in domains where negotiation issues are predictable and compatible
among team members, whereas intra-team strategies in Chapter 6 are evaluated
in domains with predictable and compatible and unpredictable issues.
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As mentioned, among the different tasks that a negotiation team has to face, we
decided to focus on intra-team strategies. Intra-team strategies define team dy-
namics during the negotiation process. We consider that due to the fact that
intra-team strategies govern the decision making of the team, they directly af-
fect team performance. Hence, the direct effect on team performance drove our
research towards intra-team strategies.
In this thesis, we are interested in intra-team strategies for teams whose mem-
bers may have different preferences regarding the negotiation issues. In this chap-
ter, we start our study on the subject by focusing on models for electronic markets
where negotiation issues are predictable and compatible among team members. By
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issue predictability and compatibility among team members we refer to the fact
that the preferences of the team members over issue values are known and com-
patible. For instance, in a team composed by buyers, it is quite reasonable to
assume that all of the buyers prefer low prices to high prices, high quality to low
quality, short dispatch time to large dispatch time, and so forth. This will be
translated to the fact that even though the exact shape of the valuation function
is not known, the type of valuation function for negotiation issues is predictable
and compatible among team members: a ranking for issue values is known for each
issue and it is common among team members. This kind of assumption is com-
mon in some electronic commerce scenarios where team members share the same
role (e.g., buyers). For instance, buyers usually share the same type of valuation
function for attributes such as the price (i.e., they prefer lower prices to higher
prices), product quality (i.e., they prefer higher quality to lower quality), and the
dispatch time (i.e., they prefer shorter dispatch times to longer dispatch times).
In this scenario, we propose four intra-team strategies for a negotiation team
that negotiates with a single opponent by means of the alternating offers protocol
(12): representative (RE), similarity simple voting (SSV), similarity borda vot-
ing (SVB) and full unanimity mediated (FUM). These strategies are designed to
cover four minimum levels of unanimity regarding team decisions: no unanimity
guaranteed (i.e., representative), plurality/majority (i.e., similarity simple voting),
semi-unanimity (i.e., similarity borda voting) and unanimity (i.e., full unanimity
mediated). Among these intra-team strategies, we put a special emphasis on full
unanimity mediated since it is able to guarantee unanimity regarding team deci-
sions (i.e., full unanimity mediated). Our belief is that, when possible, unanimity
among team members is a very important feature for negotiation teams models.
Agreements that are unacceptable for a team member should be avoided since they
might deteriorate human relationships. Technologies that help to form unanimous
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decisions may provide more user satisfaction, and they can help team members
to avoid unexpected outcomes. Hence, a special interest from our part is put
into intra-team strategies that are able to guarantee unanimity regarding team
decisions.
As stated in the introduction of this thesis, one of our initial hypothesis is that
environmental conditions may affect the performance of intra-team strategies. It
has been documented that environment conditions such as the deadline, concession
speed, and reservation utility may affect the impact of single-individual bilateral
strategies (18). However, in the team case, new conditions like the number of
team members, team preferences’ diversity, and the emergent effect of aggregating
team members’ behaviors/actions may also end up affecting team performance.
Prior to the negotiation process, negotiation teams face the challenge of selecting
which intra-team strategy should be employed. If environmental conditions have
an effect on the performance of the different intra-team strategies, the intra-team
strategy for the negotiation at hand should be selected accordingly to the current
environmental conditions inferred by team members. One of our research goal is
identifying how these environmental conditions may affect the different intra-team
strategies presented in this chapter. Due to the large amount of variables that may
affect the negotiation, we employ an empirical approach to study the behavior of
the four intra-team strategies.
The chapter is organized as follows. First, we describe the assumptions of our
framework (Section 5.2). Then, we illustrate a motivating negotiation scenario for
the strategies presented in this chapter. The motivating scenario is based on a
group booking domain. After that, the details of the four intra-team strategies
are thoroughly described in Sections 5.4, 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7. Then, in Section 5.8,
we describe in depth some of the empirical evaluations carried out to study the
behavior of full unanimity mediated. In Section 5.9, the experiments carried out to
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analyze the different intra-team strategies in different negotiation environments.
Finally, we briefly state the conclusions of this chapter in Section 5.10.
5.2 Negotiation Setting
• The teamA is formed byM different agents ai, 1 ≤ i ≤M (A = {a1, a2, ..., aM}).
It should be stated that team membership is considered static during the
negotiation process. Dynamic agent-based negotiation teams are not consid-
ered in this thesis, and they are appointed as future lines of work.
• The common goal of the team A is negotiating a successful deal with the
opponent op. Thus, in this case we assume an implicit representation of the
teams’ goal.
• It is assumed that information is private, even among team members. There-
fore, agents do not know other agents’ utility functions, strategies, reserva-
tion utilities, or deadlines. We also assume that agents have limited com-
putational resources (i.e., bounded rationality). Thus, we take a heuris-
tic approach which seeks good quality results while being computationally
tractable.
• It is assumed that the team A and the opponent op communicate following
an alternating bilateral protocol (12). One of the two parties acts as the
initiator, and is entitled to propose the first offer. The other party receives
the offer and can respond with two different actions: accept the offer (suc-
cessful negotiation), or propose a counteroffer. If a counteroffer is proposed,
the initiator party receives the offer and it can either accept the counteroffer
or propose another offer, starting a new negotiation round. Depending on
the intra-team strategy, one of the team members or a team mediator is
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responsible of the communications with the opponent. In this setting, the
fact that one of the parties is a team is not directly stated to the other party,
although in some domains it may be logical to think that the party is formed
by multiple individual (i.e., group booking).
• Additionally, it is also assumed that the negotiation is time-bounded, and
each party has a private deadline TA (team deadline), Top (opponent dead-
line). When its deadline is achieved, the party leaves the negotiation and it
is considered a failed negotiation. In the case of TA, it is considered a joint
deadline for all of the team members, who have agreed upon this deadline
prior to the negotiation at hand.
• The team mediator, if present, is never a perfect mediator that aggregates
the utility functions of all the team members. This assumption is taken due
to the fact that, depending on the application, some team members may
not be completely trustable and they may attempt to exaggerate/change
their preferences to manipulate the negotiation process. This mischievous
behavior is easily carried out when aggregating utility functions.
• The negotiation domain is comprised of n issues. A complete offer is repre-
sented as X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn}, where xi is a specific instantiation of issue
i. Additionally, we use the notation Xti→j to denote that offer X was sent
at round t from party i to party j.
• Every agent i (team member or opponent) has its preferences represented
by means of additive utility functions in the form:
Ui(X) = wi,1 Vi,1(xi,1) + wi,2 Vi,2(x2) + ...+ wi,n Vi,n(xn) (5.1)
where X is a complete offer, xj , is the value given to the j-th issue, Vi,j(.)
is the valuation function for issue j used by agent i to normalize the issue
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value to [0, 1], and wi,j is the weight/importance given by agent i to issue j
in the negotiation process. Several observations should be made regarding
these utility functions:
– Weights are normalized so that
∑n
j=1 wi,j = 1.
– Issues are assumed to be independent from each other. Thus, the val-
uation of one of the issues does not alter the others issues’ valuation.
– Negotiation issues are compatible and predictable among team members.
An issue j with domain Dj is compatible among team members if for
each pair of team members a, b ∈ A, and for each pair of issue values
v1, v2 ∈ Dj , the following expression is true:
Va,j(v2) ≥ Va,j(v1)←→ Vb,j(v2) ≥ Vb,j(v1). (5.2)
Hence, an issue is compatible among team members if changing its
value (v1) with another value (v2) increases/decreases a team mem-
ber’s utility, then v2 would also increase/decrease the utility for other
members. Thus, there is potential for cooperation among team mem-
bers. Examples of functions that are compatible and predictable are
monotonically increasing valuation functions or monotonically decreas-
ing valuation functions. Moreover, we assume that team members share
the same type of monotonic function (i.e., increasing or decresing) for
each Vi,j(.). As for the opponent, it is assumed that the monotonic
function for Vi,j(.) is the opposite type to that of team members. It is
reasonable to assume this model for valuation functions in e-commerce
scenarios. Buyers usually share the same type of valuation function
for issues such as the price (monotonically decreasing), product quality
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(monotonically increasing), and the dispatch time (monotonically de-
creasing), whereas sellers usually use the opposite type of monotonic
functions (monotonically increasing for price, monotonically decreasing
for product quality, and monotonically increasing for dispatch time).
– Issue weights wi,j are different for team members. This way, we are able
to represent the fact that some team members may be more interested
in some issues whereas other team members may be more interested in
other issues (e.g., some team members prefer price over quality, while
others give a higher priority to the product quality). The weights of
the opponent’s utility function may be different from those of team
members.
• The opponent has a reservation utility RUop. Any offer whose utility is lower
than RUop will be rejected. Each team member ai has a private reservation
utility RUai . This individual reservation utility is not shared among team-
mates. Therefore, a team member ai will reject any offer whose value is
under RUai . In this setting, reservation utilities represent the individual
utility of each agent if the negotiation process fails.
• In our negotiation model, we define that a final decision X (i.e., final agree-
ment) is unanimously acceptable among team members when the utility
reported by such decision for each team member is equal to or greater than
the reservation utility of each team member:
∀ai ∈ A,Uai(X) ≥ RUai (5.3)
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5.3 Motivating Example: Group Booking
In this section we present a scenario which can be modeled by means of a negoti-
ation between a team and an opponent. Its purpose is to illustrate the behavior
of the different intra-team strategies when they are described in Sections 5.4, 5.5,
5.6 and 5.7. The scenario involves a group of persons that need to book an hotel
in a city for a group vacation. We have named this scenario as Group Booking.
In this scenario, a group of friends (e.g., Alice, Bob and Charlie), who have
decided to spend their holidays together, has to book accommodation for their stay.
Their destination is Rome, and they want to spend a whole week. Each friend is
represented by his/her electronic agent (aa, ab, ac), who acts semi-automatically
on behalf of its user. This agent has previously elicited the preferences of its
user regarding booking conditions. Each group member has different preferences
regarding possible booking conditions. Thus, the final agreement with the hotel
should satisfy every friend as much as possible. This leads to the use of an agent-
based negotiation team model. The group of agents, engages in a negotiation with
a well-known hotel in their city of destination, which is also represented by an
electronic agent (op). During the pre-negotiation, both parties have decided to
negotiate the following issues:
• Price per person (pp): The price per person is the amount of money that each
friend will pay to the hotel for the accommodation service. The issue domain
goes from 210$, which is the minimum rate (30$ per night), to 700$, which
is the maximum rate (100$ per night). A realistic assumption in the group
of friends is that friends prefer to pay lower prices to higher prices (mono-
tonically decreasing valuation function), whereas the seller prefers to charge
higher prices to lower prices (monotonically increasing valuation function).
126
5.3 Motivating Example: Group Booking
• Cancellation fee per person (cf): When a booking is cancelled, the hotel
deletes the reservation but it charges a fee to compensate for losses. The
issue domain goes from 0$ (no cancellation fee) to 150$. A realistic as-
sumption in the group of friends is that friends prefer to pay lower prices
to higher prices (monotonically decreasing valuation function), whereas the
seller prefers to charge higher prices to lower prices (monotonically increasing
valuation function).
• Full payment deadline (pd): The full payment deadline indicates when the
group of friends has to pay the full price to confirm their reservation. The
domain goes from “Today”=0 days (the date time when the final agreement
has been signed) to “Departure Date”=30 days, which indicates that the
team should only pay when leaving the hotel. A realistic assumption in the
group of friends is that friends prefer to pay as late as possible (monotonically
increasing valuation function), whereas the seller prefers to charge as soon
as possible (monotonically decreasing valuation function).
• Discount in bar (db): As a token of respect for good clients, the hotel offers
nice discounts at the hotel bar. The issue domain goes from 0% (no discount)
to 20%. A realistic assumption in the group of friends is that friends pre-
fer higher discounts to lower discounts (monotonically increasing valuation
function), whereas the seller prefers to offer lower discounts prices to higher
discounts (monotonically decreasing valuation function).
For illustrative purposes thorough this chapter, the users’ preference profiles of
each friend have been modeled by means of additive utility functions as follows:
• Alice is sure that she wants to go on a travel, but she is short on budget
right now. Thus, she gives more importance to the price of the hotel and the
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payment date. She thinks that the hotel bar is very expensive, so having food
outside the hotel is a better option than using discounts at the bar. After
the elicitation process, Alice utility function was elicited with the following
weights:
Uaa(X) = 0.5 Vpp(xpp) + 0.0 Vcf (xcf ) + 0.5 Vpd(xpd) + 0.0 Vdb(xdb) (5.4)
• Bob is not very sure about being able to travel in the agreed dates since
he may have to attend a conference. Thus, one of his main priorities is
minimizing the cancellation fee. Additionally, he is moderately worried about
the hotel price but he does not give much importance to the payment date
and discounts at the bar. Bob utility function was elicited with the following
weights:
Uab(X) = 0.3 Vpp(xpp) + 0.6 Vcf (xcf ) + 0.05 Vpd(xpd) + 0.05 Vdb(xdb) (5.5)
• On the one hand, Charlie is equally worried about the hotel price and the
payment deadline, but he is sure about going on a travel. On the other hand,
Charlie is a fan of good food, and he has heard very good reviews about the
hotel bar. He thinks that the discounts are a good opportunity to taste the
culinary specialties of the hotel bar. His utility function was elicited with
the following weights:
Uac(X) = 0.35 Vpp(xpp) + 0.1 Vcf (xcf ) + 0.35 Vpd(xpd) + 0.2 Vdb(xdb) (5.6)
Alice, Bob and Charlie share the same type of monotonic functions for the
valuation functions Vj(.). In this example, monotonically increasing valuation
functions have been modeled as Vj(x) =
x−xmin
xmax−xmin and monotonically decreasing
functions have been modeled as Vj(x) = 1− x−xminxmax−xmin . For instance, the valuation
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function for the price would look like Vpp(xpp) = 1 − x−210700−210 , and valuations
for 210$, 400$, 500$, and 700$ would result in Vpp(210) = 1, Vpp(400) = 0.61,
Vpp(500) = 0.40, and Vpp(700) = 0 respectively.
As for the reservation utility, the three friends also have different options.
While Alice may buy a new TV in case that the negotiation fails (RUaa = 0.3),
Bob can go to his parents’ apartment (RUab = 0.2), and Charlie’s only alternative
vacation plan is going camping (RUac = 0.3). The electronic agents of the three
friends have decided that they can attempt to interact up to 100 times with the
opponent (TA = 100), and they think that a linear concession would be adequate
for the negotiation at hand (βA = 1) given the current conditions.
It should be pointed out that all of the preference profiles created for all of
the experiments carried out in this chapter correspond to our motivating scenario.
Once we have described the general assumptions of our negotiation model for
compatible and predictable domains, we describe each of the intra-team strategies
thoroughly.
5.4 Representative (RE)
The representative strategy (RE) is perhaps the simplest intra-team strategy. Ba-
sically, one of the team members is selected as representative are for the team
during the negotiation. This agent acts on behalf of the team during the negotia-
tion, making it responsible of selecting which offers are sent to the opponent, and
whether or not opponent’s offers are accepted. The only communications are those
carried out between the representative agent are and the opponent aop. Therefore,
this strategy is equivalent to a classic bilateral strategy.
The representative agent negotiates according to its own utility function Uare(.)
since it does not know the utility function’s form of the other participants. The
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two decisions that have to be taken during the negotiation are which offers are
sent to the opponent, and whether or not the opponent’s offer is accepted.
5.4.1 Offer proposal
Being a time-bounded negotiation, the representative employs a time-based con-
cession strategy sare(.) to negotiate with the opponent. It is based on a team
deadline TA and a concession speed βA, which have been agreed upon prior to the
negotiation start. This time-based tactic is formalized as (18, 57):






The time-based strategy defines the aspiration level (utility demanded) by the
agent at a specific round t. The utility is demanded from the point of view of the




A→op) ≥ sare(t) (5.8)
This means that any offer sent to the opponent by the representative reports a
utility for the representative which is greater than or equal to the level of demand
marked by the time based concession tactic. Since there is a large number of offers
(possibly infinite) that may obey the equation above, we aimed to satisfy the
opponent’s preferences as much as possible. The representative selects the offer
that is the most similar to the previous offer received from the opponent using a






5.4.2 Evaluation of Opponent’s Offer
A common acceptance criterion is that an opponent’s offer is accepted if it reports
a utility which is higher than or equal to the utility that is to be demanded in
the next negotiation step. In the case of the representative, it will accept the
opponent’s offer Xtop→A at round t if it reports a utility Uare(X
t
op→A) greater than









It is clear that since the representative negotiates according to its own utility func-
tion and reservation utility, it cannot guarantee any kind of unanimity regarding
team decisions. Decisions taken by the representative may only be acceptable to
himself, but nothing can be assured about the rest of team members. Next, we
illustrate several examples with the example introduced in Section 5.3. In these
examples, we assume that Alice is selected as representative.
In the first example, Alice has to propose an offer to the opponent at round
t = 30 with a demand of sare(30) = 1− (0.7)( 30100 ) = 0.79. The last opponent offer
has been X29op→A = (700, 150, 30, 0). One of the offers with Uare(A → op) ≥ 0.79
that minimizes the distance to X29op→A is X
30
A→op = (494.2, 150, 30, 0). This offers
yields Uab(X
30
A→op) = 0.176 and Uac(X
30
A→op) = 0.518. If the offer were to be
accepted, it would be acceptable for Alice and Charlie, but not for Bob. Thus, the
team decision in this case would only guarante 23 unanimity.
In another round t = 100, Alice receives X100op→A = (406, 150, 0, 0) so that
Uare(X
100
op→A) = 0.3 ≥ sare(101). Alice would accept the offer, but it does not reach
the desired utility level for Bob RUab = 0.2 > Uab(X
100
op→A) = 0.18, and Charlie
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RUac = 0.3 > Uac(X
100
op→A) = 0.21. In this case, no one but the representative
would get an acceptable deal from the negotiation.
Finally, in another negotiation at t = 100, Alice receives X100op→A = (406, 0, 0, 0)
so that Uare(X
100
op→A) = 0.3 ≥ sare(101). Alice would accept the offer and it would
be an acceptable offer also for Bob RUab = 0.2 < Uab(X
100
op→A) = 0.78, and Charlie
RUac = 0.3 < Uac(X
100
op→A) = 0.31. Hence, the final offer would be acceptable for
every team member.
One could think that if no consensus can be guaranteed, this strategy is not
worth being used. However, when team members tend to be very similar this strat-
egy is expected to yield acceptable results with communication costs equivalent to
a bilateral negotiation process.
Another issue that has to be taken into account when using this strategy is
security. In our example, we selected the representative randomly. Nevertheless,
this should not be the way to proceed in a real application. Due to the fact that the
representative makes all the decisions for the team, this strategy is highly prone
to be manipulated by malicious agents. By malicious agents, we mean agents
that supplant the identity of party members or agents that falsely allege a certain
identity when their real identity is of an exact opposite nature (e.g., sellers posing
as buyers). It is acknowledged that the representative should be an agent trusted
among team members. For this matter, trust and reputation (38, 39) and social
choice (131) mechanisms could be employed to determine the representative.
5.5 Similarity Simple Voting (SSV)
The second intra-team strategy relies on a trusted team mediator that helps team
members to participate in the negotiation process. Its main tasks involve coor-
dination of voting processes and communications with the opponent. It should
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be highlighted that the team mediator communicates team’s decisions to the op-
ponent, and broadcasts opponent’s decisions among team members. Thus, the
fact that every team member participates in the negotiation process remains un-
known for the opponent. As for intra-team communications, it should be noted
that team members do not communicate among them, but they only communicate
anonymously with the team mediator.
The decision rule used for voting processes is plurality/majority. More specifi-
cally, a plurality rule is used in the voting process employed to decide which offer
is sent to the opponent, and a majority rule is used in the voting process employed
to decide opponent’s offer acceptance. A detailed view of the intra-team strategy
can be observed in Algorithm 4, which describes the whole process from the point
of view of the mediator. Messages are represented as (Body direction agents).
Therefore, (Accept −→ op) means that the agent sends an accept message to op,
whereas (Reject ←− op) describes a message from op with the content “Reject”.
5.5.1 Offer proposal
Whenever a new offer has to be proposed to the opponent at round t, the mediator
opens a call for proposals among team members. Each team member ai is allowed
to communicate anonymously one offer Xtai→A to be proposed to the opponent.
Once every proposal has been gathered, the mediator opens a voting process where
offers proposed XT t =
M⋃
i=1
Xtai→A are made public among team members. Then,
each agent ai anonymously sends a multi-vote V oteai to the mediator. A multi-
vote has votes for every offer in XT t. We use the notation V oteai(j) to denote
the vote given by agent ai to the offer j-th from XT
t. The votes can be either
positive (1), if the offer j-th is acceptable for ai at round t, or negative (0), if the
offer j-th is not acceptable for ai at round t. Once all votes have been gathered,
the mediator sums up the number of positive votes and the most supported offer
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XtA→op is selected, made public among team members, and sent to the opponent.
When a tie is produced, the tie-breaker rule consists in randomly selecting one of







We assume that, since the negotiation is time-bounded, team members follow a
time-based concession strategy where the concession speed βA is common and
agreed by teammates prior to the negotiation process:






For proposing an offer to team members, the member ai proposes an offer X
t
ai→A
from the iso-utility curve defined by sai(t). Since there may be more than a single
offer with such utility, the agent has to choose one of the multiple offers. If the
agent ai wants its offer X
t
ai→A to be accepted it should maximize the probability
of being the most supported proposal by team members and the probability of




where pop(X) is the probability for X to be accepted by the opponent, and pA(X)
is the probability for X to be selected by team members. One way to approx-
imate these probabilities, which can be very costly to calculate, is by means of
similarity heuristics. We incorporated agents with a similarity heuristic based on
the Euclidean distance. It takes into account the last offer proposed by the op-
ponent Xt−1op→A and the offer sent by team members in the previous negotiation
round Xt−1A→op. The most similar an offer is to X
t−1
op→A, the more probabilities for
the offer to be accepted by the opponent. Analogously, the most similar an offer
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is to Xt−1A→op, the more probabilities for the offer to be the most supported option
in the voting process and, therefore, to be sent to the opponent. Thus, Equation










Finally, for determining the acceptability of offers proposed by team members
at round t, we use a rational criterion so that an agent ai emits a positive vote
V oteai(j) = 1 for the j-th offer if it reports a utility that is greater than or equal
to the utility marked by the concession strategy sai(t). Otherwise, the offer is not







where XT t(j) represents the j-th offer in XT t.
5.5.2 Evaluation of Opponent’s Offer
Whenever the mediator receives an offer Xtop→A from the opponent at round t,
it broadcasts the offer among team members. Then, the mediator opens up a
majority voting process where each agent ai states whether or not the opponent’s
offer is acceptable acai(X
t
op→A). The mediator counts the number of acceptances,
and if the offers is supported by the majority (> |A|2 ) then it is accepted by the
team. Otherwise, the offer is rejected. If the number of team members is even
and a tie has been produced, a random decision is taken by the mediator. This
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How team members ai decide the acceptability of the opponent’s offer acai(X
t
op→A)
follows the rational mechanism that we have employed so far. Basically, the of-
fer is acceptable if it yields a utility which is greater than or equal to the utility
demanded by the concession strategy in the next negotiation round sai(t+1). Oth-












The proposed method is capable of guaranteeing team decisions that are sup-
ported by a plurality/majority of the participants. More especifically, plurality
is assured in the case of the offer proposed to the opponent, and majority is as-
sured when deciding opponent’s offer acceptance. Exceptions for this minimum
level of team consensus are ties. For instance, the most extreme case is present
when team members propose offers to the team, but they only support their own
offers. In that case, each proposal sums up exactly 1 positive vote and there is
not a clear plurality winner. In our illustrative example, the trusted mediator
has received (700, 120, 1.5, 8) from the opponent at t = 89, and the last team
offer was (602, 142.5, 3, 4). Now, t = 90, the mediator opens a new call for pro-
posals. Alice demands a utility saa(90) = 0.37, and the offer with such utility
that maximizes Equation 5.14 is X90ac = (509.65, 133.04, 10.54, 5.68)
1. Bob de-
mands a utility sab(90) = 0.28, and the offer with such utility that maximizes
Equation 5.14 is X90ab→A = (605.65, 99.63, 2.68, 6.52). Charlie demands a utility
sac(90) = 0.37, and the offer with such utility that maximizes Equation 5.14 is
1Calculated using sqp (non-linear constrained optimization) in Octave 3.2.4
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t = 0;
while t ≤ TA do
Send (Call For Proposals −→ A);
XT t = ∅;
foreach ai ∈ A do
Receive (Xtai→A
←− ai);





Send (Open Voting XT t −→ A);






Send (XtA→op −→ op,A);
Receive (Xtop→A ←− op);
if Xtop→A = Withdraw then
Send (Opponent Withdraw −→ A);
Return Failure;
end
else if Xtop→A = Accept then




Send (Open Voting Xtop→A −→ A);










Send (Opponent Offer Rejected −→ A);
end
end
t = t + 1;
end
Send (Withdraw −→ op,A);
Return Failure;
Algorithm 4: Pseudo-code algorithm for the mediator in the Similarity Simple
Voting intra-team strategy.
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X90ac→A = (511.82, 119.80, 10.66, 9.10). Since Uaa(X
90
ab→A) = 0.14 < saa(90) and
Uaa(X
90
ac→A) = 0.36 < saa(90), Alice only votes positively for her own offer. Sim-
ilarly, since Uab(X
90
aa→A) = 0.21 < sab(90) and Uab(X
90
ac→A) = 0.27, Bob only
votes positively for his own offer. Finally, since Uac(X
90
aa→A) = 0.32 < sac(90) and
Uac(X
90
ab→A) = 0.19 < sac(90), Charlie’s only positive vote is for his own offer. A
tie is produced between all of the proposals, and so the mediator has to select one
randomly.
If there is a tie in the voting process that determines whether or not the
opponent’s offer is accepted, it means that the number of team members is even
and accepting the opponent’s offer has received half of the votes. The tie-breaking
rule assures that, in this case, at least half of the team members are satisfied with
the agreement at round t, and half of the members plus one are satisfied with
the agreement in case that the number of team members is odd. For instance,
at round t = 60, the mediator receives X60op→A = (406, 150, 20, 20) and makes it
public among team members. In the voting process, Alice supports the opponent’s
offer since Uaa(X
60
op→A) = 0.63 > saa(61) = 0.57, Bob does not support the
opponent’s offer since Uab(X
60
op→A) = 0.27 < sab(61) = 0.51, and Charlie supports
the opponent’s offer since Uac(X
60
op→C) = 0.64 > sac(61) = 0.57. The opponent’s
offer would be accepted and the negotiation would end with a final agreement since
2 out of 3 members supported the opponent’s decision at round 60.
However, it should be noted that even if a team member ai does not support
a team decision at round t and a final agreement is found, it does not necessarily
mean that the final agreement does not satisfy ai’s aspiration (utility of the final
agreement lower than its reservation utility). That situation is only mandatory
when t = TA, a final agreement has been found, and ai did not support such
decision. In other scenarios, the final agreement, even if not supported by every
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team member, may or may not achieve utility levels below team members’ aspi-
rations. For example, in the second example in this discussion, even if Bob does
not support the opponent offer at round 60, it still yields a utility which is higher
than his reservation utility and the final offer would be acceptable in the end. In
the first scenario, it depends on which offer is selected by the tie-breaking rule: If
Alice’s or Charlie’s offer are selected and accepted by the opponent, then every
team members achieves values over their reservation utilities. If Bob’s offer is se-
lected and accepted by the opponent, then neither Alice and Charlie are satisfied
with the final agreement.
Regarding security, against any kind of malicious agent that infiltrates the
team, SSV is more robust than RE due to the fact that a larger number of malicious
agents may be needed to manipulate the team. In the case where team members
decide on whether or not to accept the opponents’ offer, the set of malicious agents
has to be equal to half the number of team members plus one if they want to assure
that the team is manipulated. In the case of the plurality voting carried out to
decide on which offer is sent to the opponent, in the best case only two malicious
agents need to infiltrate the team but a large number of team members (i.e., a
majority) may be needed if manipulation wants to be assured.
5.6 Similarity Borda Voting (SBV)
SSV is capable of assuring majority and plurality decisions within the team. How-
ever, some scenarios may need of intra-team strategies that ensure higher levels
of consensus. SBV and FUM (described later) are designed to solve this problem.
The basic structure of SBV remains the same than in SSV, but the voting rules
employed are different. More specifically, when each team member votes team
proposals, borda count is employed to determine the winner, and a unanimity rule
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is used to determine opponent’s offer acceptance. Next, we briefly describe the
aspects which make SBV different to SSV.
5.6.1 Offer proposal
As in SSV, when the team has to propose an offer to the opponent, the mediator
opens a call for proposals where each team member can propose an offer to the
mediator. Then, once every offer has been gathered, the mediator makes them
public to the team members and a voting process starts. The main difference
between both intra-team strategies resides in the fact that team members vote
according to a Borda count rule (131). Basically, each team member ai ranks the
proposals XT t in ascending order according to its own utility function Uai(.). We
denote as rankai(XT
t) the ascending rank according to ai’s utility function, and
Position(X, rankai(XT
t)) as the position (1 to |XT t|) that the offer X occupies
in rankai(XT
t). The vote emitted by ai for offer j-th in XT
t is the position
occupied by such offer in the ranked list minus one unit:
V oteai(j) = Position(XT
t(j), rankai(XT
t))− 1 (5.18)
Numerical votes for each offer are summed up by the mediator, who finally selects
the offer that received the highest sum of scores from the team members (see
Equation 5.11). It should be highlighted that the similarity heuristic employed by
team members is the same than the one employed in SSV.
5.6.2 Offer acceptance
As for the offer acceptance, the only difference resides in the rule used by the
mediator. The opponent’s offer is accepted only if it is acceptable for all the team
members.
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5.6.3 Discussion
When describing the minimum unanimity level guaranteed by SBV, we mentioned
the term semi-unanimity. It is clear that if an opponent offer is accepted by the
team, it is acceptable for every team member due to the unanimity rule employed.
Thus, Equation 5.3 is guaranteed if the final agreement is an offer accepted from
the opponent. However, unanimity is not guaranteed regarding the team offer
sent to the opponent. Borda count is generally referred as a method that selects
broadly accepted options as winners instead of the majority/plurality option (e.g.,
avoid the tyranny of the majority). In this sense, Borda count entails some degree
of unanimity. Nevertheless, the specific degree of unanimity that borda assures is
difficult to determine in our negotiation scenario.
Some problematic situations that arose in SSV are solved with this sort of vot-
ing. If we recall the extreme tie case in SSV’s discussion, Alice proposed X90ac =
(509.65, 133.04, 10.54, 5.68), Bob proposedX90ab→A = (605.65, 99.63, 2.68, 6.52), and
Charlie proposed X90ac→A = (511.82, 119.80, 10.66, 9.10). The preference rankings




















ac→A) for Charlie. Alice’s offer gets 2 points from Alice, 0
from Bob, and 1 from Charlie, Bob’s offer gets just 2 points from Bob, and Char-
lie’s offer gets 2 points from Charlie, 1 point from Alice, and 1 point from Bob.
Hence, Charlie’s offer is selected to be sent to the opponent, and if accepted, it is
one of the proposed offers that was over every team member’s reservation utility,
making it a unanimously acceptable deal.
We may find scenarios where Borda count, despite generally selecting broadly
accepted options, selects winners that are not supported/acceptable by every team
member. For example, if t = 100, and the last offer received from the opponent is
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X99op→A = (700, 120, 1.5, 8). Alice would proposeX
100
aa→A = (542.63, 133.84, 8.36, 5.53),
Bob would propose X100ab→A = (636.37, 114.79, 2.35, 6.52), and Charlie would pro-
pose X100ac→A = (551.44, 123.68, 8.18, 8.09). In the Borda voting process, each
team member ranking would be Uaa(X
100
ab→A) = 0.10 < Uaa(X
100
ac→A) = 0.28 <
Uaa(X
100
aa→A) for Alice, Uab(X
100
aa→A) = 0.18 < Uab(X
100
ab→A) = 0.20 < Uab(X
100
ac→A) =
0.23 for Bob, Uac(X
100
ac→A) = 0.16 < Uac(X
100
aa→A) = 0.27 < Uac(X
100
ac→A) = 0.30
for Charlie. According to these rankings, Alice’s offer would receive 2 points from
Alice and 1 point from Charlie, Bob’s offer would only get 1 point from Bob, and
Charlie’s offer would get 1 point from Alice, 2 points from Bob, and 2 points from
Charlie. Therefore, Charlie’s offer would be selected to be sent to the opponent. If
it is accepted, the final deal would report utilities higher than reservation utilities
for Charlie and Bob, but not for Alice.
Since Borda count generally selects broadly accepted candidates, a larger num-
ber of malicious agents may be necessary to manipulate the team compared to the
number of malicious agents necessary to manipulate SSV. However, given the
unanimity rule employed in the opponent’s offer acceptance mechanism, it is im-
possible for opponents posing as team members to manipulate the team regarding
the acceptability of the offer sent by the opponent. Since as long as one of the
team members does not agree with the opponent’s offer, the offer will be rejected,
it is not possible for opponent agents to manipulate the team even if they infiltrate
the team in large numbers.
5.7 Full Unanimity Mediated (FUM)
The last intra-team strategy, Full Unanimity Mediated (FUM), seeks to reach una-
nimity regarding all team decisions. In fact, every team decision taken (i.e., offer
acceptance, offer proposal) following this intra-team strategy entails unanimity at
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each round t of the negotiation process. However, the type of mediator required
for FUM is more sophisticated than mediators in the rest of intra-team strategies
presented in this chapter. It requires for the mediator to participate in a pre-
negotiation process where team members hand decision rights over issues that are
not interesting for them, to be able to infer issues’ importance for the opponent,
to coordinate unanimity voting processes, and to coordinate an iterated building
process that constructs the offers sent to the opponent. A complete view of the
pseudo-algorithm carried out by the mediator can be observed in Algorithm 5.
5.7.1 Pre-negotiation: information sharing
During the pre-negotiation, team members are allowed to hand over decision rights
over issues that they do not consider interesting. The iterated offer building pro-
cess relies on a mechanism which sets issue values one-per-one according to team
members’ will. When an agent hands over decision rights on an issue, it does
not participate in the setting of such issue. All the communications in the pre-
negotiation are private with the mediator, who asks each team member regarding
the set of issues which it is willing to hand over. The rationale behind the idea of
handing over decision rights is that conflict may be reduced, and, so, the chances
to build a more likeable offer for the opponent may be increased while maintaining
a good quality for one’s own utility function. The fact that some issues may yield
little or no importance at all for some team members is also feasible in a team
setting, since some of these issues may have been introduced to satisfy the interests
of a subgroup of team members.
The pre-negotiation protocol goes as follows. First, the mediator opens a call
for decision rights, where each team member ai is allowed to send (to the mediator)
a set of negotiation issues NIai , whose decision rights are handed over by ai. Once
all the responses have been gathered, the mediator keeps track of those issues that
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Send (Ask for NIai −→ A);
foreach ai ∈ A do Receive (NIai ←− ai);
t = 0;
while t ≤ TA do
agenda = build agenda();















foreach j ∈ agenda ∧ issue not set(j) do
Send (Needed value j, given X
′t
A→op −→ ai|j /∈ NIai ∧ ai ∈ A
′);
Receive (xai,j ←− ai|j /∈ NIai ∧ ai ∈ A
′);
if monotonically increasing(j) then xj = max
i
xai,j ;












A→op? −→ ai|ai ∈ A′);








A→op) = true then A
′ = A′ − ai;
end
if A′ = ∅ then break;
end
foreach j ∈ agenda ∧ issue not set(j) do













Receive (Xtop→A ←− op);
if Xtop→A = Withdraw then
Send (Opponent Withdraw −→ A); Return Failure;
else if Xtop→A = Accept then
Send (Offer Accepted −→ A) ; Return Success;
else
Send (Open Voting Xtop→A −→ A);






Send (Accept −→ op,A); Return Success;
else
Send (Opponent Offer Rejected −→ A);
end
end
t = t + 1;
end
Send (Withdraw −→ op,A); Return Failure;
Algorithm 5: Pseudo-code algorithm for the mediator in the FUM intra-team
strategy.
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are not interesting for each agent NIai , and those issues that are not interesting
for all team members
M⋂
i=1
NIai . Once this process has finished, the team and the
mediator are ready to start the negotiation process.
Of course, the set of issues handed over by each team member is not controllable
by the mediator. It depends on the behavior of each agent. In our model, the set
of issues handed over by each agent depends on a private parameter εai . The
value of such parameter is related to the weight of the different negotiation issues
in one’s own utility function. More precisely, if εai = 0, then the agent is only
willing to hand over the decision rights over those issues that are not interesting
for himself (i.e., weight equal to zero in the utility function). When εai = 1, the
agent is willing to hand over decision rights over every issue in the negotiation. In
general, the agent is willing to hand over decision rights over issues whose sum of
weight in the utility function is equal to or lower than εai :∑
j∈NIai
wai,j ≤ εai (5.19)
Given a certain εai , a reasonable heuristic is to assume that the agent is willing
to concede as many decision rights as possible since this will enhance the possibility
of finding an agreement with the opponent. Hence, each team member ai chooses
the largest possible set NIai that fulfills Eq. 5.19. A simple algorithm that solves
this problem is ordering the negotiation issues in ascending order by weight in the
utility function. The set NIai starts empty, and, then, the array of ordered issues
is followed. If the issue weight plus the weights of those issues already in NIai
exceeds εai , then the search stops. Otherwise, the issue is added to NIai and the
algorithm continues with the next issue.
Let us imagine that εaa = 0, εab = 0.1, and εac = 0.1. Alice’s ranking of issues
(from less important to more important) would be db, cf, pd, pp. The list of issues
whom decision rights are handed over by Alice, NIaa , would start as an empty set.
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Then, Alice would start by looking at db. Since its weight in Alice’s utility function
is 0, the accumulated weights in NIai (equal to 0) and 0+wdb does not exceed εaa ,
Alice would add db to the set. The next issue that would be looked at by Alice is
cf . As before, cf is added to NIaa . Then, Alice would look at pd. Due to the fact
that pd’s weight in Alice’s utility function plus the accumulated weights in NIaa
exceed εaa , the process would stop and cf would not be added to NIaa . As for
Bob, its ranking of issues would be db, pd, pp, cf . Bob would start looking at db.
Since its weight in Bob’s utility function does not exceed εab , db is added to NIab .
The next issue would be pd, and it would be added to NIab since its weight plus
db’s weight exactly match εab . No more issues would be added to NIab . Similarly,
Charlie would only hand over decision rights for cf (NIac = {cf}).
5.7.2 Negotiation: Offer proposal
In order to determine which offer is sent to opponent, the mediator governs an
iterated building process. The aim of this iterated process is building an offer
issue per issue according to team members’ needs so that the offer sent to the
opponent is acceptable for every team member. The order in which the issues are
adjusted is determined by an agenda built by the mediator. The details of this
agenda are discussed in Section 5.7.3. Briefly, the iterated building process goes
as follows:
1. The agenda of issues agenda is built by the mediator according to the avail-
able information.
2. When the iterated process starts, every team member is considered an active
member (ai ∈ A′) in the construction process.
3. The initial partial offer X
′t
A→op stars as an offer whose issues have not been
set.
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NIai . These issues are maximized according to the opponent’s
preferences. For instance, if the price is one of these issues and the oppo-
nent is a seller, it would be maximized for the opponent, thus, acquiring
its maximum value. The partial offer X
′t
A→op is updated with the new issue
values.
5. The next issue j in the agenda is selected. Those team members active in
the construction process (ai ∈ A′) and interested in j (j /∈ NIai) are asked
by the mediator to submit the value xai,j needed of issue j to get as close
as possible to their aspiration levels.
6. The values xai,j gathered from team members are aggregated. The best value
is selected according to the ranking of issue values (issues are predictable and
compatible). For instance, if the assumed valuation function is monotonically
increasing, then the max operator is used to aggregate the values and obtain
the final value for the issue xj .
7. xj is set in X
′t
A→op and the new partial offer is broadcasted among team
members. Every team member that is active in the construction phase is
asked if the current partial offer already satisfies its current demands.
8. Every response is gathered by the mediator. Those agents that answered
positively are removed from the list of active agents. If there are still active
agents, the mediator goes back to 5.
9. When every team member has been satisfied by the partial offer X
′t
A→op, if
there are still issues that have not been set, those issues are maximized ac-
cording to the opponent’s preferences. Then, a final offer XtA→op is obtained,
made public among team members, and sent to the opponent.
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In the protocol described above, team members are asked to submit a value
for issues in which they are interested and to determine whether or not the partial
offer satisfies their needs. In both cases, and as in previous strategies, we have
assumed that team members follow time-based concession strategies similar to
the one described in Equation 5.12. However, since team members may have
handed over some issue decision rights, it is not possible for agents to demand the
maximum utility. The value εai has to be subtracted from the maximum utility.
Therefore, the concession strategy sai(t), which determines the level of demand at
each negotiation round, can be formalized as:






When team members are asked about a value for j, each team member com-
municates anonymously the value xai,j . The value communicated is the one that
gets as close as possible to its desired aspiration level sai(t) at round t. Taking






where sai(t) is the utility demanded by the agent ai at round t, Uai(X
′t
A→op) is the
utility reported by the current partial offer, and wai,jVai,j(x) is the weighted utility
reported by the value demanded by the agent. Since the value demanded looks
to be as close as possible to the utility necessary to get to the current aspiration,
the function is minimized. However, the following constrain is fulfilled by team
members in order to avoid surpassing the utility demanded:
sai(t)− Uai(X
′t
A→op)− wai,jVai,j(xai,j) ≥ 0 (5.22)
As for determining when a partial offer is acceptable, team members follow a
similar criterion to the method proposed in other intra-team strategies. Basically,
148
5.7 Full Unanimity Mediated (FUM)
a partial offer is acceptable for an agent ai if it reports a utility that is greater










where true indicates that the partial offer is acceptable at its current state for
agent ai, and false indicates the opposite.
5.7.3 Negotiation: observing opponent’s concessions and
building an issue agenda
Once the negotiation starts, the mediator attempts to guess a ranking of issues
according to the opponent’s preferences. This ranking is used to build the agenda
of issues used by the team in the iterated offer building process. The idea be-
hind the agenda is attempting to satisfy team members as much as possible with
those issues that are less important for the opponent. This way, team members
may reach their desired aspiration level with those issues less interesting for the
opponent, and use the rest of issues to make the offer as satisfactory as possible
for the opponent. The only information available for the mediator regarding the
opponent’s preferences are the offers received. Thus, the mediator has to infer a
ranking of issues according to that information. A possible heuristic is assuming
that agents usually concede less in important issues and greater concessions are
performed in lesser important issues at the first rounds of the negotiation.
Our proposed heuristic assumes that the mediator observes opponent’s offers
for the first k interactions. Then, it calculates the concession performed in each
issue. Since our practical model assumed that the opponent’s utility function
employs the opposite type of valuation function than team members for each issue,
it is feasible to calculate the amount of concession performed at each issue. For
instance, if the opponent is a seller, it is reasonable to assume that its valuation
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functions is monotonically increasing (e.g., higher prices report higher utilities)
and, thus, any value below the maximum price can be considered a concession
with respect to the maximum price. Therefore, the amount of concession can be
calculated in each issue. For each issue j, we may calculate the total amount of




|X(j)top→A − best value(j)|
max value(j)−min value(j)
(5.24)
where X(j)top→A it the value of issue j in the offer X
t
op→A, best value(j) is the best
possible value for the opponent in issue j, and max value(j) and min value(j)
are the maximum and minimum value of the issue in the negotiation domain. The
inner part of the summatory determines the concession on issue j in the offer re-
ceived at interaction/round t with respect to the best issue value for the opponent.
So, the summatory counts the total concession for issue j in the first k offers. The
heuristic is that issues that score lower in Equation 5.24 are usually those more
important for the opponent, whilst those issues scoring higher in Equation 5.24 are
those less important for the opponent. Based on the available information (i.e.,
number of rounds up to k), the mediator builds an agenda of issues according to
the scores of Cj in descending order. This way, lesser important issues for the
opponent are first in the agenda.
5.7.4 Negotiation: Offer acceptance
Since this intra-team strategy looks for unanimity regarding team decisions, we
employed the same mechanism employed in SBV for determining whether or not
an opponent offer is acceptable. When the mediator receives the opponent’s offer
Xtop→A, the offer is publicly announced to all of the team members. Then, the
mediator opens a private voting process where each team member ai should specify
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whether or not it supports acceptance of the opponent’s offer acai(X
t
op→A). The
mediator counts the number of positive votes. The offer is accepted if the number
of positive votes is equal to the number of team members. Otherwise, the offer is
rejected.
Similarly to SBV, an opponent offer is acceptable for a team member at round
t if it reports a utility that is greater than or equal to the aspiration level marked





true if sai(t+ 1) ≤ Uai(Xtop→A)
false otherwise
(5.25)
where true means that the agent supports the opponent’s offer, false has the
opposite meaning, and sai(.) is the concession strategy employed by agent ai to
calculate the aspiration level at each negotiation round t.
5.7.5 Discussion
As mentioned in this chapter, FUM allows team members to reach unanimity
regarding team’s decisions. These decisions include the offer that is sent to the
opponent and the acceptance/rejection of the opponent’s offers. In the latter, it
is clear that according to Equations 5.25 and 5.3, and the proposed acceptance
mechanism, unanimity is assured since an opponent offer is only accepted when it
is equal or greater than each team members’ demands. In the former process, how
unanimity is achieved is not straightforward.
The type of unanimity that can be guaranteed by FUM regarding the offers
sent to the opponent is a strict unanimity. We define that an offer sent to the
opponent XtA→op is a strict unanimous decision for the team when, for any
team member ai, the offer reports a utility that is greater than or equal to its
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current aspiration level sai(t):
∀ai∈AUai(XtA→op) ≥ sai(t) (5.26)
Achieving this definition of unanimity within the team ensures that if a final
agreement is found, it reports a utility that is greater than or equal to each agent’s
private reservation utility, thus fulfilling Equation 5.3. But the intra-team strat-
egy goes beyond that, since it is capable of satisfying team member’s demands
even when they are above the reservation utility. In fact, the definition of team
unanimity in Equation 5.3 is included in strict unanimity since any offer sent by
the team is equal to or greater than each team members’ reservation utility as long
as team members do not ask for less than their reservation utilities. In order to
achieve the proposed definition of unanimous decision, some assumptions have to
be made regarding the behavior of team members. Basically, team members have
to be truthful in their responses to the mediator, following the behavior specified
in Eq. 5.21, 5.22 and 5.23. Next, we prove that, if team members follow these
behaviors, unanimity is achieved in team’s decisions according to Equation 5.26.
Proof. ∀ai∈AUai(XtA→op) ≥ sai(t)
subject to: Eq. 5.21, Eq. 5.22, Eq. 5.23, and compatible and predictable issues.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that team members’ valuation functions are
monotonically increasing for any negotiation issue. It should be pointed out that,
in that case, the aggregation operation carried out by the trusted mediator is the
max operator. In any case, for any issue j, its value will be determined as xj =
max(xa1,j , xa2,j , ..., xaM ,j) and then it holds true that ∀ai ∈ A,wai,jVai,j(xj) ≥
wai,jVai,j(xai,j). The proof is quite straightforward. When the mediator declares
that an issue j must be set, three different situations may arise for an agent ai:
• ai has already reached its aspiration level with the partial offer Uai(X
′t
A→op) ≥
sai(t). Therefore, the value determined for xj will add utility to the par-
tial offer and the utility reported to ai will further exceed its aspirations
Uai(X
′t
A→op) + wai,jVai,j(xj) ≥ sai(t).
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• ai can reach its current aspiration level sai(t) if it asks for a value xai,j . Thus,
Uai(X
′t
A→op) + wai,jVi,j(xai,j) = sai(t). Since the aggregation operation is
xj = max(xa1,j , xa2,j , ..., xaM ,j), the new partial offer will have a utility that
is equal to or greater than its aspirations, Uai(X
′t
A→op) + wai,jVai,j(xj) ≥
sai(t).
• ai cannot reach its aspirations by just setting xj . In this case, ai will demand
the maximum possible value for j and then xj = xai,j . ai will have to reach
its aspiration level by adjusting the next issues in the agenda. In the worst
case scenario, the next issue to be set xN is the last one in the agenda. This
means that ai has demanded the maximum value for the previous issues
and succeeded in getting its desired value for them. Thus, before the last






wai,j = 1 and 0 ≤ sai(t) ≤ 1, the agent will reach its aspiration level by







ensured thanks to the morphology of the valuation functions (0 ≤ Vai,j(x) ≤
1).
One might wonder whether or not it is reasonable to think that agents are
truthful in this process. Members are not tempted to demand lesser value for
issues since the process would not ensure that the final agreement would achieve
its current aspiration level and, thus, reservation utility. On the other hand, it is
true that agents may be inclined to demand a greater value for issues since the
process ensures that the offer will be more profitable for them. Nevertheless, it
should be pointed out that, generally, if more value is demanded for issues the
offer may be less profitable for the opponent and the probabilities of reaching an
agreement may be greatly reduced. This issue is studied in Subsection 5.8.3, where
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we analyze whether or not team members have strong incentives to deviate from
the proposed behavior.
Another issue that needs to be considered is security with respect to malicious
agents. The proposed intra-team strategy is robust against manipulations carried
out by opponents’ agents. However, it is vulnerable to malicious agents from
competitor agents. Next we describe both types of manipulations and analyze
why FUM is robust or vulnerable against such types of manipulation.
By opponent manipulation we refer to agents that infiltrate the team in order to
increase the quality of the final agreement from the point of view of the opponent
party. In a negotiation team setting formed by buyers, we are concerned about
the fact that some seller parties may attempt to introduce agents among team
members. This way, opponents may be able to maximize their own preferences by
manipulating the decisions taken by the team. However, our proposed negotiation
model is robust to this kind of manipulation. Let us imagine a situation where a
negotiation team wants to buy a product and a seller has been able to infiltrate
agents in the team. Due to the mechanism employed to build the offer sent to
the opponent, and the mechanism employed to decide upon whether or not to
accept the opponent’s offer, it is not possible for opponent agents to manipulate
the decisions taken within the team. Regarding the iterated offer construction
process, an opponent agent would try to demand values that are close to the
preferences of the opponent. In a generic electronic commerce application, an
opponent agent might demand high values for the price and the dispatch date and
low values for the product quality. However, the aggregation rules employed by
the trusted mediator will ensure that team preferences prevail independently of
the number of infiltrated opponent agents (the best value is chosen). As for the
unanimous voting process, opponent agents might try to engage team members in
accepting the opponent’s offer. However, this is not possible due to the fact that
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as long as one team member does not support the opponent’s offer, it will not be
accepted. This is the case even in situations where the group of opponent agents
is larger than the number of real team members.
Another kind of possible manipulation is the one carried out by competitor
agents. Competitors are buyer agents (in the case that the team is made up of
buyer agents) that are interested in the same product as the team. Some competi-
tors may be interested in sabotaging team deals if that assures that competitors
get better deals from the opponent. This is especially true in environments where
goods or services are limited (e.g., personal sellers on Ebay). Thus, competitor
agents may attempt to prevent the team from reaching an agreement with the
opponent.
Even though the proposed model is robust against opponent agents, robustness
is not maintained when dealing with infiltrated competitor agents. In that case,
the strengths shown by the model become its weaknesses. In the voting process
carried out to decide upon whether or not to accept the opponent’s offer, only a
single agent is needed to manipulate the process and prevent the team from accept-
ing the opponent’s offers. On the other hand, competitor agents may manipulate
the offer construction phase by being highly demanding. In a generic electronic
commerce application, the competitor agent would demand very low values for
the price, short dispatch dates and very high product quality. This way, com-
petitor agents make offers extremely undesirable for opponent agents, preventing
the team from reaching a final agreement with the opponent. Due to the aggre-
gation operators employed by the trusted mediator, only one competitor agent is
needed to manipulate the offer construction process. Thus, this model should be
employed only when team members are extremely sure that no competitor agent
has infiltrated the team.
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5.8 Empirical Analysis of Full Unanimity Medi-
ated Intra-Team Strategy
As stated, one of the main goals of our work is obtaining intra-team strategies
that are able to guarantee unanimity regarding team decisions. For that reason,
we decided to explore Full Unanimity Mediated in depth. More especifically, we
study the importance of the agenda of issues imposed by the mediator on the
negotiation process, the impact of the number of decision rights that are handed
over during the pre-negotiation, and whether or not team members have incentives
to deviate from the proposed strategy.
5.8.1 Studying the Impact of Intra-Team Agenda
The mediator uses an agenda to determine which issues are set first in the iterated
building process. A reasonable heuristic is to try to satisfy team members with
those issues that are less important for the opponent. Otherwise, the resultant
offer may be too demanding and the negotiation process may end in failure. Thus,
ideally, the agenda should order the issues in ascendant order of importance for
the opponent.
In our first experiment, we decided to study the importance of the agenda on
the negotiation process. While every team member gets a utility that is greater
than or equal to its desired aspiration level, the offer may be more or less de-
manding for the opponent. If the offer is less demanding for the opponent, it is
more probable that it will be accepted by him. Therefore, we decided to study
the utility reported by the teams’ offer to the opponent at each negotiation round.
We simulated a negotiation process where offers are not accepted (i.e., it always
reaches the negotiation deadline) just to observe the utility of the offers proposed
by the team from the opponent’s perspective. Two different environments were
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tested: one with a short deadline Top = TA = 10, and one with a long deadline
Top = TA = 50. Other parameters were set to the standard values of our negotia-
tion model: βop = βA = 1, εai = 0, and RUop = RUai = 0. Three different types of
agendas for the FUM model were compared: a perfect agenda where the mediator
knows perfectly the order of importance given by the opponent (FUM-perfect); the
agenda built with the learning method described in this chapter (FUM-simple);
and a random agenda that is built at each negotiation round (FUM-random). For
FUM-simple, the number of initial negotiation rounds to be taken into account
was set to k = bTA4 c, which we found to be a good heuristic in practice. Ad-
ditionally, the proposed negotiation model is compared for illustrative purposes
with RE and SSV. These two models are expected to be less demanding in terms
of utility due to the fact that less conflict is introduced with the opponent (i.e.,
a fewer number of team members may reach their aspiration level). A total of
100 random teams with size M = 4 and random utility functions (N=4 issues)
were confronted with 11 randomly generated opponents. The preference profiles
created for all of the experiments carried out in this chapter correspond to our
motivating scenario: group booking. In order to capture stochastic variations in
the different models, each possible negotiation was repeated 4 times. Thus, a total
of 4400 negotiations were carried out per model and environment (i.e., short/long
deadline). The results for this first experiment can be observed in Fig. 5.1.
As can be observed in the short deadline scenario (Fig. 5.1), the offers pro-
posed by the representative model are more attractive for the opponent. This is
reasonable since, in this case, the representative only negotiates attending to its
own utility function. Therefore, it results in less conflict with the opponent and
more trade-off possibilities. The behavior observed for the perfect agenda model
and the similarity simple voting model are more surprising. Even though, in the
first rounds, SSV proposes offers that report more utility for the opponent than
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Utility reported to the opponent from the team’s offer at each round
Representative
Similarity Simple Voting
Full Unanimity Mediated (Random Agenda)
Full Unanimity Mediated (Simple Agenda)

















Utility reported to the opponent from the team’s offer at each round
Representative
Similarity Simple Voting
Full Unanimity Mediated (Random Agenda)
Full Unanimity Mediated (Simple Agenda)
Full Unanimity Mediated (Perfect Agenda)
Figure 5.1: Average utility reported to the opponent by team’s proposals per
round in short (upper graphic) and long (lower graphic) deadline scenarios.
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those built by the perfect agenda model, as the negotiation advances, the perfect
agenda model outperforms SSV. This happens at negotiation round 6. This may
be explained by the fact that, at that point, more trade-off possibilities arise be-
tween all of the team members and the opponent, and the perfect agenda model
is capable of exploiting them while assuring the desired aspiration level for each
teammate. As for the simple agenda model, it performs slightly better than the
random agenda model, but worse than the other methods in the experiment. This
is explainable by the fact that, since the negotiation deadline is short, limited
information can be used to learn the opponent’s preferences. Consequently, the
agenda built is closer to a random agenda than to the perfect agenda. In the case
of the long deadline scenario, there are some differences that are worth highlight-
ing. First, the representative model is still the one that is the most attractive for
the opponent’s interests. However, in this scenario, both the perfect agenda model
and the simple agenda model are able to outperform SSV at some points of the
negotiation process. Obviously, this happens earlier for the perfect agenda model
since it represents perfect knowledge about the opponent’s preferences. Hence, it
is able to take advantage of possible trade-offs earlier in the negotiation. It hap-
pens approximately at round 22. Regarding the simple agenda model, it is able
to outperform SSV around round 33. Differently to the first scenario, since the
amount of information to learn from is greater, the simple agenda model is able to
get closer to the perfect agenda and offer more attractive offers to the opponent.
In conclusion, results seem to point out that as the agenda gets closer to the
ideal agenda, the offers are more likeable for the opponent. Obviously, the utility
reported to the opponent by offers proposed by FUM is initially lower than other
intra-team strategies that guarantee less degree of unanimity like RE and SSV,
but as more information becomes available and the negotiation is longer, FUM
with a proper learning mechanism is able to propose offers that are more likeable
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for the opponent. This suggests that FUM may benefit from negotiation processes
where there is a long deadline.
5.8.2 Studying the Impact of εai
In this second experiment, we decided to study the impact of εai on the team’s
performance. It seems reasonable to think that low values of this parameter should
help to construct offers that are more interesting for the opponent, but high values
should impact negatively on the utility obtained by ai. We devised an experiment
where the value of εai was set in a uniform way for all of the team members. More
specifically, we used the values 0, 0.02, 0.05, 0.07, 0.1, 0.12, 0.15, 0.17, 0.2 for εai .
For the quality measures, we observed the minimum and the average utility of
the team members. Two different environments were tested: short/long deadline,
whose lengths are drawn from the uniform distributions Top = TA = U [5, 10],
Top = TA = U [30, 60], respectively. The concession speed for both parties was set
to be drawn from βop = βA = U [0.4, 0.99]. The reservation utility for the agents
was drawn from a uniform distribution RUop = RUai = U [0, 0.25]. In this case, the
learning method for the agenda was set to FUM-simple and the number of initial
rounds to be taken into account was set to k = bTA4 c. A total of 100 randomly
generated teams with size M = 4 and random utility functions (4 issues) were
confronted with 12 randomly generated opponents. Each possible negotiation was
repeated 4 times. Thus, a total of 4800 negotiation were carried out per model
and environment. The results for this experiment are shown in Table 5.1.
The results show a slight decrease in the utility (minimum utility and average
utility) as εai gets larger. This behavior is found in almost every scenario tested.
Those scenarios that do not show this pattern usually obtain very similar results
for all of the configurations. Thus, the agents should choose εai = 0 independently
of the type of scenario where they negotiate. In the best case, the agent will get
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Long deadline Short deadline
εai Min. Ave. Min. Ave.
0.00 0.49 0.72 0.35 0.60
0.02 0.50 0.71 0.37 0.61
0.05 0.49 0.68 0.37 0.58
0.07 0.48 0.67 0.37 0.57
0.10 0.49 0.66 0.37 0.56
0.12 0.48 0.65 0.37 0.56
0.15 0.48 0.64 0.37 0.55
0.17 0.47 0.63 0.38 0.54
0.20 0.46 0.61 0.38 0.55
Table 5.1: Average impact of εai on team performance. Min: Minimum utility of
team members, Ave: Average utility of team members
a slightly better utility than other values of the parameter. In the worst case
scenario, the agent will get a very similar utility to other values of the parameter
εai . The value εai = 0 corresponds to the agents only handing over those decision
rights associated to issues that yield no interest at all for the agent.
It can also be observed that the average utility is impacted more negatively
by increment of the εai parameter in the long deadline scenario than in the short
deadline scenario. A thorough analysis of our results gave an answer to this phe-
nomenon. The results suggest that higher values of εai reduce the average utility
for the team members. However, the number of negotiations that ended with no
agreement in the long deadline scenario when εai = 0 was 151 (3.1% of the ne-
gotiation cases ended with an average utility equal to 0), whereas the number of
failed negotiations was 404 (8.41%) when εai = 0 and the deadline was short. As
εai was increased to 0.2, the number of failed negotiations decreased to 35 (0.7%)
in the long deadline scenario and 91 (1.8%) in the short deadline scenario. Thus,
higher values for εai contribute to reaching an agreement in cases where no deal
was found. This effect is more notorious in the short deadline scenario. Since the
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number of failed negotiations is greatly reduced in the short deadline scenario, the
negative effect of higher εai is moderated since the new negotiations contribute
with values for the average utility that are greater than or equal to 0. Despite
this, the reduction in the number of failed negotiations is not enough to counter
the negative impact of εai .
In general, εai can be considered as some sort of moderator for the initial
demand. According to our results, in general, agents should not give up any
decision right over an issue that yields interest for him. Only those decision rights
associated to issues that yield no interest at all should be handed over. Hence,
team members should always start demanding their highest aspiration level. This
situation resembles results obtained in bilateral negotiation (18), where it was
found that if the deadline is reasonably long, the agent should start demanding
values close to their maximum utility.
5.8.3 Strategy Deviation
The proposed model assumes that team members state the truth when asked about
which issue values they need to reach their desired utility level during the offer
construction phase. When dealing with selfish agents, one risk faced is the fact
that selfish agents may not tell the truth in order to maximize their own utility. In
this case, it seems clear that team members have no incentives to ask for less issue
value than they need since it may end up in an agreement with a utility inferior
to the desired level of utility. However, team members may have incentives to
demand more value if that maximizes their utilities (be more demanding). For a
team member to play strategically, it would need to have some knowledge about
team members’ and opponent’s utility functions, deadlines, reservation utilities,
and other agents’ strategies. We aim to propose negotiation models for open
environments, where information is private. Therefore, agents usually have limited
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and uncertain information regarding the negotiation conditions. This leads to
the question of whether or not team members would achieve higher utilities by
deviating from the proposed strategy.
In this subsection we analyze whether or not team members have incentives to
deviate from the proposed strategy in the offer construction phase. For this matter,
we designed two types of deviated team members. The first type of deviated agent,
which we will name slightly deviated, behaves exactly as the standard behavior
proposed for team members in this chapter. However, during the iterated offer
construction phase, the agent does not ask for the value it needs from j, but a
value that reports higher utility than it needs. The amount of extra utility that
it attempts to achieve is controlled by a parameter di. When di > 1, the team
member demands more value than it needs, as it can be appreciated in the formula:
xai,j = argmin
x∈[0,1]
(di × (sai(t)− Uai(X
′t
A→op))− wai,jVai,j(x)) (5.27)
When the utility of the partial offer exceeds or equals the desired utility level sai(t),
the agent abandons the offer construction phase at that round. The effect of this
behavior is that, when the agent is asked to set an issue which can report the
desired utility, it demands more value for that issue and then leaves the iterated
building process. For instance, if a seller agent needs 250$ for the price issue in
order to reach its desired utility level and di = 1.25, it will ask for 250 × 1.25 =
312.5$ instead. The second type of deviated team member, named highly deviated,
behaves as the slightly deviated team member but when it has reached its desired
utility level, it stays an additional issue in the iterated building process. When
asked about the value of that extra issue, the highly deviated agent asks for a
random value that reports between 10% and 50% of the issue’s utility. For instance,
assuming that the price is scaled between 0$ and 1000$, a highly deviated seller that
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has reached its desired utility level would ask for a price value between 100$ and
500$. After setting the extra negotiation issue, the highly deviated team member
leaves the offer construction phase.
We set the parameters of our model to the same values used in the previ-
ous experiment: TA = Top = U [30, 60] for long deadline scenarios, TA = Top =
U [5, 10] for short deadline scenarios, RUai = RUop = U [0, 0.25],and βA = βop =
U [0.4, 0.99]. A total of 100 randomly generated teams with size M = 4 and random
utility functions (4 issues) were confronted with 12 randomly generated opponents.
Each possible negotiation was repeated 4 times. Thus, a total of 4800 negotia-
tions were carried out per model and environment. We studied the effect of the
number of slightly deviated agents |A|sd = {1, 2, 3, 4} (the rest of team members
having the standard behavior), the effect of the number of highly deviated agents
|A|hd = {1, 2, 3, 4} (the rest of team members having the standard behavior), and
different values for di = {1.25, 1.50, 1.75} (all of the deviated agents were set to
have the same di). The quality measure studied was the average utility since an
increment in the utility of one of the team members will always have a positive
effect on the average utility (same type of valuation functions). The results of
the experiment are depicted in Table 5.2. Some of the combinations are empty
since they do not make sense in practice (e.g., 0 deviated agents and di > 1). We
only show the results for the long deadline scenario, but it should be noted that
the same pattern was found for short deadline scenarios. It can be observed that
all the combinations obtain similar results in terms of average utility. There is
only a slight decrement in the average utility as we move to more demanding atti-
tudes (e.g., |A|hd = 4, di = 1.75). Even though, the differences between the most
demanding behaviors and other behaviors are not large enough to be considered
significant. A closer look at the negotiation traces explained the previous results.
While being more demanding may obtain higher utilities in successful negotiations,
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di = 1 di = 1.25 di = 1.5 di = 1.75
|A| = 4 [0.71-0.72] - - -
|A|sd = 1 - [0.70-0.72] [0.71-0.72] [0.70-0.71]
|A|sd = 2 - [0.71-0.72] [0.71-0.72] [0.70-0.72]
|A|sd = 3 - [0.71-0.72] [0.70-0.72] [0.69-0.70]
|A|sd = 4 - [0.70-0.72] [0.70-0.72] [0.69-0.71]
|A|hd = 1 - [0.70-0.72] [0.71-0.72] [0.70-0.71]
|A|hd = 2 - [0.70-0.71] [0.70-0.72] [0.69-0.71]
|A|hd = 3 - [0.69-0.71] [0.69-0.71] [0.69-0.70]
|A|hd = 4 - [0.69-0.70] [0.69-0.70] [0.68-0.69]
di = 1 di = 1.25 di = 1.5 di = 1.75
|A| = 4 206 - - -
|A|sd = 1 - 208 205 199
|A|sd = 2 - 202 230 236
|A|sd = 3 - 199 240 243
|A|sd = 4 - 248 267 287
|A|hd = 1 - 202 189 236
|A|hd = 2 - 241 246 274
|A|hd = 3 - 256 301 302
|A|hd = 4 - 299 292 324
Table 5.2: Confidence intervals (upper table) for the average utility of team mem-
bers and number of failed negotiations (lower table) depending on the number of
deviated agents and di.
it may also lead to a higher number of failed negotiations, thus leading to lower
or equal average utilities. These results can be observed also at Table 5.2, where
there is a clear tendency for the number of failed negotiations to increase as team
members deviate further from the standard behavior. Thus, the experimental re-
sults suggest that team members may not have incentives to deviate much from
the proposed strategy.
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5.9 Studying the Impact of the Negotiation En-
vironment on Intra-Team Strategies’ Perfor-
mance
Section 5.8 allowed us to explore Full Unanimity Mediated in detail, an intra-team
strategy that is capable of guaranteeing unanimity regarding team decisions. In
this section we explore how the four intra-team strategies presented in this chapter
perform under different environmental conditions. First, the environmental con-
ditions and performance measures studied in this chapter are introduced to the
reader. Then, we describe the experiments carried out, and we analyze the results
provided by each intra-team strategy.
5.9.1 Negotiation Environment Conditions & Team Perfor-
mance
We consider that the negotiation environment plays a very important part in team
dynamics. It may not be the same using a representative approach in a setting
where all of the team members’ preferences are very similar than using the same
strategy in a setting where team members’ preferences are exactly the opposite.
Since which conditions of the negotiation environment are available depend on the
application, we decided to focus on those general conditions that are present in
almost every negotiation scenario involving negotiation teams: opponent deadline,
team deadline, team members’ preference similarity, opponent concession speed,
and team size.
Regarding team performance, it is acknowledged that there are several well
known social welfare measures to assess the quality of decisions in a society. A ne-
gotiation team can be considered a small society, and, thus, social welfare measures
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can also be considered appropriate metrics for measuring negotiation teams’ per-
formance. More specifically, we study the impact of the negotiation environment
on the minimum utility of team members (i.e., egalitarian social welfare (160)),
and the average utility of team members (i.e., a special case of ordered weighted
averaging (160)). However, we do not exclusively restrain our analysis to social
welfare measures. Computational measures like the number of negotiation rounds
are also analyzed for all of the intra-team strategies.
5.9.1.1 Environment Condition: Opponent Deadline Length
One of the issues that can affect the negotiation process is the number of interac-
tions that the opponent has until he decides that negotiating is no longer worthy,
namely opponent deadline Top. We partitioned the opponent negotiation deadline
in three different classes: short deadline Top = U [5, 10] = S, medium deadline
Top = U [11, 29] = M , and long deadline Top = U [30, 60] = L.
5.9.1.2 Environment Condition: Team Deadline Length
Similarly, the maximum number of rounds that the team has to negotiate may also
impact the performance of the different intra-team strategies. As in the case of
the opponent deadline, we partitioned the team deadline in three different classes:
short deadline TA = U [5, 10] = S, medium deadline TA = U [11, 29] = M , and long
deadline TA = U [30, 60] = L.
5.9.1.3 Environment Condition: Team Similarity
25 different linear utility functions were randomly generated. These utility func-
tions represented the preferences of potential team members for n=4 negotiation
issues, whose Vi(.) is the same type (i.e., monotonically increasing or monoton-
ically decreasing) for all of the team members. 25 linear utility functions were
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generated to represent the preferences of opponents. These utility functions were
generated by taking potential teammates’ utility functions and reversing the type
of Vi(.).
In order to determine the preference diversity in a team, we decided to compare
team members’ utility functions. We introduce a dissimilarity measure based on
the utility difference between offers. The dissimilarity between two teammates can
be measured as follows:






If the dissimilarity between two team members is to be measured exactly, it needs
to sample all of the possible offers. However, this is not feasible in the current
domain where there is an infinite number of offers. Therefore, we limited the
number of sampled offers to 1000 per dissimilarity measure. Due to the fact that
a team is composed by more than two members, it is necessary to provide a team
dissimilarity measure. We define the team dissimilarity measure as the average of
the dissimilarity between all of the possible pairs of teammates.
For all of the teams, we measured their dissimilarity and calculated the dis-
similarity mean d̄t and standard deviation σ. We used this information to divide
the spectrum of negotiation teams according to their diversity. Our design deci-
sion was to consider those teams whose dissimilarity was greater than, or equal
to d̄t + 1.5σ as very dissimilar, and those teams whose dissimilarity was lower
than, or equal to d̄t − 1.5σ as very similar. The rest of the cases are considered
as scenarios where teams have an average similarity. In each case, 100 random
negotiation teams were selected for the tests, that is, 100 teams were selected to
represent the very similar team case, and 100 teams were selected to represent the
very dissimilar team case. These teams participate in the different environmental
scenarios, where they are confronted with one random half of all of the possible
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individual opponents. Therefore, each environmental scenario (complete instan-
tiation of all the environmental conditions) consists of 100×12×4=4800 different
negotiations (each negotiation is repeated 4 times to capture stochastic variations
in the different intra-team strategies).
5.9.1.4 Environment Condition: Opponent Concession Speed
The concession speed of the opponent during the negotiation process βop may
determine the final quality of the agreement for team members. For instance, if the
opponent concedes very quickly towards its reservation utility, better agreements
for the team may come earlier in the negotiation process. In those cases, even intra-
team strategies that guarantee less degree of unanimity may achieve good results.
We divided the family of concession speeds based on the classic classification of
time-tactics: we considered that when βop = U [0.1, 0.49] = V B the concession
speed is very boulware, when βop = U [0.5, 0.99] = B the concession speed is
boulware, when βop = U [1, 10] = C the concession speed is conceder, when βop =
U [11, 40] = V C the concession speed is very conceder. Similarly, when we refer to
βA (the team concession speed), we will also employ the same partition in boulware
(B), very boulware (VB), conceder (C), and very conceder (VC).
5.9.1.5 Environment Condition: Number of Team Members
We think that the number of team members may also influence the performance
of the different intra-team strategies. Some of the strategies may become too
demanding when the number of team members increases and it may result in
more negotiations ending in failure. Therefore, we decided to study the effect
of the team size on the performance of the different intra-team strategies. The
number of team members |A| ranged from 4 to 8. This number of team members
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is motivated by the negotiation case employed in our experiments. We consider
that groups of friends from 4 to 8 persons are a reasonable number in practice.
5.9.1.6 Team Performance: Number of Negotiation Rounds
The number of negotiation rounds considers the number of interactions between
the team and the opponent. It is a measure employed to assess the negotiation time
employed to reach a final agreement. In our study, every pair offer/counter-offer in
the negotiation thread is considered as a negotiation round. In equal conditions of
utility performance, those intra-team strategies that spend less negotiation rounds
are preferred since they employ less negotiation time to reach a final agreement.
5.9.1.7 Team Performance: Minimum Utility of Team Members
The minimum utility of team members (Min.) in a negotiation represents the
utility of the final agreement for the less benefited team member. If the final
agreement is X and the team is composed of M different team members A =




In applications where there is a strong bond among team members (i.e., the group
of travelling friends), team members may attempt to maximize the minimum util-
ity of team members in order to avoid extremely unsatisfied team members and
a degradation of the relationship among team members. Even if a strong bond is
not present among team members, an agent may desire to maximize the minimum
utility of team members if it thinks that its own utility is going to be less favored
utility by the final agreement.
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5.9.1.8 Team Performance: Average Utility of Team Members
The average utility of team members (Ave.) in a negotiation represents the average
utility of the final agreement for all of the team members. If the final agreement
is X and the team is composed of M different team members A = {a1.a2, ..., aM},







A less conservative agent may desire to maximize the average utility of team
members if it thinks that its own utility is not going to be less favored utility by
the final agreement.
5.9.2 Results
It should be highlighted that the number of variables included in the study give a
large combination of scenarios. Due to space limitations and for the the comfort of
the reader, we only include those results which are the most interesting from our
point of view. Next, we analyze the results of the experiments that were carried
out in this chapter.
5.9.2.1 Number of Negotiation Rounds
Although we measured the number of negotiation rounds in each experiment,
we found that a general pattern was found in almost every experiment. Thus,
instead of commenting the results for the number of negotiation rounds in each
experimental section, we decided to present the performance of the four intra-team
strategies according to the number of negotiation rounds just once. As a sample
for this behavior, we can observe the number of negotiation rounds spent by each
intra-team strategy when team and opponent have a long deadline (Top = L and
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TA = L), the number of team |A| members is set to 4, and the opponent uses
different concessions speeds βop in Table 5.3.
As long as the concession speed of the four intra-team strategies is the same, RE
is usually the fastest intra-team strategy, followed by SSV, then SBV, and finally
FUM. Since less unanimity is guaranteed among team members, it is logical that
there may be less conflict with the opponent and, thus, agreements are found
faster with low unanimity strategies like RE and SSV. The main exception for
this rule is when team members are very similar and the opponent uses either
boulware or very boulware concession speeds. In those cases, FUM is able to
finalize negotiations successfully in fewer rounds than SBV (and sometimes SSV).
The learning heuristic employed by FUM benefits from the fact that the opponent
usually concedes more in those issues that are less important and, thus, it is able
to infer a proper agenda and propose better offers to the opponent (i.e., ending the
negotiation faster). This pattern disappears as team members get more dissimilar.
In that case, FUM also has to deal with more intra-team conflict, which in turn
results in more demanding offers needed to guarantee unanimity.
Additionally, as expected, as the concession strategy of team members becomes
more conceder, the number of negotiation rounds spent is lower. Thus, RE using
βA = V B is slower than RE using βA = B, which is slower than RE using βA = C,
which is slower than RE using βA = V C.
The number of negotiation rounds spent by each intra-team strategy is inter-
esting as a selection criterion when intra-team strategies perform equally in utility
terms (minimum or average utility). For instance, if SBV and FUM tie in utility
terms, a team is suggested to select SBV most of the times due to the fact that
it usually requires less negotiation rounds, if SSV and SBV tie in utility terms,
the team should select SSV since it usually requires less rounds than SBV, and so
forth.
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Very Similar, Top = TA = L, M = 4 Very Dissimilar, Top = TA = L, M = 4
βop = V C C B V B βop = V C C B V B
RE βA = V C 2.01 2.28 7.25 19.57 RE βA = V C 2.03 2.33 7.78 19.71
SSV βA = V C 2.02 2.41 8.35 22.08 SSV βA = V C 2.00 2.71 9.97 24.35
SBV βA = V C 2.01 2.70 10.48 24.83 SBV βA = V C 2.05 3.44 12.99 27.33
FUM βA = V C 2.11 2.63 10.31 24,10 FUM βA = V C 2.90 4.52 16.29 30.70
RE βA = C 2.39 3.77 11.07 23.47 RE βA = C 2.28 3.30 10.98 22.84
SSV βA = C 2.73 5.17 13.17 25.33 SSV βA = C 2.45 5.17 14.83 27.43
SBV βA = C 3.02 6.18 15.55 27.32 SBV βA = C 2.99 7.12 18.64 30.08
FUM βA = C 4.09 6.23 14.01 26.45 FUM βA = C 6.54 10.47 21.13 32.66
RE βA = B 9.17 13.63 22.48 30.73 RE βA = B 6.57 10.02 19.94 29.19
SSV βA = B 15.53 19.99 26.97 32.95 SSV βA = B 12.09 18.26 26.42 33.52
SBV βA = B 17.96 22.40 28.88 34.21 SBV βA = B 16.50 22.74 30.54 35.76
FUM βA = B 20.31 23.25 25.59 33.09 FUM βA = B 25.93 28.53 30.97 36.96
RE βA = V B 22.50 25.47 31.59 35.51 RE βA = V B 17.22 21.14 28.94 34.50
SSV βA = V B 28.62 31.44 35.27 37.22 SSV βA = V B 25.44 30.04 34.59 37.64
SBV βA = V B 31.50 33.21 36.24 37.80 SBV βA = V B 30.10 33.29 36.77 38.74
FUM βA = V B 32.77 33.67 33.97 37.15 FUM βA = V B 35.00 36.59 36.39 39.01
Table 5.3: Average number of rounds when both parties have a long deadline.
5.9.2.2 Same Type of Deadlines
The next set of experiments that we conducted consisted in assessing which intra-
team strategies work better when both parties have the same type of deadline. We
studied those scenarios where both parties have short deadlines or long deadlines.
For each deadline scenario, we tested very dissimilar teams, average similarity
teams, and very similar team. We gathered information about the minimum and
average utility of team members regarding each possible strategy configuration
(e.g., team concession speeds, intra-team strategies, opponent concession speeds,
etc.). The number of team members remained static at |A| = 4. The reservation
utilities are drawn from uniform distributions RUop = U [0, 0.25] and RUai =
U [0, 0.25].
The results for this batch of experiments can be found in Table 5.4. It shows
the average of the minimum utility of team members (Min.) and the average of the
173
5. INTRA-TEAM STRATEGIES FOR NEGOTIATION TEAMS IN
PREDICTABLE DOMAINS
Very Similar, Top = TA = S, M = 4
βop = V C βop = C βop = B βop = V B
Min. Ave. Min. Ave. Min. Ave. Min. Ave.
RE β = B 0.68 0.79 0.59 0.71 0.41 0.55 0.29 0.40
SSV β = B 0.70 0.79 0.61 0.70 0.45 0.56 0.33 0.42
SBV β = B 0.71 0.79 0.62 0.70 0.47 0.56 0.34 0.42
FUM β = B 0.69 0.77 0.62 0.72 0.48 0.60 0.35 0.47
Very Similar, Top = TA = L, M = 4
βop = V C βop = C βop = B βop = V B
Min. Ave. Min. Ave. Min. Ave. Min. Ave.
RE β = B 0.75 0.85 0.66 0.77 0.47 0.61 0.32 0.45
SSV β = B 0.75 0.83 0.67 0.76 0.51 0.62 0.37 0.48
SBV β = B 0.77 0.83 0.69 0.76 0.54 0.62 0.40 0.48
FUM β = B 0.75 0.81 0.69 0.77 0.60 0.72 0.44 0.56
Very Dissimilar, Top = TA = S, M = 4
βop = V C βop = C βop = B βop = V B
Min. Ave. Min. Ave. Min. Ave. Min. Ave.
RE β = B 0.26 0.62 0.19 0.54 0.11 0.42 0.07 0.30
SSV β = B 0.50 0.73 0.41 0.66 0.29 0.52 0.18 0.37
SBV β = B 0.55 0.73 0.46 0.65 0.34 0.52 0.21 0.36
FUM β = B 0.55 0.70 0.46 0.65 0.34 0.58 0.23 0.44
Very Dissimilar, Top = TA = L, M = 4
βop = V C βop = C βop = B βop = V B
Min. Ave. Min. Ave. Min. Ave. Min. Ave.
RE β = B 0.38 0.72 0.27 0.63 0.11 0.45 0.06 0.31
SSV β = B 0.57 0.78 0.45 0.70 0.28 0.57 0.18 0.43
SBV β = B 0.65 0.79 0.55 0.71 0.37 0.56 0.24 0.41
FUM β = B 0.62 0.75 0.56 0.71 0.48 0.72 0.31 0.54
Table 5.4: Average of the minimum utility of team members (Min.) and the
average of the average utility of team members (Ave.).
average utility of team members (Ave.). It only shows the results for intra-team
strategies using a boulware concession speed since we found that the best results
are found in this setting. Additionally, it should be highlighted that the results for
average similarity teams were very similar to the very dissimilar case. Thus, we did
not include this information in the tables to show a more compact and interpetrable
representation. The results in bold font indicate those configurations that are
statistically better and different (t-test α = 0.05) to the rest of configurations.
When both parties have a short deadline (first and third sub-table in Table
5.4), independently of team similarity, SBV β = B and FUM β = B are usually
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the best options for the minimum utility. The unanimity and semi-unanimity rules
employed by this strategy make possible for the worst affected team member to
ensure that its situation is better with respect to other rules. As for the average
utility of team members, FUM β = B is usually the best option. The only ex-
ception for this pattern is when the opponent uses conceder strategies (βop = V C
or βop = C). In that case, all of the strategies perform similarly, especially when
team members are very similar. For instance, we can observe that RE, SSV, SBV
β = B are the best option for the average utility of team members when the
deadline is short, team members are very similar, and the opponent uses a very
conceder strategy. In the same setting, but with the opponent using a conceder
strategy, FUM is statistically better but the differences are not very important
(less than a 1.8%).
However, when both parties have a long deadline to negotiate (subtables 2 and 4
in Table 5.8), FUM β = B becomes the best choice for the minimum and average
utility of team members in almost every scenario. The only exceptions for this
superiority are, again, scenarios where the opponent employs conceder strategies.
For instance, when the deadline is long, team members are very dissimilar, and
the opponent uses a very conceder strategy, SBV β = B is the best intra-team
strategy for the minimum and average utility of team members.
We can also observe that RE and SSV are specially affected by very dissimilar
preferences’ scenarios. When team members are very similar, both strategies are
capable of being close to SBV and FUM in the minimum and average utility of team
members as long as the opponent plays conceder strategies. However, both intra-
team strategies’ results get further from those of SBV and FUM when conflict is
introduced inside the team (average similarity and very dissimilar scenario). These
intra-team strategies are not able to tackle situations where team members have
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very dissimilar preferences due to the type of decision rule applied, and their use
in such situations is discouraged.
The reason why several strategies perform similarly in utility terms when the
opponent plays conceder strategies is simple: Since the opponent concedes very fast
in the first rounds of the negotiation process, as long as the team does not concede
very fast (i.e., boulware strategy), all of the strategies are capable of finding a
reasonable good agreement in the first rounds by letting the opponent concede
and then accepting the opponent’s offer. However, there is an additional reading
that explains why strategies like FUM, which guarantees unanimity regarding team
decisions, does not perform so well when the opponent uses conceder strategies.
FUM relies on the assumption that the opponent concedes very little in those
issues that are important for its interests at the first rounds. However, when the
concession strategy carried out by the opponent is conceder or very conceder (a
more acute effect) big concessions are usually carried out at the first rounds. Thus,
FUM is not able to infer an appropriate agenda. In Section 5.8, it was shown that
as the agenda gets further from the real ranking of opponent preferences, the
more demanding becomes the strategy. This may have a negative effect in the
negotiation, since more negotiations may end in failure due to the high demands
of the team. In fact a slight effect is observed in the results: when the opponent
uses a boulware strategy, the percentage of successful negotiations is 94.6% which
is greater than the 92.6% obtained when the opponent uses a conceder strategy
and the 93.1% obtained when the opponent uses a very conceder strategy.
Another issue found in the results is the difference between FUM and other
strategies when the deadline is long. FUM tends to obtain better results when
the deadline is long for both parties and the differences with the other intra-team
strategies become greater when compared with the short deadline scenario. The
reason for this phenomenon is similar to the reason mentioned in the paragraph
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above. FUM is a strategy that relies on the information gathered in the negotiation
process. Thus, when the number of interactions is lower, the agenda inferred by the
trusted mediator is more different to the ideal agenda. When the agenda deviates
from the ideal agenda, offers proposed by the team are more demanding and less
probable to be accepted by the opponent. As a matter of fact, the reader can
notice the difference on average between FUM β = B in long deadline scenarios
and the results obtained by FUM β = B in short deadline scenarios counterpart is
approximately 8.1%, whereas it is approximately 5.3% for SBV, 5.4% for SSV and
5.8% for RE. Logically, every intra-team strategy benefits from having a longer
deadline, but the results suggest that FUM benefits still more than the rest of intra-
team strategies due to its learning heuristic based on the amount of information.
5.9.2.3 Different Types of Deadlines
The next batch of experiments consisted in studying the behavior of the different
intra-team strategies when both parties have strongly different types of deadline.
Thus, in this case, one of the two parties has a deadline which is way lower than
the deadline of the other party. Clearly, the party with a lower deadline is at
disadvantage with respect to the other party since it has fewer offers to send
before ending the negotiation in failure, and the pressure to accept the opponent’s
offers arises earlier.
Short Team Deadline and Long Opponent Deadline First, we start by
analyzing the case where the deadline of the team is shorter than the deadline of
the opponent party. Hence, TA = U [5, 10] and Top = U [30, 60]. The reservation
utilities are drawn from uniform distributions RUop = U [0, 0.25] and RUai =
U [0, 0.25]. The results of this experiment can be found in Table 5.5. The results
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in bold font indicate those configurations that are statistically better and different
(t-test α = 0.05) to the rest of configurations.
In this case, the team has a shorter deadline and, thus, it should be at dis-
advantage with respect to the opponent. However, we can observe that when the
opponent uses a conceder or very conceder strategy, the results are similar to the
analogous case where both parties had a short deadline. These results can be ex-
plained due to the fact that since the opponent concedes very quickly, a good
deal can be found for the team in the first rounds of the negotiation process and
the team is not affected by the fact that its deadline is shorter. Nevertheless, as
the opponent starts to employ boulware strategies, there is a clear negative effect
(i.e., a reduction) on the minimum and average utility of team members: all of
the strategies are affected by the fact that the team has a shorter deadline. In the
scenario where both parties have a short deadline, the average for the average util-
ity of team members in conceder settings1 is approximately 0.67, and the average
for the average utility of team members in boulware settings2 is approximately
0.45. Thus, the average utility for team members is reduced a 25%. In the present
setting, the average of average utility of team members in conceder settings is
approximately 0.63, whereas the average of the average utility of team members
in boulware settings is approximately 0.10. Therefore, the average utility of team
members is reduced a 53%, approximately doubling the difference found in the
case where both parties had a short deadline.
When team members are very similar (upper sub-table in Table 5.5), it can
be observed that, as in the scenario where both parties have a short deadline
and team members are very similar, several strategies perform very similarly. The
1This measure is calculated averaging the average for the average utility of team members
for all of the intra-team strategies when βop = C and βop = V C in Table 5.4
2This measure is calculated averaging the average for the average utility of team members
for all of the intra-team strategies when βop = B and βop = V B in Table 5.4
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main difference resides in the fact that the only strategy capable of reaching similar
results to FUM β = B in the minimum and average utility is RE β = B. Differently
to the case when team members are very similar and the deadline for both parties
is short, the RE βA = B strategy is capable of achieving similar results to the
other intra-team strategies even in less conceding settings (βop = C, βop = B,
and βop = V B). These results suggest that, despite not assuring any minimum
level of unanimity, employing a representative with a reasonably slow concession
(boulware) leads to good results compared with those obtained by other intra-team
strategies. A closer look at the experiments threw some light over these results.
For instance, when βop = B, the number of successful negotiations was 2695 for
RE βA = B, 1925 for FUM βA = B, 1855 for SBV βA = B, and 2394 for SSV
βA = B. The average utility for successful negotiations was 0.32 for RE βA = B,
0.34 for SSV βA = B, 0.39 for SBV βA = B, and 0.42 for FUM βA = B. Hence,
despite obtaining less quality results in successful negotiations, the representative
approach becomes a good option for these scenarios because it leads to a great
number of negotiations ending in success where other intra-team strategies fail
to succeed (utility=0). SSV, UBS, and FUM need more interactions to find a
satisfactory deal, but when they find it, it is better in utility terms. However, in
average, a representative approach may be more adequate for settings where the
team has a shorter deadline than the opponent.
As for the scenario where team members are very dissimilar (lower sub-table in
Table 5.5), we can observe that the negative effect produced by having a shorter
deadline is especially acute when the opponent uses boulware or very boulware
concessions. The dissimilarities between team members, and the fact that there
are very few interactions to find a deal that satisfies both team and opponent,
contribute to a strong reduction in the minimum and the average utility of team
members. In terms of the minimum utility of team members, FUM and SBV
179
5. INTRA-TEAM STRATEGIES FOR NEGOTIATION TEAMS IN
PREDICTABLE DOMAINS
βA = B work better when the opponent uses conceder or very conceder conces-
sions. However, almost every intra-team strategy performs equally bad in terms
of the minimum utility of team members when the opponent moves to boulware
concessions (especially in the very boulware case). In this case, the representative
approach can no longer compete with the rest of strategies in terms of utility in
most scenarios. Nevertheless, despite team members being very dissimilar and RE
not guaranteeing any unanimity regarding team decisions, RE performs slightly
better than the rest in terms of the average utility of team members when the op-
ponents concedes using boulware. The explanation to this phenomenon is similar
to the case where team members were very similar: a lesser number of negotiations
end in failure (26% failures for RE, 33% for SSV, 48% for SBV, and 46% for FUM),
which compensates for the dissimilarity between team members’ preferences and
the unanimity level guaranteed by RE. In any case, the utility obtained for team
members is so low in the average and minimum utility of team members that, in
some cases, it may even be better not to negotiate with such kind of opponent and
spend computational resources in looking for another alternative.
Long Team Deadline and Short Opponent Deadline In this case, the team
has an advantage over the opponent since its maximum deadline is way longer
than the opponent’s deadline. The goal of these experiments is to determine the
combination of intra-team strategies and negotiation parameters that maximize
the different social welfare measures employed. Thus, if the team has a maximum
deadline equal to the uniform distribution TA = U [30, 60], the team may decide to
play (prior to the negotiation) a different class of deadline like a medium deadline
(TA = U [11, 29]) or a short deadline (TA = U [5, 10]) if the results of the simulation
suggest that better results are obtained by not playing the maximum deadline.
Thus, we also show the results for teams that play a medium deadline, and teams
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Very Similar, Top = L, TA = S, M = 4
βop = V C βop = C βop = B βop = V B
Min. Ave. Min. Ave. Min. Ave. Min. Ave.
RE β = B 0.64 0.75 0.48 0.60 0.15 0.24 0.02 0.04
SSV β = B 0.64 0.74 0.46 0.57 0.14 0.22 0.02 0.04
SBV β = B 0.65 0.74 0.47 0.56 0.13 0.19 0.01 0.02
FUM β = B 0.65 0.74 0.49 0.61 0.15 0.22 0.02 0.04
Very Dissimilar, Top = L, TA = S, M = 4
βop = V C βop = C βop = B βop = V B
Min. Ave. Min. Ave. Min. Ave. Min. Ave.
RE β = B 0.245 0.596 0.153 0.482 0.025 0.170 0.002 0.040
SSV β = B 0.459 0.703 0.280 0.540 0.035 0.156 0.002 0.017
SBV β = B 0.511 0.706 0.313 0.496 0.028 0.082 0.001 0.064
FUM β = B 0.520 0.704 0.336 0.545 0.026 0.084 0.001 0.060
Table 5.5: Average for the minimum utility of team members (Min.) and the
average utility of team members (Ave.) when the team has a short deadline and
the opponent has a long deadline.
that play a short deadline. In this experiment, the opponent plays a short deadline
Top = U [5, 10]. The reservation utilities are drawn from uniform distributions
RUop = U [0, 0.25] and RUai = U [0, 0.25]. The results of this experiment for the
very similar scenario can be observed in Fig. 5.2 and 5.3, whereas the results
for the very dissimilar scenario can be observed in Fig. 5.4 and 5.5. The dots
indicate those configurations that perform statistically better than the rest (t-test,
α = 0.05).
We start by analyzing the results for scenarios where team members are very
similar (Fig. 5.2 and 5.3). We can observe that for situations where the opponent
is very conceder, the team benefits from playing strategies with the same deadline.
Since the opponent concedes very fast in the first negotiation rounds, the best deals
for the team may be proposed in the first negotiation rounds. Playing a longer
deadline may be risky since the team may have extremely high aspirations during
the whole negotiation, which results in most offers being rejected and ending the
negotiation in failure. As a matter of fact, the number of successful negotiations for
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intra-team strategies playing a short deadline and boulware concession was 95.1%,
68% for medium deadline and boulware concession, and 45% for long deadline and
boulware concession, 29% for medium deadline and very boulware concession, and
14% for long deadline and very boulware concession. Other configurations may
have a higher number of successful negotiations, but they are not able to retain
as much utility as the boulware configuration. As the opponent starts to move
towards strategies that concede more slowly, the best intra-team strategies for the
team are those played with a medium deadline and boulware strategy (RE, SBV
and SSV β = B). In those cases, the opponent may not propose the best deals for
the team until its last negotiation rounds. Thus, playing a slightly longer deadline
with a boulware concession comes at an advantage for the team since the team does
not fully concede in the whole negotiation and still accepts last opponent’s offers.
Some strategies played with a medium deadline like FUM β = B are still too
demanding and end in more negotiation failures (they have very little information
to learn the opponents’ preferences).
The very dissimilar scenario (Fig. 5.4 and 5.5) is a little bit different. In
this scenario, the team needs to deal with strong divergences in their preferences
too. Thus, teams are prone to be more demanding in order to accommodate
the preferences of as many team members as possible. We can observe that for
cases where the opponent uses conceder strategies, the team should play boulware
strategies with the same deadline. Similarly to the very similar scenario, playing
a longer deadline is risky since it results in extremely high aspirations and most
offers being rejected. However, in the very dissimilar scenario, the transition from
selecting short deadline strategies to selecting medium deadline strategies does
not appear until the opponent uses boulware strategies. This may be explained
precisely due to the dissimilarity among team members, which requires stronger
demands that are not met when playing medium deadline. As the opponent starts
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to concede using boulware strategies, the best intra-team strategies are usually
found in the medium deadline, as in the very similar scenario case.
In conclusion, in these experiments we have observed that, generally, even
though the team is able to play a long deadline and the opponent plays a short
deadline, the team would benefit more from playing the same type of deadline than
the opponent or a slightly longer deadline.
5.9.2.4 Team size effect on intra-team strategies
We decided to analyze the effect of the team size in the performance of intra-team
strategies. Thus, we repeated the conditions in 5.9.2.2 increasing the number
of team members. We excluded the RE strategy from the analysis. Since team
members do not interact in RE and no unanimity level is guaranteed, the inclusion
of additional team members should not affect the way in which the strategy works.
The results of this experiment can be found in Figure 5.6 and 5.7. It shows the
average and minimum utility of team members for teams of size |A| = {4, 5, 6, 7, 8}.
Generally, it can be observed in all of the graphics that, as the number of
team members increases, the quality of the results in terms of the minimum and
the average utility is reduced. This behavior was expected since as the number of
agents increases, the set of possible agreements is reduced and the conflict inside
the team and with the opponent is increased. However, the reduction in utility
terms can be appreciated more easily in the minimum utility of team members.
The average for the average utility of team members when |A| = 4 is 0.70 and 0.67
for |A| = 8, whereas the average for the minimum utility of team members when
|A| = 4 is 0.48 and 0.41 for |A| = 8. As the number of team members increases,
the contribution of each team member to the average utility is lesser, and that is
the reason why the negative effect of team size on utility measures can be observed
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more easily in the minimum utility of team members than in the average utility
of team members.
We expected that as the number of team members increased, the performance
of unanimity intra-team strategies like FUM would greatly decrease compared to
the performance of SSV since more team members would increase the demands of
the team and make offers less interesting for the opponent. However, the difference
in performance between the three strategies is approximately maintained in almost
every graphic as the number of team members increases. Therefore, team size did
not have a different effect on the performance of the three intra-team strategies,
affecting all of intra-team strategies equally. The decision on which intra-team
strategy should be chosen seems to be unaltered by team size.
The only exceptions to this rule are scenarios where the opponent uses conceder
strategies (βop = C and βop = V C) and team members’ preferences are very
dissimilar (rows 1 and 3, Figure 5.7). In these scenarios, we can observe that there
is a special negative effect of team size on the performance of FUM with respect
to the other intra-team strategies, which results in FUM being one of the worst
choices when the number of team members is large. As a numeric example of
the reduction in the performance of FUM , the difference in the average utility
between SBV and FUM goes from approximately a 2% (|A| = 4) to 10% (|A| = 8)
when βop = V C and the deadline is short, from approximately a 0% (|A| = 4)
to 5% (|A| = 8) when the deadline is short and βop = C, and from 3% (|A| = 4)
to 8% (|A| = 8) when the deadline is long and βop = V C . This phenomenon
has a reasonable explanation. When the opponent uses conceder strategies FUM
has greater difficulties to learn a proper issue agenda. If the number of team
members increases and they are very dissimilar, the demands of team members
increase, which summed up to the fact that the agenda does not properly reflect




In this chapter we have focused on studying intra-team strategies for negotiation
teams that negotiate with a single opponent by means of the alternating offers
bilateral protocol (12). More especifically, the focus of our analysis has been intra-
team strategies for negotiation domains where negotiation issues are predictable
and compatible among team members. In this setting, there is potential for cooper-
ation among team members since they share the same type of valuation functions
(e.g., monotonically increasing or monotonically decreasing). Therefore, if one of
the team members demands more from the negotiation issues and increases its
welfare, it will result in the rest of team members staying at the same level of
utility or increasing their respective utilities.
We have proposed four different intra-team strategies that are able to guar-
antee four different levels of unanimity regarding team decisions: representative
(RE; no unanimity), similarity simple voting (SSV; majority/plurality), similarity
borda voting (SBV; semi-unanimity) and full unanimity mediated (FUM; una-
nimity). Among these intra-team strategies, we have put a special emphasis on
full unanimity mediated since it is able to guarantee unanimity for domains with
predictable and compatible issues among team members. Results have shown that
team members, in practice, do not have much incentive to deviate from the pro-
posed team member behavior due to the fact that offers become very demanding
and negotiations end in failure. Additionally, we have found that full unanimity
mediated is robust against infiltrated agents from the opponent that attempt to
manipulate the team into accepting/proposing offers that are very close to the op-
ponent’s preferences. However, the intra-team strategy is prone to be manipulated
by agents from the competition whose aim is to prevent the team from reaching a
deal with the opponent.
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Another of the goals of this chapter was studying how environmental conditions
affected the performance of the different intra-team strategies. We studied how
the deadline of both parties, the concession speed of the opponent, similarity
among team members’ preferences and team size affected the performance in terms
of the minimum utility of team members, the average utility of team members
and the number of negotiation rounds. The results suggest that depending on the
environmental conditions and the team performance metric, team members should
select different intra-team strategies, which confirms our initial hypothesis in this
thesis. Next, we summarize some of the most important results found in this
chapter:
• Generally, when the concession speed is the same for the different intra-
team strategies, RE takes less numbers of negotiation rounds than SSV,
which takes less number of rounds than SBV, which takes less number of
rounds than FUM. The exception for this rule is when team members are
very similar and the opponent uses boulware or very boulware strategies,
which makes FUM usually faster than SBV.
• FUM tends to outperform the rest of intra-team strategies studied in utility
terms (minimum and average utility of team members) when there is a long
time to negotiate and the opponent uses either boulware of very boulware
concession strategies. When the opponent uses conceder or very conceder
strategies, different intra-team strategies tie in terms of the minimum and
average utility of team members.
• When the team deadline is way shorter than the opponent’s deadline, all of
the intra-team strategies are negatively affected in the results obtained in
the minimum and average utility of team members. When team members
are very similar, RE becomes one of the best choices for the average utility
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of team members since it is capable of ending more negotiations successfully
where other intra-team strategies fail. When team members are very dis-
similar, FUM and SBV tend to work better in terms of utility. However,
if the opponent uses boulware or very boulware concession strategies every
intra-team strategy performs equally bad and team members are encouraged
to look for other negotiation alternatives.
• In situations where the team’s maximum deadline is way larger than the
opponent’s deadline, the team should not play intra-team strategies with the
maximum deadline but intra-team strategies with the same type of deadline
than the opponent or a slightly longer type of deadline. Otherwise, the
team performance in utility terms is not maximized due to more negotiations
ending in failure.
• As the number of team members increases, the performance in utility terms
of all of the intra-team strategies is negatively affected. However, in general,
all of the intra-team strategies studied are equally affected by the increment
in the number of team members. Thus, team size did not have an effect
on the intra-team strategy that should be selected by team members to
maximize the minimum or the average utility of team members.
With this chapter we have proposed intra-team strategies for negotiation do-
mains exclusively composed by predictable and compatible issues. While these
types of domains represent an important number of possible scenarios in elec-
tronic commerce, other scenarios may also exist where unpredictable issues are
present. An issue can be considered as unpredictable among team members if no
common order of issue values can be inferred for team members. For instance, if a
group of travelers has to negotiate with the hotel on the orientation of their room,
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where do team members stand between rooms oriented towards the sea with re-
spect to rooms oriented towards the pool? It may be the case that all of the team
members prefer the same order of issue values, but nothing can be guaranteed
since it is also possible that some team members prefer different orders of issue
values. And more importantly, how can unanimity be guaranteed regarding team





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5.2: Results for very similar team members when the team has a long
deadline, the opponent has a short deadline and the opponent uses conceder or very
conceder tactics.
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Figure 5.3: Results for very similar team members when the team has a long





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5.4: Results for very dissimilar team members when the team has a long
deadline, the opponent has a short deadline and the opponent uses conceder or very
conceder tactics.
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Figure 5.5: Results for very dissimilar team members when the team has a long



































































































































































Figure 5.6: Effect of the size of the team on team performance when both parties
have the same type of deadline and team members are very similar.
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Figure 5.7: Effect of the size of the team on team performance when both parties






The model presented in this chapter extends FUM to make it capable of reaching
unanimously acceptable agreements in domains that contain both predictable and
unpredictable issues. As stated, unpredictable issues among team members are
those whose issue ranking cannot be inferred prior to the negotiation process.
Therefore, the preferences of team members may or may not generate intra-team
conflict. For instance, in a team of travelers that negotiates travel accommodation
with a hotel, it is difficult to tell whether or not team members would prefer free
internet, free drinks, gym service, or a guided tour as a complimentary activity.
This extension allows us to cover a wider range of negotiation scenarios that were
not initially supported by strategies proposed in Chapter 5. From the strategies
presented in Chapter 6, RE, SSV and SBV support any kind of negotiation domain
as long as little modifications are introduced (i.e., changes in similarity heuristics).
195
6. NEGOTIATION TEAMS IN UNPREDICTABLE DOMAINS
However, FUM, which is the strategy that is capable of guaranteeing unanimity
regarding team decisions, cannot work in domains with unpredictables issues. Our
interest in designing intra-team strategies capable of guaranteeing unanimity drove
us to extend FUM for domains with unpredictable issues too.
We propose two negotiation strategies for team members: a basic negotiation
strategy, and a negotiation strategy based on Bayesian learning to model its team-
mates’ and opponent’s preferences for unpredictable issues. The performance of the
model proposed in this Chapter is evaluated in a set of environmental conditions.
We describe our general framework in Section 6.2 and the motivating scenario in
Section 6.3. The intra-team protocol that allows team members to reach unanimity
is detailed in Section 6.4. After that, we propose two negotiation strategies for
team members in Section 6.5 and we explain why unanimity is guaranteed among
team members in Section 6.6. After analyzing the experimental results in Section
6.7. Finally, we briefly highlight the conclusions of this chapter in Section 6.8.
6.2 Negotiation Setting
Most of the characteristics of the negotiation setting coincide with those of Chapter
5. To avoid redundance, in this chapter we only highlight those features which are
different from the previous chapter.
• A team mediator is present in the negotiation. The team mediator plays a
key role during the negotiation since it does not only broadcast the messages
between team members and opponent party but also coordinates the team
members and helps to reach unanimously acceptable deals.
• Among the n different negotiation issues that compose the negotiation do-
main, we consider that there are issues that are predictable and compatible
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among team members and issues that are unpredictable among team mem-
bers. An issue j with domain Dj is compatible among team members if for
each pair of team members a, b ∈ A, for each pair of issue values v1, v2 ∈ Dj ,
the following expression is true:
Va,j(v2) ≥ Va,j(v1)←→ Vb,j(v2) ≥ Vb,j(v1). (6.1)
Hence, an issue is compatible among team members if changing its value
(v1) with another value (v2) increases/decreases a team member’s utility,
then v2 would also increase/decrease the utility for other members. An is-
sue is predictable for an agent if the preference ordering of issue values is
known due to the negotiation domain. Therefore, an issue is compatible and
predictable among team members if the preferences regarding issue values
are known due to the negotiation domain and increasing the utility of one
of the team members by selecting one specific issue value results in other
team members staying at the same utility or also increasing their respec-
tive utilities. Thus, there is potential for cooperation among teammates in
compatible and predictable issues. Our proposed intra-team strategy takes
advantage of these issues to satisfy team members as much as possible and
guarantee unanimously acceptable agreements. On the other hand, an issue
is unpredictable among team members if the preference ordering of the issue
values cannot be accurately predicted and Equation 6.1 may not hold for the
issue. In this framework, PR is the set of predictable and compatible issues,
while UN is the set of unpredictable issues inside the team.
• An offer is unanimously acceptable for a team A if it is acceptable for all of
the team members inside the negotiation team:
∀ai ∈ A,Uai(X) ≥ RUai . (6.2)
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The intra-team strategy proposed in this chapter assures that team members
only accept those offers that are unanimously acceptable and that offers proposed
to the opponent are over each team members’ reservation utilities, thus, making
it unanimously acceptable.
6.3 Motivating Example: Advanced Group Book-
ing
The case of study of this chapter is similar to the one presented in the previous
chapter. A group of travelers (i.e., Alice, Bob, Carol, and Dave) wants to go on a
holiday together and arrange their accommodation accordingly. To do this, they
may need to negotiate together with a hotel on the following issues.
• Price (p): It represents the price per night that each traveler pays to the hotel
for the booking service. The value goes from 200$, which is the minimum
rate applicable by the hotel, to 400$, which is the maximum rate found in the
hotel. This negotiation issue is considered to be predictable and compatible
among team members since all of the travelers obviously prefer low prices to
high prices. Contrarily, the hotel prefers high prices to low prices.
• Cancellation fee (cf): This issue represents the amount of the final price
that each friend pays if the reservation is canceled. Possible values for this
negotiation issue go from 0% to 50%. This is a predictable and compatible
issue among team members since all of the travelers prefer low cancellation
fees to high cancellation fees. On the contrary, the opponent prefers high
cancellation fees to low cancellation fees.
• Arranged Foods Included (af): The hotel may also offer some diets included
in the deal with the travelers. The type of dietary plans included are none,
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breakfast, breakfast+lunch, breakfast+dinner, lunch+dinner, and all. In our
negotiation scenario, we have considered that this negotiation issue is un-
predictable among team members since preferences of team members on this
issue may vary, and it cannot be assumed to be the same for each member.
• Type of room (tr): The four travelers can be accommodated in different
types of room depending on their preferences. More specifically, the hotel
offers 4 individual rooms, 2 twin rooms, 1 triple and 1 individual room, or 1
apartment. As the previous issue, it is considered that the type of room is
an unpredictable negotiation issue among team members.
• Payment method (pm): The amount of money paid by the travelers may be
paid by different methods. The hotel allows for the payment to be made
in cash, via credit card, by bank transfer, in a 3 months deferred payment
through the bank, and in a 6 months deferred payment. This negotiation
issue in unpredictable since team members may prefer to choose different
payment methods.
• Room orientation (ro): If possible, the team members can decide upon an
orientation for the balcony of their rooms. The different options are inner
garden, main street, pool, sea, and outer garden. This issue is also considered
an unpredictable issue among team members.
• Free amenity (fa): As a token of generosity for booking as a group, the hotel
offers one free service to all of the team members. More specifically, the team
members can choose between gym service, free wi-fi, 1 free drink per day, 1
free spa session, pool service, cable tv service, and one free guided tour. Since
the preferences of team members vary for this issue and no assumption about
their preferences can be made, this issue is also considered as unpredictable.
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To sum up, for this case study we have that PR = {p, cf} and UN =
{af, tr, pm, ro, fa}, with a total of 4200 different combinations of discrete issue
values (af, tr, pm, ro, fa), and two real issues (p, cf). We assume that the team
mediator knows which issues are predictable and can apply an operator such as
min/max (monotonically decreasing/increasing valuation functions). For unpre-
dictable issues, team members can have different types of valuation functions and
the mediator does not know which issue values are better for team members. Each
team member may assign different weights (i.e., priorities) to negotiation issues
and the opponent’s valuation functions and issue weights may be different from
those of team members.
6.4 Intra-Team Protocol
We propose an intra-team protocol that is governed by a team mediator. Basically,
the team mediator regulates the interactions that can be carried out among team
members and, accordingly, helps team members to reach unanimous acceptable
decisions inside the team. The proposed protocol is clearly differentiated into two
different phases: Pre-negotiation and Negotiation. On the one hand, during the
pre-negotiation, the mediator helps team members to identify potential offers that
are not unanimously acceptable for every teammate. On the other hand, during
the negotiation the mediator coordinates the offer proposal mechanism (composed
of a voting process for unpredictable issues and an iterated building process for
predictable issues), and the evaluation of opponent’s offers.
6.4.1 Pre-negotiation Phase
The assignment of unpredictable issues during the negotiation is more complicated
than assigning predictable issues since preferences on unpredictable issues may
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be incompatible within the team members. The fact that team members and
the team mediator do not have any prior knowledge about the incompatibility
of preferences within the team, makes it more difficult for the team mediator to
detect which offers are unanimously acceptable for the team. In our proposal,
the mediator attempts to find the combinations of unpredictable issue values that
will not result in an unanimously acceptable agreement under any circumstance.
We say that a combination of unpredictable issue values will not result in an
unanimously acceptable agreement when setting the most desired value for the
compatible and predictable issues, there is at least one team member that cannot
reach its reservation value. The rationale behind identifying these combinations of
unpredictable issue values is pruning the negotiation space inside the team. Hence,
team members exclusively work with combinations of unpredictable issue values
that can result in unanimously acceptable offers.
We define an unpredictable partial offer X
′
as a partial offer that has a concrete
instantiation of all the unpredictable issues in UN . Similarly, we consider that a
complete offer X is the offer that has all of the issues in UN∪PR instantiated. The








For a team member ai, an unpredictable partial offer X
′
is not acceptable when
the sum of the utility of Uai(X
′
) and the maximum utility that can be taken from





Vi,j(v) is less than its reservation
value RUai . For a team member ai, we define the set of unpredictable partial
offers that under any circumstance will result in an unacceptable offer as forbidden





) +maxPRai < RUai} (6.3)
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OFFERS CONSTRUCTED WITH NON FORBIDDEN
UNPREDICTABLE PARTIAL OFFERS
Figure 6.1: Representation of the negotiation space of an agent
It is worth noting that Fai is not the whole negotiation space that is unaccept-
able for ai, but just a portion of it. In fact, some unpredictable partial offers that
are not contained in Fai , can become unacceptable when the agent does not get
the value needed from predictable issues. An intuitive idea of the negotiation space
of an agent can be observed in Figure 6.1. As expected, the offers generated with
forbidden unpredictable partial offers only end up in unacceptable offers for the
agent, whereas offers generated by non forbidden unpredictable partial offers in-
clude acceptable and unacceptable offers for the agent. That is, an acceptable offer
can be reached only by using non forbidden unpredictable partial offers. However,
it does not mean that all of the offers generated by non forbidden unpredictable
partial offers will be acceptable. The size of Fai may grow as the reservation utility
of the agent increases. Thus, agents with high reservation utilities are expected to
have larger sets of Fai than agents with low reservation utilities.
In the pre-negotiation phase, the mediator coordinates the following intra-team
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protocol to discover the set of forbidden unpredictable partial offers for the team
FA. Figure 6.2 shows an overview of the proposed intra-team protocol. Speech
balloons represent public communications inside the team, while directional arrows
represent private communications among two different agents. According to the
proposed protocol, the team mediator initiates the pre-negotiation phase by asking
each team member ai to calculate its own set of forbidden unpredictable partial
offers Fai (See the first frame in Figure 6.2). Each team member builds its own
(forbidden) set as requested, and it is communicated to the mediator privately
as depicted in the second frame (see Figure 6.2). When the mediator receives
the sets from team members, it aggregates them in order to construct the set
of forbidden unpredictable partial offers for team A, FA =
⋃
ai∈A
Fai . Then, as
observed in the third frame (see Figure 6.2), the team mediator makes public the
list of forbidden unpredictable partial offers of the team FA. It should be stated
that, since any unpredictable partial offer in this set will prevent one of the team
members from reaching its reservation utility, the team is not allowed to generate
an offer involving any of the partial offers in FA. After the team mediator has
shared FA with team members, the negotiation phase starts.
The set of forbidden unpredictable partial offers FA may be a useful tool. The
team mediator may be able to detect prior to the negotiation if no unanimous
acceptable agreement is possible among team members (i.e., when FA covers all
of the possible partial offers). Additionally, the information gathered from each
agent may facilitate team formation under the rationale that those Fai that are
the most similar may reduce intra-team conflict. The use of this information in
team formation algorithms is considered as a future line of work.
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Figure 6.2: Overview of the intra-team protocol carried out during the pre-
negotiation
6.4.2 Negotiation Phase
In the negotiation, two mechanisms are carried out at each round: a mechanism
for deciding to accept/reject the opponent’s offer (Evaluation of Opponent’s Of-
fer), and a mechanism for proposing an offer to the opponent (Offer Proposal).
For the former, a unanimity voting process is employed, while for the latter an




6.4.2.1 Evaluation of Opponent’s Offer
This mechanism is carried out each time the team mediator receives an offer from
the opponent. Since the main goal of the proposed intra-team strategy is achieving
unanimously acceptable agreements for the team, a unanimity voting is carried out
to decide whether or not the opponent’s offer is acceptable for the team. With this
mechanism, as long as one of the team members is not satisfied with the opponent’s
offer, the offer is not accepted by the team, precluding the team from reaching
agreements that are not unanimously acceptable. The intra-team protocol used for
this mechanism goes as follows. First, the team mediator receives the offer Xt from
the opponent at time t. If Xt involves any forbidden unpredictable partial offer in
FA, the opponent offer is automatically rejected. However, the opponent’s offer is
also informed to team members in order to allow each team member to process
the new information leaked by the opponent if they see it necessary. Otherwise,
if the combination of unpredictable issue values is not in FA, the mediator makes
the opponent’s offer public among team members and starts an anonymous voting
process (i.e., votes are communicated privately to the team mediator and only the
final result of the voting is publicly communicated to team members). Each team
member ai states to the mediator whether he is willing to accept X
t (positive
vote) or to reject it (negative vote) at that specific instant. Since we desire to
guarantee unanimity, the offer is only accepted if all of the team members emit a
positive vote. Otherwise, the offer is rejected and a counter-offer is proposed as
explained in Section 6.4.2.2.
6.4.2.2 Offer Proposal
Proposing an offer to the opponent is a complex task, since the space of offers may
be huge and the preferences of the team members should be reflected in the offer
sent to the opponent. Moreover, the offer sent should be unanimously acceptable
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for team members. The process is divided into two sub-phases: constructing an
unpredictable partial offer, and setting up predictable issues. In both phases, the
team mediator acts according to Algorithm 6. We explain both processes in detail
below.
• Constructing an unpredictable partial offer: The first step is proposing
an unpredictable partial offer, a partial offer which has all of the unpredictable
issues instantiated. Since team members know from FA the list of unpre-
dictable partial offers that will not result in unanimously acceptable offers
under any circumstance, any offer proposed by the team should avoid being
constructed from unpredictable partial offers found in FA. The method used
to propose offers to the opponent relies on the fact that unpredictable issues
are those issues where more intra-team conflict may be present, whereas
full potential for cooperation is present in predictable and compatible issues.
Hence, in order to build an offer to be sent to the opponent, it seems more ap-
propriate to set unpredictable issue values first and then, depending on the
remaining needs of team members, allow team members to set compatible
and predictable issues as they require to reach their demands. The pro-
posed mechanism for the first part, proposing an unpredictable partial offer,
is based on voting and social choice. The voting process goes as follows.
1. The mediator asks each team member to anonymously propose one
unpredictable partial offer X
′t
ai .
2. Each team member privately sends its proposal to the team mediator,
who gathers all of the proposals in a list that will be later sent to team
members. If any unpredictable partial offer proposed by ai is contained
in FA, the mediator automatically ignores this proposal.
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3. Once all of the proposals have been gathered, the team mediator makes
public the list of proposal UPO
′t among team members and opens a
Borda scoring process (131) on proposed candidates.
4. Each team member anonymously scores the unpredictable partial offers
and anonymously sends the scores to the team mediator. The team
mediator sums up scores and selects the candidate with the highest
score X
′t
A , making it public among team members. This candidate, an
unpredictable partial offer, is the base for the full offer that is to the
opponent.
• Setting up predictable and compatible issue values: Once unpre-
dictable issues have been set, it is necessary to set predictable and compatible
issues to construct a complete offer. As it has been stated along this thesis,
there is full potential for cooperation among team members in these issues,
since increasing the utility of one of the team members by selecting one issue
value will result in the other team members staying at the same utility or
increasing their utility. The selected unpredictable partial offer does not sat-
isfy equally the needs of all the team members. Nevertheless, team members
can make use of predictable and compatible issues to satisfy their remaining
needs while not generating conflict inside the team. To complete the partial
offer X
′t
A , the iterative mechanism proposed in FUM (see Chapter 5) is used
to build the final offer issue per issue.
6.5 Team Members’ Strategies
The team mediator defines the coordination mechanisms and the rules of the game
inside the team. However, each team member’s internal strategy has a great effect
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/*Proposing an unpredictable offer*/;
Send (Ask for X
′t
ai −→ ∀ai ∈ A);
Receive(X
′t








Send (Score borda UPO
′t −→ ∀ai ∈ A);









agenda=build predictable agenda(); A′ = A;
/*Setting predictable issues*/;
foreach j ∈ agenda do
Send (Needed value xai,j , for X
′t
A −→ ∀ai|ai ∈ A′);
Receive (xai,j ←− ∀ai|ai ∈ A′);



















A? −→ ∀ai|ai ∈ A′);






A) = true then A
′ = A′ − {ai};
end
if A′ = ∅ then break;
end
foreach j ∈ agenda ∧ issue not set(j) do












Algorithm 6: Pseudo-algorithm for the offer construction from the point of
view of the mediator. Send (message −→ condition ) means that message is
sent to every agent that fulfills condition
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on team dynamics. In this chapter, we propose two types of negotiation strategy
for team members. According to the first strategy (i.e., our basic team member),
the team member only considers its own utility function to take decisions. In the
second strategy, team members also take into account its teammates’ and oppo-
nent’s preferences by employing Bayesian learning (i.e., Bayesian team member).
6.5.1 Basic Strategy for Team Members
Since negotiations are time-bounded, we consider that team members have to
perform some kind of concession if an agreement is to be found. For this purpose
we have designed basic team members as agents whose demands are controlled
by an individual and private concession tactic. More specifically, the concession
strategy for a team member ai is based on time-based tactics (18, 57). This
concession strategy estimates the utility demanded by ai at time t by using the
formula in Equation 6.4, where RUai is its reservation utility, T is the negotiation
deadline, and βai is the concession speed, which determines how fast the agent’s
demands are lowered towards the reservation utility.






6.5.1.1 Evaluation of Opponent’s Offer
Given an offer Xt proposed by the opponent at round t, the team member emits
a positive vote for this offer in the unanimity voting process if it reports a utility
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6.5.1.2 Offer Proposal
As documented in Section 6.4.2, team members interact at three points during
the offer proposal. First, they propose an unpredictable partial offer to the team
mediator. Since each team member ai has its demands regulated by a time-based
tactic, when proposing an unpredictable partial offer to the mediator at instant t,





ai /∈ FA ∧ (Uai(X
′t
ai) +maxPRai ≥ sai(t)) (6.6)
Hence, ai selects an unpredictable partial offer which is not forbidden inside the
team (since it will be ignored by the team mediator) and whose utility allows him
to achieve or surpass its current demands at time t. This way, the team member
assures that if the proposed unpredictable partial offer is the winner of the Borda
voting process, it can reach its current demands. However, one should be aware
that many unpredictable partial offers may fulfill Equation 6.6. Therefore, it is
necessary to select one of them as the proposed candidate. Being our basic team
member, from the set of partial offers that fulfill Equation 6.6, a team member
selects one of the candidates randomly.
The second time that a team member interacts with the team mediator is for
scoring unpredictable partial offers that have been proposed by team members.
For scoring candidate partial offers in the Borda voting process, a basic team
member orders the candidates according to the partial utility reported by each of
the candidates. That is, the team member assigns the highest score to the partial
offer whose utility is the highest for itself, and the second highest score to the
partial offer whose utility is the second best one, and so forth.
Finally, team members also interact with the mediator during the iterative
mechanism used to set predictable and compatible issues. In this part of the intra-
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team negotiation, team members employ the same strategy describe in FUM (see
Chapter 5).
6.5.2 Bayesian-based Strategy for Team Members
The Bayesian negotiation strategy for a team member is based on modeling the
team’s (as a whole) and its opponent’s preferences on unpredictable issues. For
this purpose, two Bayesian models are employed to predict whether unpredictable
partial offers are acceptable for both teammates and the opponent. One of the
Bayesian models is employed to capture the preferences of the team on unpre-
dictable issues, whereas the other is used for capturing the preferences of the
opponent on unpredictable issues. The strategy used to evaluate opponent’s offer
is the same than the one described in the basic strategy.
6.5.2.1 Bayesian Learning
Bayesian learning is a probabilistic learning method based on Bayes’ theorem (58).
Given a certain set of hypothesis H and some observation e, Bayesian learning
attempts to compute the probability p(h|e) that a certain hypothesis h is true
after observing e. In our case, we want to determine whether or not the proposed
offer will be acceptable for the opponent (or the team) (H={acc,¬acc}) given a
certain unpredictable partial offer (e = X
′t).
Since we assume that there is no interdependence among negotiation issues, we
can consider that each negotiation issue contributes individually to the acceptabil-
ity of an offer/unpredictable partial offer. Thus, applying Bayes’ theorem under
















6. NEGOTIATION TEAMS IN UNPREDICTABLE DOMAINS
where p(acc) is the prior probability for an unpredictable partial offer to be ac-
ceptable, p(¬acc) is the prior probability for an unpredictable partial offer to be
non-acceptable, and p(xj |acc) is the conditional probability for the value of the
j-th issue to be part of an acceptable offer.
We consider positive examples Sacc as those examples that correspond to the
acceptable hypothesis (acc) and negative examples S¬acc as those examples that
correspond to the not acceptable hypothesis (¬acc). For the opponent’s model,
we employ unpredictable partial offers that have appeared in opponent’s offers as
positive examples, and unpredictable partial offers that appear in offers rejected
by the opponent as negative samples. For the team’s model, we use FA and
those opponent’s offers rejected by team members as the set of negative examples.
Winners in the Borda votings (i.e., unpredictable partial offers contained in offers
sent to the opponent) are considered as positive examples.
When computing p(xj |h), we calculate the proportion between the number of







Up to this point, we have explained how the team members model other team
members’ and the opponent’s preferences by means of Bayesian models. However,
we have not explained yet where these models come into play. Basically, Bayesian
models are employed to help in the selection of the unpredictable partial offer that
is proposed to the other team members. If we remember from the basic team
member formalization, team members propose at t unpredictable partial offers in
the set defined in Equation 6.6. Bayesian models help to the select a candidate
from such set.
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However, it is reasonable to think that in the first interactions Bayesian models
do not accurately represent other agents’ preferences. For that purpose, a team
member invests part of the negotiation time texp in exploring the negotiation space
and collecting information regarding the opponent’s and the team’s preferences.
As long as the negotiation process has not surpassed texp, the team member just
selects randomly one of candidate unpredictable partial offers as basic team mem-
bers do. Meanwhile, the Bayesian models are continuously updated with the new
information that becomes available during the negotiation. After reaching the
time threshold, the team member starts to use Bayesian models in order to select
the unpredictable partial offer. The heuristic used in the selection of the candidate
is proposing an unpredictable partial offer that is both acceptable for the team and
the opponent. The model has an additional parameter named pesc. It represents
the probability of avoiding the Bayesian models (using the random proposal model)
when the negotiation time has gone beyond texp. This parameter is included in
the model in order to: (i) explore further the negotiation space; (ii) escape from
local optima induced by inaccurate Bayesian models (e.g., wrong samples, limited







(wApA(acc|X) + woppop(acc|X)) if rand ≤ pesc ∧ t ≥ texp
select random partial offer(B) otherwise
(6.9)
where B is the set of candidate unpredictable partial offers that fulfill Equation
6.6, rand is a random number in [0,1], pA(acc|X) is the probability for a candi-
date unpredictable partial offer to be acceptable for the team, popp(acc|X) is the
probability for the candidate unpredictable partial offer to be acceptable for the
opponent, and wA and wop
1 represent the weights or importances given to the
1wA + wop = 1
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acceptability of the unpredictable partial offer for the team and the opponent, re-
spectively. Varying these weights allow team members to show different behaviors
depending on their inclination to satisfy either the team or the opponent with the
unpredictable partial offer.
6.6 Unanimously Acceptable Proof
As stated, one of our research goals is proposing negotiation team models that
are able to guarantee unanimously acceptable team decisions. Next, we show that
under the assumption of rationality1, team members are able to achieve unani-
mously acceptable final agreements, if an agreement is found. For that matter, let
us employ reductio ad absurdum (reduction to absurdity).
If X is the final agreement, let us suppose that Equation 6.2 (unanimously ac-
ceptable) is violated in a negotiation: unanimity is not reached because ai obtained





wi,jVi,j(xj) < RUai (6.10)
The final agreement is found when (1) team members accept an opponent’s
offer or (2) the opponent accepts a team’s offer. Next, we show that in both cases,
Equation 6.10 is never true.
1. When the team members accept an opponent’s offer, a unanimity voting
process has been carried to decide whether or not to accept the final offer.
The offer is only accepted if all of the team members have emitted a positive
vote. Since a rational agent ai would never have incentive to emit a positive
vote if the offer reports a utility below its reservation utility, this scenario is
never true.
1Rational agents seek to improve their current welfare. Thus, they would not take actions
that lead to utilities below their reservation utilities
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2. When the opponent accepts a team’s offer X, the offer has been proposed
by the intra-team mechanism mentioned in Section 6.4.2.2. The offer can be
decomposed into an unpredictable partial offer X
′t and an instantiation of
predictable issues. The team member ai is not able to get over its reservation
utility if and only if X
′t ∈ Fai or when X
′t /∈ Fai and ai could not get
what it demanded in predictable issues. A rational agent has no incentive
to exclude a forbidden unpredictable partial offer X




Fai and the mediator ignores unpredictable partial offers
in FA, an unpredictable partial offer X
′t that forms a team offer is never
in Fai . If X
′t /∈ Fai then the agent can accomplish to satisfy the following
expression Uai(X
′t)+maxPRai ≥ RUai . ai could not get over its reservation
value because he could not demand the most of predictable issues. However,
when the team mediator aggregates predictable issues inside the team, the
team mediator selects the highest value for team members in the the list of
values proposed by them. Thus, ai can obtain the maximum utility from
predictable issues. If an agreement is found, Equation 6.10 is never true.
Since both possible scenarios are never true under our initial assumption, we
have shown by reduction ad absurdum that, if a final agreement is found, it is
unanimously acceptable. Another research issue is the presence of exaggerating
team members (i.e., agents that exaggerate their preferences to get the most from
the negotiation). In our setting, even if team members exaggerate and decide to
include in Fai unpredictable partial offers that are acceptable but report low utility
or they demand more than they need from predictable issues, if a final agreement is
found it will be unanimous among team members. However, by doing so, they may
be pruning negotiation space and lowering the probability of finding agreements.
This is an interesting situation that we plan to study in the future.
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6.7 Experiments
In this section, we explore the behavior of the proposed negotiation model in differ-
ent environments. In order to assess the performance of the proposed negotiation
approach, we have performed three different experiments. All of the experiments
carried out have been done in the negotiation domain introduced in Section 6.3.
The first experiment aims to compare the performance of the proposed model with
basic and Bayesian team members against other negotiation team models in this
thesis. The comparison is carried out in scenarios with different degrees of team’s
preference dissimilarity. In the second experiment we study how the weights wA
and wop, which control the importance given to the preferences of the team and
the opponent in the unpredictable partial offer proposed to teammates, impact
the performance of the proposed model when team members employ the Bayesian
strategy. Finally, we conduct an experiment to study the effect of team members’
reservation utility on the performance of the proposed negotiation model.
The implementations of this chapter have been carried out in genius (150), a
well-known simulation framework for negotiations. It supports simulation of ses-
sions and tournaments based on bilateral negotiations. Users are able to design
their own agents and test them against a wide variety of different agents designed
by the community. The framework provides information critical for analysis (e.g.,
utility, Pareto optimality, etc.) which is extremely useful for research tasks. More-
over, the use of Genius as a testbed for bilateral negotiations is testified by its
use in the annual automated negotiating agent competition (ANAC) (161). The
ANAC competition provided Genius with a large repository of agents. The in-
tegration of ABNT in Genius additionally facilitates the following objectives: (i)
the use of Genius in ANAC has provided with wide variety of opponent agents;
(ii) Genius is a consolidated testbed among the agent community. Thus, the in-
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clusion of ABNT inside Genius can facilitate research on agent-based negotiation
teams by other scholars, and even give room to a future negotiating competition
involving teams.
6.7.1 First Experiment: Measuring Model Performance
As stated above, in this first set of experiments we study the performance of the
proposed model. The study is carried out with an emphasis on observing the per-
formance difference in settings having different degrees of preference dissimilarity
among team members. In our experiment, we consider two configurations for the
proposed model: when all the team members use the basic strategy (i.e., basic),
and when all the team members employ the Bayesian strategy proposed in this
chapter (i.e., Bayesian). We also included the Similarity Borda Voting model (i.e.,
SBV, see Chapter 5) in our experiment. The reason to include this intra-team
strategy in our study is due to the fact that it is capable of achieving similar re-
sults to FUM under certain circumstances. In order to adapt this approach for
domains with unpredictable issues, we use a similarity heuristic that uses Euclidean
distance for real/integer issues and string matching for other types of issues.
In our framework, we are also interested in studying how team members’ pref-
erences impact on the performance of team negotiation models. The team dis-
similarity measure is calculated as shown in Chapter 5. For this experiment, we
decided to explore teams whose preferences are very dissimilar, teams whose prefer-
ences are very similar, and teams with an average degree of similarity/dissimilarity
(i.e., average similarity). For the scenario of very dissimilar preferences, 9 negoti-
ation cases were randomly generated (i.e., a combination of 3 different negotiation
teams consisting of four team members with 3 different opponents), while 9 negoti-
ation cases were randomly generated for the very similar preferences scenario (i.e.,
a combination of 3 different negotiation teams consisting of four team members
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with 3 different opponents) and 12 negotiation cases were randomly generated for
the average similarity scenario (i.e., a combination of 4 different negotiation teams
consisting of four team members with 3 different opponents).
For the models proposed in this chapter (i.e., basic and Bayesian members),
there are several parameters that need to be fixed. Initially, the reservation utility
of each team member was set to RUai = 0.5 to simulate negotiation scenarios
where team members have outside options besides the current negotiation. Ad-
ditionally, for each team member (i.e., basic, Bayesian and SBV) the concession
speed was randomly selected from a uniform distribution of boulware strategies
βai = U [0.5, 1]. In the case of Bayesian team members, the time of exploration
was set to texp = 70% and the probability of escape after the exploration phase
was set to pesc = 30%
1. Initially, we set Bayesian team members to care equally
about the probability for unpredictable partial offers to be accepted by the team
and the opponent wA = wop = 0.5.
Since the model presented in this chapter has been implemented in genius,
we are able to study team performance against state-of-the-art opponents. We de-
cided to test the negotiation team models against different families of opponents.
More specifically, we followed the categorization of negotiation strategies proposed
by Baarslag et al. (151), which divides negotiation strategies into four categories:
competitors, conceders, matchers, and inverters. On the one hand, competitors
hardly concede (independently of opponent behavior), whereas conceders yield
independently of the opponent behavior. On the other hand, matchers concede
when they perceive that the opponent concedes, and they do not concede if they
perceive that the other party does concede. Inverters respond by implementing the
opposite behavior shown by the other party. According to the practical catego-
rization of Baarslag et al., we selected Agent K (162), winner of negotiating agent
1These values were found to work well in practice for almost every scenario tested.
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competition in 2010, as competitor agent for our tests, Nice Tit-for-Tat (163),
participant in 2011’s negotiating competition, as a matcher strategy, a time-based
tactic (18, 57) with βop = 0.2 (i.e., very boulware) as an inverter strategy, and a
time-based tactic (18, 57) with βop = 2 (i.e., conceder) as a conceder strategy.
Following the type of setting used in the annual agent competition, the nego-
tiation time is set to T = 180 seconds. Each opponent strategy is faced against
each negotiation team model in every possible negotiation case. A total of 20
repetitions are done per negotiation case in order to capture stochastic variations
in negotiation strategies. Therefore, 3 × 3 × 3 × 4 × 20 = 2160 (team preference
profiles × opponent preference profiles × team negotiation models × opponent
strategies × repetitions) negotiations were simulated in the very similar scenario,
2160 negotiations were simulated in the very dissimilar scenario, and 2880 negoti-
ations were simulated in the average similarity scenario. Information was gathered
regarding the joint utility of the team1 in the final agreement, and the opponent
utility (included to see the effect of Bayesian models) in the final agreement. The
results of the experiment can be found in Table 6.1. An ANOVA test (α = 0.05)
with a Boniferroni post-hoc analysis was carried out to assess statistical differences
among the different measures gathered. Those measures that are statistically the
best configurations for each column are highlighted in bold style.
It can be observed that when team members’ preferences are very similar, both
basic and Bayesian models are statistically equivalent to each other and they are
statistically better than SBV with respect to the average team joint utility. Basic
and Bayesian models outperform SBV with respect to the average team joint utility
since they are able to guarantee unanimously acceptable agreements, while SBV
does not guarantee such condition. The reason why Bayesian models do not give
1We consider the joint utility of the team to be the product of the utilities of the team
members.
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Very Similar
Agent K Nice Tit-for-Tat Very Boulware Conceder
T. Joint Op. T. Joint Op. T. Joint Op. T. Joint Op.
SBV 0.181 0.743 0.150 0.694 0.184 0.755 0.552 0.482
Basic 0.259 0.683 0.173 0.760 0.223 0.696 0.561 0.468
Bayesian 0.263 0.690 0.164 0.746 0.224 0.695 0.557 0.472
Average Similarity
Agent K Nice Tit-for-Tat Very Boulware Conceder
T. Joint Op. T. Joint Op. T. Joint Op. T. Joint Op.
SBV 0.168 0.629 0.137 0.562 0.170 0.598 0.324 0.428
Basic 0.211 0.574 0.141 0.691 0.210 0.585 0.386 0.414
Bayesian 0.248 0.583 0.158 0.669 0.224 0.574 0.390 0.414
Very Dissimilar
Agent K Nice Tit-for-Tat Very Boulware Conceder
T. Joint Op. T. Joint Op. T. Joint Op. T. Joint Op.
SBV 0.07 0.522 0.160 0.457 0.128 0.547 0.257 0.430
Basic 0.174 0.397 0.184 0.572 0.254 0.505 0.472 0.367
Bayesian 0.209 0.457 0.196 0.559 0.271 0.489 0.475 0.367
Table 6.1: Average joint Utility (T. Joint) and average opponent Utility (Op) for
the first set of experiments.
an advantage over the basic model in the very similar scenario can be explained due
to the fact that, since team members are very similar, there is no necessity to carry
out team modeling. If an offer is good for one of the team members, it will probably
be good for other teammates. Additionally, since team members’ preferences are
similar, it is also easier for opponents to learn the team preferences, which helps
to find better agreement even if only the opponent uses opponent modeling. The
basic model, the Bayesian model and SBV perform statistically equal in terms
of the average team joint utility only when the opponent is a conceder. Since
the opponent concedes rapidly, the three team negotiation models are able to get
similar results.
If we observe the opponent utility when team members’ preferences are very
similar, one can realize that the opponent may be benefited if the team members
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employ the SBV model. This is observable in the case of the competitor agent (i.e.,
Agent K) and the inverter agent (i.e., very boulware), which exploit the team using
the SBV model and that is reflected in a statistically lower team joint utility and
a statistically higher opponent utility. We could not find this pattern in the case
of matchers and conceders since they should not tend to exploit team members.
As conflict is introduced inside the team by making team members’ preferences
more dissimilar (i.e., very dissimilar and average similarity scenarios), it can be
observed that usually team members get the statistically highest average team joint
utility by employing the Bayesian strategy for modeling the team’s preferences. In
this case, the teammates’ preferences are no longer very similar and some sort of
modeling mechanism is needed in order to guide the intra-team negotiation towards
agreements that are good for all of the team members. The only exception for this
pattern is found in the conceder case, where the performance in terms of the team
joint utility was found to be statistically equivalent among basic and Bayesian
models. Taking a closer look at the negotiation traces, we observed that, in all
of the negotiations, the exploration time texp was never surpassed. Therefore,
Bayesian models do not get to be used. In fact, the average negotiation time
against conceder agents was 62 seconds in the very similar scenario, 76 seconds
in the average similarity scenario, and 88 seconds in the very dissimilar scenario.
All of them are below the threshold of 126 seconds delimited by texp. As a result
of reaching an agreement early, the team members have not used their Bayesian
model while generating their proposals.
In the case of the average opponent’s utility, we found a similar pattern to the
one found in the very similar scenario, where the opponent exploit teams using
the SBV model if a competitor or matcher strategy is played. Additionally, we
also found that when teammates’ preferences are very dissimilar and the opponent
uses a conceder strategy, the opponent also gets a statistically higher utility if team
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members employ the Similarity Borda Voting model. Since no full unanimity is
guaranteed by SBV, the negotiation space considered by team members is larger
than that considered by the basic and the Bayesian model. The opponent may
benefit from those new portions of negotiation space since the agreement space
may get larger.
As for the comparison between basic team members and Bayesian team mem-
bers in terms of the opponent utility, the Bayesian model’s performance is slightly
better than the performance of the basic model when facing Agent K. Nevertheless,
we could not observe this behavior against Nice Tit-for-Tat and Very Boulware.
We analyzed the trace of different negotiations against Nice Tit-for-Tat and Very
Boulware opponents. In the former case, we could observe that close to the end
of the negotiation the Nice Tit-for-Tat opponent had only sent 5 different unpre-
dictable partial offers in a domain that has 4200 different unpredictable partial
offers. This behavior results in scarce information for any learning mechanism.
In the case of negotiations against Very Boulware agents, one should consider
that the Very Boulware strategies concede only towards the end of the negotiation
and, most of the time, the aspirations are very high. On top of that, the Very
Boulware implementation in Genius sends any offer with the demanded utility
without considering any other information. Thus, most of the samples gathered
by the Bayesian classifier when facing Very Boulware agents correspond to offers
with high demands where usually only the best issue values appear. Other issue
values do not appear in the samples or they have their frequency misrepresented
with respect to the utility that they actually report. Therefore, any learning mech-
anism based on frequencies (i.e., Bayesian) would have difficulties in learning these
opponents’ preferences. This fact explains in part the reason why Bayesian clas-
sifiers improve the joint utility of the team over the basic model, but they do not
improve the utility obtained by the opponent.
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In conclusion, in this first experiment we have found that team members benefit
in terms of the team joint utility by using the proposed model in this chapter with
respect to other approaches like SBV. Additionally, we have shown that as long
as some intra-team conflict is present in teammates’ preferences, team members
benefit from playing the Bayesian strategy proposed in this chapter.
6.7.2 Second Experiment: Analyzing the impact of param-
eters for the proposal of unpredictable partial offers
If we recall from Section 6.5.2 there are two weight parameters that control how
important the opponent’s and team’s preferences are while generating the unpre-
dictable partial offer (respectively wop, wA). wA represents how important it is
for us to make an unpredictable partial offer acceptable for the team, whereas wop
represents how important it is for us to make an unpredictable partial offer accept-
able for the opponent. The use of these weights is not trivial, since one should
consider that, it only refers to the acceptability of the unpredictable partial offer
by one of the two parties. A complete offer is composed by the predictable and
unpredictable issues. Therefore, using a high value of wop may not have the desired
effect on the opponent unless unpredictable issues are important for the opponent.
In this second experiment we explore the impact of these weights in a wide variety
of situations. More specifically, we consider situations where the team gives more
importance to unpredictable partial issues than the opponent, situations where
the opponent gives more importance to unpredictable partial issues than the team,
and situations where both team and the opponent give the same importance to
unpredictable partial issues.
To assess the importance given by an agent to unpredictable partial issues, we
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We consider that when Iai ∈ [0.0, 0.33] the agent ai gives low importance to unpre-
dictable issues, when Iai ∈ [0.33, 0.66] it gives average importance to unpredictable
issues, and when Iai ∈ [0.66, 1.0] the agent gives high importance to unpredictable
issues. We generated 8 random negotiation cases where team members give a high
importance to unpredictable issues and the opponent gives low (4 cases) and av-
erage (4 cases) importance to unpredictable issues, 8 different randomly generated
negotiation cases where team members give a low importance to unpredictable is-
sues and the opponent gives average (4 cases) and high (4 cases) importance to
unpredictable issues, and 12 negotiation cases where the opponent and the team
give the same importance to unpredictable issues (4 cases where both give low
importance, 4 cases where both give average importance, and 4 cases where both
give high importance).
We tested three different configurations for Bayesian team members: standard
Bayesian team members that give the same importance to the acceptability of the
unpredictable partial offer by the opponent and the team wA = wop = 0.5 (Nor-
mal), Bayesian team members that give more importance to the acceptability of
the unpredictable partial offer by the opponent wA = 0.25 wop = 0.75 (Opponent
Oriented), and Bayesian team members that give more importance to the accept-
ability of the unpredictable partial offer by the team wA = 0.75 wop = 0.25 (Team
Oriented). As for the opponent’s strategy, we selected Agent K since we observed
that Bayesian classifiers are able to learn good models from offers sent by Agent
K.
For each negotiation case, we repeated the negotiation 20 times in order to
capture stochastic variations in strategies. Therefore, a total of 1680 negotiations
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were carried out in this experiment. The results of this experiment can be observed
in Table 6.2. It shows the average of the joint team utility and the average of the
opponent utility. An ANOVA test (α = 0.05) with Bonferroni post-hoc analysis
was carried out to detect statistically different averages. The statistically better
configurations for each of the three scenarios are highlighted in bold font style.
It can be appreciated that when unpredictable issues are more important for the
opponent, the best results in average are obtained by taking an opponent oriented
approach: proposing unpredictable partial offers that are very likely to be accept-
able for the opponent and satisfy remaining members’ aspirations by demanding
on predictable and compatible issues, which are less important for the opponent.
This approach gets better results in terms of the opponent utility and the team
joint utility1 As for the scenario where unpredictable issues are more important
for the team, it is clearly observed that the best choice for team joint utility is to
give a high weight to wA, thus employing a team oriented approach. Since unpre-
dictable issues are more important for the team, they should satisfy their needs
as much as possible with proposed unpredictable partial offers and demand less
on predictable issues, which are more important for the opponent. The opponent
utility is maximized when taking an opponent oriented approach, but it results in a
considerable reduction in the team joint utility. Thus, in normal conditions, team
members do not have any incentive to use an opponent oriented approach over a
team oriented approach in this scenario. Finally, the last scenario corresponds to
the case where unpredictable issues have the same importance for both parties. In
this case, there may be more conflict between the team and its opponent since the
parties do not have a clear trade-off opportunity such as increasing the demand
1The p-value when comparing the team joint utility obtained by the opponent oriented
approach and the normal approach was 0.07, which is very close to 0.05. Therefore, we decided
to consider it as statistically different.
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Equal importance on unpredictable issues
T. Joint Op
Normal 0.168 0.480
Opponent Oriented 0.155 0.521
Team Oriented 0.116 0.323
Unpredictable issues more important for the team
T. Joint Op
Normal 0.213 0.576
Opponent Oriented 0.200 0.595
Team Oriented 0.248 0.561
Unpredictable issues more important for the opponent
T. Joint Op
Normal 0.280 0.627
Opponent Oriented 0.296 0.664
Team Oriented 0.271 0.559
Table 6.2: Impact of wA and wop on the team joint utility and the opponent utility
in different scenarios
on unpredictable issues while decreasing the demand on predictable issues as ap-
peared in two previous cases. One can observe that the best team joint utility is
obtained when using the standard team members 1 (wA = wop = 0.5). Since both
parties give the same importance to unpredictable issues, it seems natural to give
the same importance to the acceptability of the unpredictable partial offer by the
team and the opponent. The team oriented approach is clearly worse than the
rest of approaches since most of the negotiations (42 %) ended in failure due to
the team being too demanding and not satisfying the opponent’s preferences. As
for the opponent utility, the best option seems again the opponent oriented ap-
proach, but the cost is obtaining worse team joint utility than the best approach.
Thus, normally, team members do not have incentive to use an opponent oriented
approach over a normal approach in this scenario.
1When comparing the team joint utility obtained by the normal approach and the opponent
oriented approach, the p-value was 0.06, which is very close to 0.05. Thus, we considered both
results as statistically different in practice.
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However, for an effective adjustment of wA and wop, some information regard-
ing which party gives more importance to unpredictable issues may be needed.
It can be observed that in the three scenarios analyzed in this chapter, standard
team members are the best option when both parties give the same importance
to unpredictable issues and the second best option in the rest of the cases. The
opponent oriented approach is the best option in one scenario (when unpredictable
issues are more important for the opponent), the second best option in one sce-
nario (when unpredictable issues are equally important for both parties), and the
worse option in another scenario (when unpredictable issues are more important
for the team). As for the team oriented approach, it seems to be the best option in
one of the scenarios (when unpredictable issues are more important for the team),
and the worse option in the other two scenarios. Hence, in absence of any prior
information regarding this matter, a conservative approach suggests using stan-
dard team members and assuming that both parties give the same importance to
unpredictable issues.
6.7.3 Third Experiment: Analyzing the Impact of the Reser-
vation Utility
In the third experiment, we investigate the impact of team members’ reservation
utility on the team performance. As explained in Section 6.4.1, team members
jointly prune a part of the negotiation space (i.e., a set of unpredictable partial of-
fers) which does not contain, with absolute certainty, any unanimously acceptable
offer. This pruning is directly related with the reservation utility of team members,
which represents the minimum acceptable utility by team members. Therefore,
any offer with a utility lower than the reservation utility is not acceptable for the
agent.
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Lower reservation utilities make it easier to obtain the needed utility by just
setting compatible and predictable issues. Thus, each team member prunes less
negotiation space with the unpredictable partial offers sent to the team mediator.
Presumably, a joint list of forbidden unpredictable partial offers (i.e., the nego-
tiation space that is pruned) with lower reservation utilities is smaller than lists
constructed with higher reservation utilities. This leaves more room for finding an
agreement with the opponent. However, if team members have very low reserva-
tion utilities, despite having more room for finding an agreement, they may end up
with low utility agreements in the end. On the contrary, with higher reservation
utilities, it is harder to obtain the needed utility with compatible and predictable
issues. Therefore, each team member may need to prune more negotiation space
and the joint list of forbidden unpredictable partial offers will be larger than the list
constructed with lower reservation utilities. In fact, if team members set very high
aspirations with their reservation utility, it may end up with all the negotiation
space being pruned. However, if an agreement is found under these conditions, it
may lead to team members achieving high levels of utility.
In this experiment, we test the impact of having different levels of reservation
utility on team performance. More specifically, as we did in Section 6.7.1, we
tested teams employing the Bayesian model against different families of strate-
gies: competitor (i.e., Agent K), matcher (i.e., Nice Tit-for-Tat), inverter (i.e.,
very boulware), and conceder (i.e., conceder). As an additional dimension to our
study, we also introduced preference similarity as in our first experiment. There-
fore, teams are tested in the scenario where team members’ preferences are very
dissimilar, the scenario where team members’ preferences have an average degree
of similarity, and the scenario where team members’ preferences are very simi-
lar. We configured three different types of Bayesian teams (i.e., teams composed
by Bayesian team members) with different levels of reservation utilities. First,
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Very Similar Average Similarity Very Dissimilar
RUai = 0.35 0.4% 11.6% 35.3%
RUai = 0.50 23.8% 34.2% 72.6%
RUai = 0.65 73.7% 81.8% 90.8%
Table 6.3: Average percentage of unpredictable partial offers pruned in the pre-
negotiation.
a Bayesian team with a relatively low reservation utility RUai = 0.35. Second,
a Bayesian team with a moderate reservation utility RUai = 0.5, and, finally, a
Bayesian team with a high reservation utility RUai = 0.65. These three types of
teams were faced in every scenario and negotiation case against every type of op-
ponent for 20 repetitions. We gathered information on the team joint utility and
the utility obtained by the opponent, and an ANOVA (α = 0.05) with Bonferroni
post-hoc analysis was carried out to determine results that are statistically better
than the rest.
Table 6.3 shows the average percentage of unpredictable partial offers that
were pruned in the pre-negotiation depending on the team configuration and team
preference similarity. According to this table, it can be observed that as team
dissimilarity increases, the number of unpredictable partial offers that are pruned
in the pre-negotiation also increases. Since team members’ preferences are grad-
ually more dissimilar, the list of unpredictable partial offers shared with the team
mediator by each team member tends to be more different from the rest of lists
shared by other teammates. Thus, when joining all of the lists it is just natural
that more unpredictable partial offers are pruned. The experiment shows that as
reservation utilities for team members increase, the tendency is to prune more
negotiation space. If team members play excessively high reservation utilities, this
may effectively result in leaving no room at all for negotiation by pruning all the
negotiation space.
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Very Similar
Agent K Nice Tit-for-Tat Very Boulware Conceder
T. Joint Op. T. Joint Op. T. Joint Op. T. Joint Op.
RUai = 0.35 0.195 0.760 0.117 0.799 0.160 0.761 0.526 0.493
RUai = 0.50 0.263 0.690 0.164 0.746 0.224 0.574 0.557 0.472
RUai = 0.65 0.350 0.619 0.286 0.667 0.354 0.634 0.635 0.431
Average Similarity
Agent K Nice Tit-for-Tat Very Boulware Conceder
T. Joint Op. T. Joint Op. T. Joint Op. T. Joint Op.
RUai = 0.35 0.167 0.651 0.090 0.758 0.136 0.667 0.342 0.440
RUai = 0.50 0.248 0.583 0.158 0.669 0.224 0.574 0.390 0.414
RUai = 0.65 0.242 0.402 0.268 0.535 0.313 0.493 0.470 0.378
Very Dissimilar
Agent K Nice Tit-for-Tat Very Boulware Conceder
T. Joint Op. T. Joint Op. T. Joint Op. T. Joint Op.
RUai = 0.35 0.193 0.577 0.115 0.661 0.173 0.568 0.373 0.408
RUai = 0.50 0.209 0.457 0.196 0.559 0.271 0.489 0.475 0.367
RUai = 0.65 0.068 0.091 0.346 0.459 0.409 0.408 0.580 0.331
Table 6.4: Average joint Utility (T. Joint) and average opponent Utility (Op) for
teams composed by Bayesian team members with different reservation utilities.
Table 6.4 shows the results of this experiment in terms of the average joint util-
ity and the average opponent utility. A bold font style is used to highlight those
Bayesian team configurations that are statistically the best option against each
opponent. It can be observed that despite the degree of disimilarity among team
members’ preferences, in this experimental setting team members obtained statis-
tically better team joint utility by setting high reservation utilities. This pattern
arose against Nice Tit-for-Tat, Very Boulware and Conceder opponents. Never-
theless, when facing Agent K, this pattern could only be observed when team
members’ preferences are very similar or they have an average similarity. As pref-
erence dissimilarity increased, we can observe how setting a high reservation utility
(i.e., RUai = 0.65) gradually becomes the worst possible course of action (from
the options studied) when facing Agent K. The reason for this behavior is mainly
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explained due to the increase in the number of failed negotiations. If we observe
the very similar scenario, the number of failed negotiations when facing Agent K
and RUai = 0.65 is 1.6%. If we change to average similarity scenarios, the number
of failed negotiations is 34.2% when facing Agent K with RUai = 0.65. The same
measure is increased to 81.8% in the very dissimilar scenario. Recalling what we
observed in Table 6.3, as team dissimilarity increases, the number of unpredictable
partial offers to be pruned is larger. This leaves less negotiation space to be played
with Agent K. Differently from Very Boulware, Conceder, and Nice Tit-for-Tat,
Agent K is a competitor agent that attempts to concede as less as possible by
estimating the maximum utility that can be obtained from the opponent and em-
ploying a limit of compromise when the opponent takes a hard stance. First of
all, if reservation utilities are high, it can be considered that team members play
a hard stance. Second, if too much negotiation space is pruned, it may be feasi-
ble that the set of remaining unpredictable partial offers precludes Agent K from
reaching its limit of compromise. Thus, employing such a configuration against a
competitor agent like Agent K may result, as we have observed in practice, in an
increase in the number of failed negotiations. In the case of the opponent utility,
it is always maximized when the team sets low reservation values. This is natural
since, in the end, team members will concede more and any type of opponent can
take advantage from this situation.
In conclusion, we have observed that generally team members may benefit from
playing high reservation utilities against conceders, inverters, and matchers. How-
ever, if faced against competitors like Agent K, setting high reservation utilities
may prune too much negotiation space, especially when team members are very
dissimilar. This results in negotiation spaces that may not contain the minimum
limits established by competitor agents, thus, ending negotiations with failure. In
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general, team members should be cautious when setting the reservation utility
since it may end up in more negotiation failures.
6.8 Conclusions
In this chapter we have presented an extension to FUM which tackles domains
with unpredictable issues. This allows us to tackle a wide variety of negotiation
scenarios in electronic commerce. The extension is capable of assuring unani-
mously acceptable agreements for all of the team members. It takes advantage of
the categorization of negotiation issues as predictable and compatible, and unpre-
dictable. We have proposed two different types of team members for the current
model: a basic team member that proposes unpredictable partial offers during the
negotiation solely guided by its own utility function, and a Bayesian team member
that suggests unpredictable partial offers based on the preferences of the team and
the preferences of the opponent.
Results have shown that, as long as preferential conflict is present in the team,
team members have a incentive to employ the Bayesian strategy over the basic
strategy. Additionally, we have shown that in absence of information regarding
which party gives more importance to unpredictable issues, Bayesian team mem-
bers should give the same importance to the team’s preferences and the opponent’s
preferences over giving more importance to the team’s preferences. Finally, we
have also shown that team members may benefit from playing higher reservation
utilities against several types of agents like conceders, matchers and inverters. Nev-
ertheless, setting high reservation utilities may become the worst option as team





As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, the main goal of this work is pro-
viding negotiation models for complex negotiations in multi-agent systems. More
especifically, we set as goals of this thesis the design of a negotiation model for Am-
bient Intelligence domains and the design of negotiation models for the novel topic
of agent-based negotiation teams. The latter refers to groups of persons/agents
that join together as a single negotiation party because they share a common in-
terest at the negotiation at hand. In the following section, we outline how this
thesis has contributed to the resolution of the aforementioned goals.
7.1 Contributions
The main contributions of this thesis are the following:
• We reviewed the state-of-the-art in automated negotiation from the point
of view of Artificial Intelligence. A special emphasis was put to analyze
which current negotiation models are more convenient for Ambient Intelli-
gence due to the specifities of the domain: scarce computational resources,
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the dynamicity of the system, and limited computation time. The analysis
allowed us to identify that from the point of view of negotiation in Ambient
Intelligence, the use of time-based concession tactics, the use of complex and
interdependent utility functions for representing agents’ preferences, and the
use of similarity heuristics and genetic algorithms as learning mechanisms
may be more adequate for Ambient Intelligence.
• We proposed a negotiation model for Ambient Intelligence domains that is
applicable to bilateral negotiations which employ a k-alternating offer pro-
tocol. Each agent employs genetic algorithms during the pre-negotiation to
sample good and significantly different offers for oneself. During the nego-
tiation, agents propose offers from the iso-utility curve that are the most
similar ones to the last offers received from the opponent. Additionally, each
agent uses genetic operators over one’s good own offers and offers received
from the opponent in order to sample new offers that are interesting for both
parties. The results show that the proposed negotiation model is capable of
obtaining statistically equivalent results to negotiation models that sample
the whole negotiation domain while sampling a significantly lower number
of negotiation offers. This is significantly important for Ambient Intelligence
domains, since it certainly reduces the amount of computational resources
employed in the negotiation.
• We also contributed with a general worflow of negotiation tasks for agent-
based negotiation teams. The workflow aims to identify the tasks that may
help agent-based negotiation teams to reach success in negotiations. Each of
the tasks is analyzed and related with current research that is being carried
out in multi-agent systems and Artificial Intelligence. On top of that, the
analysis also goes further and it points out those unsolved problems that may
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appear in each of the phases due to the specific characteristics of agent-based
negotiation teams.
• From the proposed workflow tasks, we have focused on proposing intra-team
strategies, which govern team dynamics during the negotiation. More specif-
ically, we explored the space of intra-team strategies for negotiation teams
whose team members have different preferences. We analyzed intra-team
strategies for team members in domains exclusively composed by compatible
and predicatable negotiation issues: the representative intra-team strategy,
the similarity simple voting intra-team strategy, the similarity borda voting
intra-team strategy, and the full unanimity mediated intra-team strategy.
Each of the aforementioned intra-team strategies is capable of guaranteeing
different levels of unanimity regarding team decisions: no unanimity, major-
ity/plurality, semi-unanimity, and strict unanimity. The different intra-team
strategies are analyzed under different environmental conditions (e.g., dead-
line lengths, intra-team conflict, team size, etc.) and those intra-team strate-
gies that perform better are identified. We have been able to identify that
depending on the environmental conditions and the team’s goal (e.g., aver-
age utility of team members, mininum utility of team members, number of
rounds, etc.), some intra-team strategies work better than other intra-team
strategies. Thus, environmental conditions play a key role in the selection
of the strategy to be carried out during the negotiation.
• Additionally, we extended the full unanimity mediated intra-team strategy
to tackle domains with compatible and predictable issues, and unpredictable
issues. The extesions is capable of guaranteeing that if an agreement is found,
it is unanimously acceptable among team members. The implementation of
this framework has been carried out in genius, which allows us to (i) use a
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wide variety of opponent agents; (ii) facilitate research on agent-based nego-
tiation teams by other scholars, and even give room to a future negotiating
competition involving teams. The performance of the model has been tested
in some enviromental conditions, and we have been able to observe how such
conditions affect the performance of the different model configurations. Ad-
ditionally, we have been able to show that the proposed extension performs
statistically better than other intra-team strategies in domains with both
types of issues.
7.2 Future Work
Due to the novelty of the topic, agent-based negotiation teams is the area of
research that, as of today, possibly remains more unexplored and with vast oppor-
tunities for new research. With respect to negotiation in the Ambient Intelligence
domain, we consider that there are still interesting areas that should be researched
in the future. Next, we describe some of the future lines of work that we consider
as potentially interesting for future research:
• As introduced in the general workflow of tasks presented in Chapter 4, several
tasks should be carried out by negotiation teams during the pre-negotiation.
These pre-negotiation tasks have been largely unexplored by multi-agent
literature and compose a critical problem since factors like team formation,
understanding the negotiation domain, and selecting a proper negotiation
protocol may have an important impact on team performance during the
negotiation. Thus, we consider that future work in negotiation teams should
also explore team tasks carried out in the pre-negotiation.
• In Chapter 1 we commented that one of the reasons to employ a nego-
tiation team is gathering together individuals with different expertise and
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complementary skills. When the negotiation domain is complex, it requires
of different knowledge areas and skills in order to be tackled successfully.
Thus, if agent-based negotiation teams are to participate in complex nego-
tiations, different expertise, complementary skills, and proper coordination
mechanisms are needed. This is a scenario that we have not studied in this
thesis, where we have focused on negotiation teams which are composed by
team members with different preferences.
• In this thesis, it was proved that environmental conditions may affect the
performance of different intra-team strategies. In fact, the optimal intra-
team strategy from a given intra-team strategy may vary according to the
environmental conditions. Thus, negotiation teams should select the cur-
rent intra-team strategy according to such information. We argue that a
counselor agent may help team members to select the optimal intra-team
strategy. The counselor agent would observe for changes in the environment
and also attempt to learn the strategies employed by opponents given those
environmental conditions. Based on this information, team necessities, and
the results of simulations like the ones carried out in this thesis, the coun-
selor agent may be able to advise teams on which intra-team strategies would
work better.
• As stated in Chapter 6, the team mediator may employ the information on
forbidden unpredictable partial offers to detect whether or not unanimously
acceptable agreements are possible among team members and to form nego-
tiation teams with lower degrees of intra-team conflict. We are interested on
designing mechanisms that allow us to employ such information for success-
fully forming negotiation teams.
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• At some points of this thesis, we have discussed about the possibility for some
opponent agents and some competitor agents to infiltrate the negotiation
team. These agents aim to sabotage the negotiation teams with different
purposes and methods. The consequences of such manipulations may be
very negative for teams (e.g., very expensive deals). Therefore, one of our
concerns and future lines of work is the design of mechanisms (e.g., trust
and reputation) or intra-team strategies (i.e., full unanimity mediated in
the case of manipulations carried out by opponent agents) that are robust
against these types of manipulations.
• As we have observed in this thesis, intra-team conflict with regards to team
members’ preferences is one of the factors that affects team performance the
most. As we also discussed, the formation of negotiation teams has special
considerations that should be addressed like social power over sellers, the so-
cial network of team members, the skill distribution among team members,
and so forth. Another important issue to be considered is the dynamicity of
the multi-agent system. For instance, in Ambient Intelligence domains, users
may enter and leave the system very quickly, resulting is a more challenging
scenario for negotiation team formation. Therefore, we think that, due to
the aforementioned reasons, negotiation team formation is a topic worthy of
being researched. As a case of study we could think of a ubiquitous mall
where users with similar needs are grouped together in order to take advan-
tage of group discounts. In this scenario, we would be able to contribute
in the state-of-the-art of agent-based negotiation teams and negotiation in
Ambient Intelligence.
Along the aforementioned research issues that may be worthy of being re-
searched in the future, we have identified some potential scenarios that may be
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supported by some of the technologies developed in this thesis:
• Even though there are some works in the area of human negotiation teams,
the topic remains uncovered with respect to dyadic negotiations. One of
the reasons for this issue is the fact that team dynamics are hard to study
by social scientists, and experiments with human negotiation teams require
more economic efforts. In that sense, computational models that mimic hu-
man negotiation teams may help social scientists. Firstly, simulations with
computational models are cheap and it may allow social scientists to ini-
tially explore several scenarios before expending vast economic resources.
Secondly, computational models can be employed as substitutes for human
participants, which may also save economic resources for social scientists.
And lastly, but not the least important, computational models can be used
to train real negotiators in several scenarios. With respect to computational
models for human negotiation teams, we are currently working in compu-
tational models that take into account cultural factors in negotiation team
dynamics (164).
• The Smart Grid is the next generation electricity distribution grid. The
grid abases its functioning on information networks that allow customers
and sellers to purchase/sell energy intelligently. Those decisions may be
based on consumption peaks, user requirements, energy saving policies, and
so forth. We think that agent-based negotiation teams may be employed in
these networks to gather together groups of consumers or groups of sellers.
In the first case, groups of buyers with similar characteristics (e.g., similar
energetic needs, physical proximity, etc.) may form groups which allow them
to take advantage from buying at bulk. In the second case, groups of small
green energy producers may form a virtual power plant, which may allow
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to provide a notable amount of energy. This may result in green energy
producers being able to compete more fairly with big producers. Therefore,
we consider that applying agent-based negotiation teams in the smart grid
is a potentially interesting scenario.
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ing. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 40(2):239–270,
2011. 102, 103
[136] P. Everaere, S. Konieczny, P. Marquis, et al. The
strategy-proofness landscape of merging.
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 28(1):49–
105, 2007. 103
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